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In the post-Cold War era many closed or fully authoritarian regimes experienced 
massive changes and transitions. It is important to note that many of these regimes did 
not transition toward democracy. Instead, we witnessed the proliferation of hybrid 
regimes, regimes that have both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. In this 
study, I examine the emergence of a specific type of hybrid regime, electoral 
authoritarianism. The central argument of this study is that electoral authoritarianism is 
closely associated with violent histories of regime change, or what I call violent origins. 
Violent origins refer to revolutions, military coups, and civil wars. Violent origins do not 
have liberalizing effects. The effects of violent origins contribute to the durability of 
authoritarian practices. In essence, the effects of violent origins prevent regimes from 
fully liberalizing into democracies. The result is the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. I find support for this argument through quantitative analyses of 108 
cases and illustrative case studies of Nicaragua during the Sandinista era and Paraguay 
during Alfredo Stroessner’s tenure. In addition, other competing explanations are 
examined. The results of this study reveal that there is a fairly ambiguous relationship 
between economic development and the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. 
Additionally, the results reveal that the emergence of electoral authoritarianism is tied to 
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The end of the Cold War brought great transformation to political regimes around 
the world. Many closed authoritarian regimes experienced transitions in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s in areas throughout Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. 
It is important to make clear, however, that many of these transitions did not lead directly 
to democracy. Instead, many closed or fully authoritarian regimes transitioned into hybrid 
regimes. The literature on hybrid regimes is relatively nascent, but there is a deep 
understanding about what the concept is.  
The concept of a hybrid regime lies in a gray zone between closed 
authoritarianism on the one hand and consolidated democracy on the other hand. 
Carothers (2002) calls this spectrum the gray zone of “hybrid regimes.” Many scholars 
use different terminology: semidemocracy (Smith 2005), semiauthoritarianism (Ottaway 
2003), semidictatorship (Brooker 2000), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 
2002) and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006).1 While there is some differentiation 
in such concepts, they all essentially describe regimes that have both democratic and 
autocratic characteristics. Classifying political regimes on a continuum that ranges from 
																																																						
 
1 This is not an exhaustive list of terms; there are undoubtedly more. This list 
illustrates several of the common terms though.  
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closed authoritarianism to democracy has greater rigor and is more satisfactory in theory. 
Terms such as hybrid regimes capture the defining features of such regimes, namely their 
autocratic and democratic features.  
The focus of this study is to analyze the emergence of hybrid regimes. This study 
examines the emergence of a specific type of hybrid regime: electoral authoritarianism. 
Electoral authoritarian regimes hold elections that allow opposition parties and are 
somewhat competitive. Electoral authoritarian regimes, however, are not fully 
democratic. Elections occur under the influence of authoritarian practices. Though not 
massive, repression persists. Often, incumbents have massive advantages over opposition 
parties, which results in minimally competitive elections. Although such regimes existed 
prior to the 1990s, electoral authoritarian regimes have proliferated in the post-Cold War 
era. By my count, more than 56 countries experienced transitions into electoral 
authoritarianism in the post-Cold War era. The goal of this study is to identify the factors 
that account for the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. 
While much has been written on the characteristics of electoral authoritarian 
regimes, far less has been written about why and how such regimes emerge in the first 
place. The aim of this study is to examine why closed or fully authoritarian regimes 
transition into electoral authoritarian regimes. One related question that needs to be 
addressed pertains to why fully authoritarian regimes allow competitive elections. 
Another equally important question pertains to why autocratic practices remain despite 
liberalization. To answer these questions, we have to examine the factors that contribute 
to the durability of autocratic practices. In other words, we have to assess why in lieu of 
some liberalization, full democratization does not occur. Why do authoritarian practices 




Questions about the emergence of electoral authoritarianism stem from both a 
puzzling observation and a research gap that scholars have not fully delved into. Many 
scholars argue electoral authoritarianism proliferated due to the constraints and incentives 
of the post-Cold War international environment (Levitsky and Way 2010, 16-20). 
However, these scholars do not systematically examine these “constraints and incentives” 
closely. Equally important is the puzzling fact that while some closed authoritarian 
regimes transitioned into electoral authoritarianism, others remained fully closed or 
transitioned straight into democracies. What explains this variation? Why did some 
authoritarian regimes transition while others did not? The main goal of this dissertation is 
to provide some insight on these questions.  
 
Brief Explanation of the Argument and Findings 
	
The central argument of this study is that electoral authoritarian transitions are 
associated with violent origins. Though it is certainly not the only variable, I find that 
electoral authoritarianism is closely associated with violent histories of regime change, or 
what I call violent origins. In the context of this study, violent origins refer to revolutions, 
military coups, and civil wars. I find evidence that electoral authoritarian regimes are 
more likely to rise out of countries that have experienced revolutions, military coups, and 
civil wars. I find support for this through quantitative analysis or large number-of-cases 
analysis (large-N) and the use of case studies. Violent origins are not associated with 
electoral authoritarianism because they have liberalizing effects. Quite the opposite. In 
fact, I find that regimes with violent origins are less likely to fully democratize. Violent 
origins are associated with electoral authoritarianism because they contribute to the 
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durability of authoritarianism. History has shown us that some of the longest tenured and 
closed authoritarian regimes have had a violent origin (e.g., Vietnam, China, Cuba). Still, 
why are violent origins connected to electoral authoritarianism? 
The emergence of electoral authoritarianism is tied to two crucial factors. First, 
liberalization must occur. Transition from closed authoritarianism to electoral 
authoritarianism requires liberalizing reforms in a state. Nonetheless, these liberalizing 
reforms do not lead to full democratization. This brings us to the second crucial factor, 
authoritarian durability. In this context, authoritarian durability refers to how durable or 
robust the means of autocratic practices are within any given state. For example, can the 
regime still rely on the state’s repressive apparatus (military or security forces). 
Additionally, is there enough regime cohesion and organization for the ruling regime to 
employ repressive practices. When liberalizing reforms occur, authoritarian practices still 
linger in states with authoritarian durability. Hence, states that have high authoritarian 
durability are less likely to fully democratize. Instead, these states may likely liberalize to 
the point of electoral authoritarianism. The collision of these two factors leads to a state 
that implements democratic reforms but still retains authoritarian practices. In short, 
liberalization activates the transition out of closed authoritarianism, but authoritarian 
durability inhibits the transition to full democracy. 
This explanation for the emergence of electoral authoritarianism draws some 
major questions. For example, why does liberalization occur? Why do closed 
authoritarian regimes liberalize in the first place? Most closed authoritarian regimes do 
not voluntarily liberalize unless they are influenced or pressured to do so. The urgency to 
liberalize can come from several sources. International influences or domestic 
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grumblings can pressure regimes to liberalize. However, in this study I find solid 
evidence that international influences and pressures cause many regimes to implement 
liberalizing reforms. In many instances, liberalization is imposed on regimes. Many 
regimes can certainly withstand international pressures or thwart domestic grumblings; 
therefore, they stay fully closed without any intention of liberalizing. However, other 
regimes do not have enough leverage to avoid liberalization; therefore, these regimes 
may begrudgingly liberalize due to international and domestic pressures. Still, many of 
these regimes stay in power because they have the ability to manipulate democratic 
reforms in their favor. Regimes can satisfy the pressures to liberalize while maintaining 
power and dominance at the same time. In order to accomplish this, however, regimes 
must employ authoritarian practices. This leads us to questions about authoritarian 
durability.     
One major question associated with the emergence of electoral authoritarianism 
pertains to what factors contribute to authoritarian durability. The concept of 
authoritarian durability invites us to explore why some states have more aspects of 
authoritarian durability than others. Put differently, why is it that some authoritarian 
states fully democratize in the face of liberalizing pressures, while other authoritarian 
states only allow some liberal openings and still maintain power. I argue that regimes that 
arise out of violent origins are more likely to maintain stout authoritarian practices. As I 
will expound upon in the rest if this dissertation, violent origins have several causal 
mechanisms that contribute to authoritarian durability.  
First, regimes that arise from violent origins have a strong capacity for repression. 
A tenacious repressive state apparatus allows the regime to employ authoritarian 
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practices. Secondly, regimes that arise from violent origins are also likely to enjoy strong 
regime cohesion. This cohesion is maintained by durable partisan identities that were 
reinforced during the violent conflicts of the regime’s origins. Lastly, regimes that arise 
from violent origins may even gain legitimacy from the masses if they can bring stability 
to a country fresh off a violent conflict. If legitimacy cannot be attained, many regimes 
can at least receive initial tolerance. Initial sentiments of legitimacy or tolerance allow the 
regime time to construct a highly capable state apparatus that facilitates authoritarian 
durability. These effects vary case by case, but these effects are certainly a contributing 
factor to the emergence of electoral authoritarianism.   
 To summarize, violent origins contribute to the durability of authoritarian 
practices. The notion of violent origins helps to explain why authoritarian practices linger 
and liberalizing regimes do not fully democratize. Regimes are often pressured or 
influenced to liberalize. Although some regimes may not have the leverage to fully 
withstand liberalizing pressures, they still have enough authoritarian durability to 
maintain power in the face of democratic reforms. A violent origin is not the only factor 
that contributes to the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Violent origins are also 
not a prerequisite to electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism can emerge 
from regimes without violent origins. There are a number of reasons why electoral 
authoritarianism may emerge.  
In this study, I also examine other competing explanations or factors that may 
affect the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Through this analysis, I find several 
other findings that may have implications on future research endeavors. One explanation 
for the emergence of electoral authoritarianism draws from more recent literature that 
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connects liberalization to international factors. I find evidence that liberalization in fully 
closed authoritarian regimes is closely associated with international factors or the nature 
of the international environment. Large-N analysis reveals that the post-Cold War era 
was indeed associated with the proliferation of electoral authoritarianism. The large-N 
analysis also reveals that Western influence and pressures affect the likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism. The case studies examined in this study also support this 
assertion. The case studies reveal that US pressure and influence played a role in 
transitions toward electoral authoritarianism. The evidence found in this study leads me 
to conclude that international variables have an important influence on the emergence of 
electoral authoritarianism. 
The other competing explanation draws upon a classic line of literature that links 
democratization with development. Past literature has closely examined how 
democratization is affected by development and modernization. However, this theoretical 
framework has usually been applied to transitions into full democracies. In this study, I 
analyze the relationship between economic development and the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. The findings in this study reveal that there is an ambiguous relationship 
between electoral authoritarianism and economic development. Through large-N 
analysis, I find no evidence that economic development is closely associated with 
electoral authoritarianism. These findings are certainly not conclusive, and future 
research endeavors should delve more deeply into the relationship between economic 
development and electoral authoritarianism. 
This study has several implications. The concept of violent origins is promising 
and deserves attention in future research endeavors. This study contributes to the 
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literature of hybrid regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes. More importantly, this 
study provides insights into a research gap that the literature has surprisingly not 
adequately addressed: what causes the emergence of electoral authoritarianism? 
Additionally, since this research focuses on transitions from closed authoritarianism, this 
study contributes to the literature of regime change and democratization. Understanding 
transitions from closed authoritarianism into hybrid regimes will provide many insights 
on democratization, since hybrid regime transitions are often a precursor to full 
democratization (Brownlee 2008). This study also contributes to literature that examines 
the international realm of liberalization. This study also provides some insights into 
several other classic questions. Consider for example that this study inherently examines 
the features of authoritarian durability, or why some regimes endure while others 
collapse. Additionally, this study provides some insights on important questions. Does 
Western democracy promotion work? Does economic development increase the 
likelihood of liberalization? 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
closely examines the concept of hybrid regimes. This section briefly focuses on the 
literature and history of the concept. Following this, I present a section with a detailed 
discussion on electoral authoritarianism. Although electoral authoritarianism is a type of 
hybrid regime, the concept has clear defining guidelines. Afterward, the concept of a 
violent origin is discussed in detail. This section addresses what a violent origin is and 
how some of its characteristics can vary. Finally, the last section of this chapter outlines 
the plan of this dissertation.  
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What Are Hybrid Regimes? 
	
This section takes a more detailed look at the concept of hybrid regimes and the 
existing literature. The concept of hybrid regimes must begin with a discussion about 
democracy. Robert Dahl’s (1971) conception of democracy or polyarchy requires 
institutions that ensure government policies are shaped by votes and the preferences of 
citizens. Polyarchy not only requires free, fair and competitive elections, but also requires 
freedoms that make such elections meaningful (i.e., freedom of expression and 
organization). In contrast, Joseph Schumpeter takes a minimalist approach when it comes 
to his definition of democracy. For Schumpeter, positions of power must be filled 
“through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1942, 269). Samuel 
Huntington contends that a system is democratic when “its most powerful collective 
decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes” (Huntington 1991, 7). Hybrid regimes have some of 
these democratic elements, yet these regimes engage in authoritarian practices so 
frequently that they cannot be labeled as democracies.  
 In brief, hybrid regimes have both authoritarian characteristics and democratic 
characteristics. However, hybrid regimes still differ greatly from fully authoritarian 
regimes and democracies. In comparison to fully/closed authoritarian regimes, hybrid 
regimes implement elections. While elections may not be implemented or just exist as 
façades in fully authoritarian regimes, they are generally competitive in hybrid regimes. 
In many circumstances elections also serve as a legitimate vehicle to gain power in 
hybrid regimes. Additionally, in terms of competition, one defining feature of hybrid 
regimes is the existence of parliamentary opposition and opposition parties that have an 
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electoral chance. Again, in fully/closed authoritarian regimes parliament is usually a 
façade. In contrast, opposition parties are more likely to be competitive in hybrid 
regimes. Legislatures can function as potential platforms for the opposition, although 
hybrid regime legislatures can also be relatively weak. Even with these democratic 
elements, hybrid regimes cannot be called democracies because incumbent regimes 
utilize authoritarian practices. Quite often, civil liberties are limited and incumbents may 
implement authoritarian practices to curtail both civil liberties and political rights. In 
addition, incumbent regimes use authoritarian practices to gain an electoral advantage 
over the opposition. With regard to hybrid regimes, Andreas Schedler (2006) argues that 
while elections serve as a means to democratic governance, they also serve as an 
instrument of authoritarian control.  
Although authoritarian practices differ on a case-by-case basis, in hybrid regimes, 
the ultimate goal of the incumbent regime is to stay in power and have some form of 
control in the electoral arena. Creating an uneven electoral playing field is one way to 
stay in power. An uneven electoral playing field is one in which state institutions are 
widely abused for partisan ends (Levitsky and Way 2010). An uneven electoral playing 
field limits the opposition’s ability to organize and compete. The incumbent is 
systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and the opposition’s ability to 
compete is seriously handicapped (Levitsky and Way 2010).  
There are three important factors that lead to an uneven playing field: resource 
disparities, unequal access to the media, and unequal access to the law (Levitsky and 
Way 2010, 58). First, incumbents have direct access to state resources and such resources 
can be appropriated for their electoral efforts. The opposition can be disenfranchised 
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through subtle means such as the manipulation of electoral rolls and moving voting sites 
or inexplicably moving voters to other districts that may be inaccessible (Case 2006, 
103). If voters are not disenfranchised, then the ruling regime may attempt to buy their 
votes. If vote buying fails, the regime can engage in voter intimidation and outright 
electoral fraud (Case 2006, 104). Local officials or local governments are used to 
coordinate vote fraud or steal votes (Way 2006). Some form of repression also limits the 
opposition. For instance, military and security organizations are used to intimidate the 
opposition or harass the opposition. Moreover, finance and tax officials may be used to 
harass the opposition’s financial donors and their businesses.  
Second, incumbents can disproportionately influence the media. The incumbent 
regime may receive more exposure throughout the media, especially if state sponsored 
media exists. In some instances, the media can be pressured into providing biased 
coverage of the opposition. Equally important, the incumbent regime can pressure the 
media to limit criticism of the government. Another authoritarian practice pertains to the 
fact that incumbents can influence the judiciary, electoral authorities, and other state 
officials. More importantly, such officials can be used as partisan tools against the 
opposition. In addition, leaders reserve important positions of power for important actors 
in the regime. Consider for example that legislative seats can be constitutionally reserved 
for powerful military members in Thailand (Case 2006, 100). This strategy allows the 
regime to keep the opposition from places of power. These advantages are crucial leading 
up to elections, but they are also crucial in between electoral periods since a deprived 
opposition is often unable to maintain organization (Levitsky and Way 2010, 62). These 
authoritarian practices are the main reason why hybrid regimes are not labeled 
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democracies. It is also important to note that not all hybrid regimes are on an inevitable 
path to full democratization.   
Another important issue to the study of hybrid regimes is that they are not always 
“transitional” regimes headed towards democracy. Much of the post-Cold War thinking 
centered around the notion of “waves” and “reverse waves” of democracy. The notion of 
“waves” was conceptualized by Samuel Huntington who argued that many countries 
embraced democracy in a particular period or a wave of democracy. Illustratively and 
figuratively, a wave propels countries forward; some countries ride the wave to dry land 
and develop as democracies while others float back into a nondemocratic sea as the wave 
recedes (Ottaway 2003, 9). The hope is that the latter countries will be pushed to land by 
the next wave of democracy in the future. It is important to note that most countries who 
failed to the reach shore are not failed democracies, but rather, they are countries that 
rode the wave as far as they wanted and managed to stop. Such regimes may have 
deliberately implemented democratic features while also keeping autocratic features 
(Ottaway 2003, 9). 
The concept of hybrid regimes challenges “transitional” thinking, or the notion 
that most regimes will eventually transition to democracy. Generally speaking, 
democratization is viewed as a three-phase process which includes liberalization or a 
political opening in an authoritarian regime; followed by a transition to power, which 
may be accomplished through elections; finally, consolidation occurs and democratic 
institutions are strengthened and a democratic culture is deepened. Hybrid regimes 
challenge this mode of thinking because liberalization or a transition phase may be seen 
as the end. 
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There are several crucial questions about hybrid regimes. How do they form? Do 
hybrid regimes arise purposefully or are they the result of conflict and compromise? 
Larry Diamond provides some insights on hybrid regimes. Diamond contends that 
virtually all hybrid regimes in the world are quite deliberately “pseudodemocratic,” 
meaning that the existence of formal democratic institutions often mask the reality of 
authoritarian domination (2002, 24). Diamond also notes that while opposition victory is 
not impossible, it certainly requires a level of mobilization, unity, and skill that is far 
beyond the requirement for victory in a true democracy (2002, 24). Other scholars 
provide some insight as to nature of hybrid regimes. 
Maria Ottaway labels hybrid regimes as “semiauthoritarian” regimes. Ottaway 
defines semiauthoritarian regimes as systems that combine the “rhetorical acceptance of 
liberal democracy” with illiberal or authoritarian traits (2003, 3). Such regimes will have 
formal democratic institutions and may uphold a limited sphere of civil and political 
liberties. Nevertheless, incumbent governments in such regimes are in limited danger of 
losing power because as Ottaway notes, such incumbents “know how to play the 
democracy game and still retain control” (2003, 6). This is to say that semiauthoritarian 
regimes are not failed democracies or democracies in transition, but rather, they are 
regimes that are carefully constructed and maintained. It is not in the interest of most 
leaders for their country to become more democratic since they stand to lose power. As 
Ottaway puts it, if semiauthoritarian systems had it their way, the regime would never 
change (2003, 7). 
Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarian regimes as:  
Civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely 
viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse 
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of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis the opposition. Such 
regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to 
contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field 
is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. (2010, 5)  
 
In essence, competitive authoritarian regimes refer to government regimes in which 
“competition is thus real but unfair” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). One major difference 
between Levitsky and Way’s conception of competitive authoritarianism and Ottaway’s 
conception of semiauthoritarianism is that Ottaway makes a claim that there is no way to 
challenge the power of incumbents or that competition is fiction in semiauthoritarian 
regimes (2003, 15). The opposite is true in the conception of competitive authoritarian 





Many scholars have focused on the concept of hybrid regimes. These scholars 
have their unique labels and conceptualizations for describing hybrid regimes, but overall 
a hybrid regime has both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. Generally, the 
democratic aspect entails democratic institutions implemented in the political regime 
(i.e., elections), while the authoritarian aspect entails the practices implemented by the 
governing regime. One of the challenges of this study relates to how the concept of 
hybrid regimes will be measured. In other words, how does one decide whether a political 
regime is in fact a hybrid regime? Admittedly, the study of hybrid regimes may also 
require the use of guidelines set by other scholars. However, for this study I will rely on 
Andreas Schedler’s conceptualization of a hybrid regime: electoral authoritarianism. 
Schedler defines electoral authoritarianism as a regime in which elections are 
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inclusive (universal suffrage), minimally pluralistic (opposition is allowed to participate), 
minimally competitive (incumbent dominated, but opposition wins votes and seats), and 
minimally open (opposition parties experience repressive treatment though not massive 
repression) (2006, 3). Schedler argues that although electoral authoritarian regimes 
establish elections as the official path to power, they do not make elections the “only 
game in town” (2006, 12). Ruling parties still seek to control the outcomes of electoral 
competition by seeking to navigate through democratic restrictions that would inhibit 
their quest for votes (Schedler 2006, 12). Table 1.1 illustrates notable examples of 
countries that have experienced electoral authoritarianism.  
Some scholars note that within the concept of electoral authoritarian regimes there 
are two electoral contexts: hegemonic regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes 
(Donno 2013; Schedler 2013). Electoral misconduct by the incumbent, a defining trait of 
electoral authoritarianism, is still widespread in both types of regimes, but the regimes 
differ when it comes to the political strength of the ruling regime. Daniela Donno finds 
that in hegemonic regimes the incumbent or the ruling party enjoys overwhelming 
electoral dominance (i.e., usually winning more than 70-75% of the vote or seat share) 
(2013, 703). This is in contrast to competitive authoritarian regimes, in which the 
opposition parties pose greater electoral challenges and win a larger share of the votes 
(Donno 2013, 703). The two regimes may also differ in material capabilities. Hegemonic 
regimes tend to have more extensive patronage networks that are sustained through rich 
access to resources (e.g., natural resource wealth, state-controlled economy) (Donno 
2013, 707). In addition, several studies find that the probability of a democratic transition 
is closely related to the regime’s prior electoral dominance; competitive authoritarian  
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Table 1.1 Examples of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
  
Afghanistan  Albania 
Algeria Angola  
Armenia  Azerbaijan  
Bahrain  Bangladesh  
Belarus  Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Burkina Faso  Burundi  
Cambodia  Central African Republic 
Chad  Congo-Kinshasa  
Congo-Brazzaville  Djibouti  
Croatia  Ethiopia  
Egypt  Gabon  
Georgia  Ghana  
Guinea  Guinea-Bissau  
Guyana  Haiti  
Indonesia  Ivory Coast  
Jordan  Kazakhstan  
Kenya  Kyrgyzstan  
Lebanon  Lesotho  
Liberia  Macedonia  
Madagascar  Malawi  
Malaysia  Mauritania  
Moldova  Morocco  
Mozambique  Nicaragua  
Niger  Nigeria  
Panama  Paraguay  
Romania  Russia  
Sierra Leone  Singapore  
Sri Lanka  Tajikistan  
Tanzania  Taiwan  
Uganda   Tunisia  
Yemen  Ukraine  
Zimbabwe  Zambia   
   
 
   
 
17 
regimes are more likely to transition to democracy than hegemonic regimes (Brownlee 
2009; Roessler and Howard 2009). Donno (2013) finds that competitive authoritarian 
regimes are more likely to democratize when there is domestic and international pressure 
exerted on a weak ruling regime. Howbeit, if this pressure is absent, competitive 
authoritarian regimes are no more likely to lead to democracy than hegemonic regimes 
(Donno 2013, 714). 
These scholars have their unique labels and conceptualizations for describing 
hybrid regimes, but overall a hybrid regime has both democratic and authoritarian 
characteristics. Generally, the democratic aspect entails democratic institutions 
implemented throughout the state (e.g., elections), while the authoritarian aspect entails 
the practices implemented by the governing regime. In this study, I specifically study the 
emergence of electoral authoritarianism. My central argument is that violent origins 
increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism.   
 
What Are Violent Origins? 
When an electoral authoritarian regime arises in a state, its presence can be very 
tied to the nature of the state’s previous regime. I argue that there is a crucial relationship 
between an electoral authoritarian regime and the origins of the previous regime or the 
preceding regime. By origins, I am referring to how the preceding regime came into 
power. Was the preceding regime established as a result of elite splits? Did the preceding 
regime come to power through a military coup? A revolution? A civil war? Or perhaps 
the preceding regime came to power through legitimate electoral means. I argue that 
understanding the origins of a regime allows us some insight into how and why electoral 
authoritarian regimes emerge. 
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In some instances, electoral authoritarian regimes arise because the previous 
regime, which is often fully authoritarian, allows for the implementation of elections. 
However, even with the implementation of elections, autocratic practices remain, and the 
result is electoral authoritarianism. The emergence of electoral authoritarianism occurs in 
many contexts and from many different types of origins. Though there are many factors, I 
argue that the emergence of electoral authoritarianism is more likely to occur if the 
previous regime emerged in a violent context. This is to say that the emergence of 
electoral authoritarianism is often tied to what I call “violent origins.” In this study, a 
violent origin refers to a regime that came into power through violent means. Violent 
means are defined as a revolution, a civil war, an insurgency, or a military coup. Table 
1.2 presents examples of countries with violent origins. To more concretely understand 
the concept of violent origins let us consider some illustrative examples.  
First, consider a regime that arises through violent means, such as a revolution or a 
military coup. This regime becomes fully authoritarian and rules the state for x-amount of 
years. After x-amount of years this ruling regime implements democratic reforms, such as 
elections, and allows opposition groups to compete for legislative and executive office. 
Nevertheless, the ruling regime skews the electoral playing field and continues to employ 
autocratic practices that repress and hinder the success of opposition groups. Though 
elections bring the possibility of defeat, under such circumstances the ruling regime may 
continue to stay in power for x-amount of years. In this example, an electoral 
authoritarian regime emerged out of a previously closed or fully authoritarian regime. 
More importantly and in the context of this study, electoral authoritarianism emerged 
from a previous regime that had violent origins. 
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Revolutions, Insurgents, Civil Wars  
 
Algeria (1965) Angola (1976, 1991) 
Bangladesh (1975, 1981) Burundi (1987) 
Burkina Faso (1987) Cambodia (1975) 
Burundi (1976) Chad (1990) 
Central African Republic (1966, 1981) China (1949) 
Chad (1975) Congo, Democratic Rep. (1997) 
Chile (1973) Cuba (1959) 
Congo, Republic of (1963) Ethiopia (1992) 
Cote d’Ivoire (1999) Guinea-Bissau (1999) 
Egypt (1953) Haiti (2004) 
Georgia (1991) Iran (1979) 
Guinea (1984) Laos (1975) 
Guinea-Bissau (1980) Liberia (1997, 2003) 
Haiti (1989) Mozambique (1974) 
Indonesia (1965) Nicaragua (1979) 
Iraq (1968) Nigeria (1970) 
Lesotho (1986) Rwanda (1961, 1994) 
Liberia (1980) Somalia (1991) 
Libya (1969) Taiwan (1949) 
Mali (1968) Uganda (1986) 
Mauritania (1978, 2005) Vietnam (1975) 
Niger (1974) Zimbabwe (1980) 
Nigeria (1966, 1983)  
Panama (1982)  
Paraguay (1954, 1989)  
Rwanda (1973)  
Sierra Leone (1971, 1991)  
Somalia (1969)  
Sudan (1989)  
Syria (1970)  
Togo (1963)  
Uganda (1971)  
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Let us consider another illustrative example of what it means to have a violent 
origin. Suppose a regime arises through a form of violent means, such as a military coup. 
This newly formed regime does not become fully authoritarian, but instead implements 
elections. The implementation of elections, however, does not result in a state that is fully 
democratic. Instead, what results is a state in which the ruling incumbents skew the 
electoral playing field and employ other authoritarian practices to stay in power and win 
elections. In essence, electoral authoritarianism emerges directly out of a violent origin. 
Hence, the concept of a violent origin also applies when a new regime emerges out of 
violent means and soon afterwards becomes electoral authoritarian.  
It is important to note that these examples are just presented to illustrate the 
notion of a violent origin and how violent origins are tied to electoral authoritarianism. 
Furthermore, these examples are not a representation of how all electoral authoritarian 
regimes emerge. To be clear, not all regimes that have violent origins become electoral 
authoritarian. Moreover, violent origins are not a prerequisite needed for the emergence 
of electoral authoritarianism. However, I do argue that electoral authoritarianism is more 
likely to emerge precisely because of violent origins. In these violent origins we have the 
roots for durable authoritarian practices that linger and remain, even in states that 
liberalize and implement competitive elections.  
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 the literature on 
regime change is reviewed. This chapter examines our current understanding of how 
transitions from closed authoritarianism occur. This chapter also examines the 
relationship between economic development and democratization. Additionally, this 
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chapter also examines the relationship between democratization and international factors/ 
the international environment. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation. This chapter takes a close look at the causal mechanisms of violent origins. 
This chapter also delves into why fully authoritarian regimes liberalize and how autocrats 
can manipulate several advantages from liberalization. In Chapter 4, the methodology of 
this study is discussed. This chapter describes the construction of the dataset utilized in 
this study. Furthermore, this chapter explains how electoral authoritarianism is measured 
and classified in this study. The validity and reliability of this measurement are examined 
in this chapter. A discussion on the procedures of analysis, large-N analysis and case 
studies, is also presented in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 begins to cover the large-N analysis conducted in this study. 
Specifically, this chapter analyzes the relationship between electoral authoritarianism and 
economic development. This chapter also analyzes the relationship between electoral 
authoritarianism and international factors or the international environment. Chapter 6 also 
presents large-N analysis, but this chapter focuses on the central theme of this 
dissertation, the relationship between violent origins and electoral authoritarianism. This 
chapter analyzes how violent origins affect the presence of electoral authoritarianism.  
In Chapter 7 the case of Nicaragua is presented. This chapter examines Nicaragua 
under the rule of the Sandinistas (1979-1990). Nicaragua transitioned into electoral 
authoritarianism in the early 1980s and remained so until the country transitioned to full 
democracy in the 1990s. This case helps to illustrate the causal mechanisms of violent 
origins and the effects of international pressures and influence. Chapter 8 presents the 
case of Paraguay under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). Initially, the 
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Stroessner regime was fully authoritarian but eventually transitioned into electoral 
authoritarianism. This case also illustrates the causal mechanisms of violent origins and is 
helpful for understanding the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Chapter 9 is the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation. This chapter summarizes the main findings of this 
study. The implications of these findings are also discussed in this chapter. The potential 







































In order to understand how electoral authoritarianism (or other types of hybrid 
regimes) emerge, it is crucial to understand how regime change occurs. Specifically, it is 
important to understand how transitions away from closed authoritarianism materialize. It 
is also crucial to consider what recent literature has to say on democratization and 
transitions into electoral authoritarianism. The role of development is one of the 
quintessential explanations for democratization. Theories that address the relationship 
between economic development and democratization may provide crucial insights into 
the causal mechanisms of regime change. More recent literature has focused on the 
international dimension of regime change. At the heart of this literature is the claim that 
the nature of the international environment plays a crucial role in regime change, and 
more specifically, the proliferation of electoral authoritarianism. In the analyses portion 
of this study, the roles of both development and international factors are closely 
examined. Therefore, it is imperative that this literature is reviewed.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section of this chapter I 
review the literature on regime change. Specifically, I examine the variables that make 
authoritarian regimes more or less susceptible to regime change. Additionally, I examine 
the literature that focuses on how transitions occur or the regime transition process. In the 
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second section of this chapter the relationship between economic development and 
democratization is examined. An understanding of this literature may provide some 
insights into why electoral authoritarian regimes emerge. The third section of this chapter 
examines the relationship between international factors or the international environment 
and democratization. The emergence of electoral authoritarianism has recently been tied 
to the nature of the international environment (Levitsky and Way 2010); therefore, it is 
useful to examine this relationship. In the final section of this chapter, I provide a 
conclusion for this chapter that summarizes the major points of the existing literature.  
 
Regime Change in Closed Authoritarian States 
Explaining regime change is a complicated matter. Regime change can take place 
for any number of reasons: economic development, death in leadership, economic crisis, 
domestic pressures and/or foreign pressures. Taking this another step further, predicting 
regime change can be near impossible since transitions often depend upon complex 
interactions of actors, beliefs, and circumstances (Kuran 1991). Even still, the literature 
on regime change provides some useful insights on why regime change occurs and how 
regime change occurs. 
When focusing on regime change in authoritarian regimes, there are two 
important components. The first component pertains to susceptibility, or how susceptible 
an authoritarian regime is to a transition. In other words, authoritarian durability is crucial 
to understanding the emergence of hybrid regimes, particularly electoral authoritarianism. 
In this section, I discuss the domestic factors and variables that make authoritarian 
regimes more susceptible to transitions. While past literature has not specifically focused 
on which factors make authoritarian regimes more susceptible to electoral authoritarian 
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transitions, past literature provides many insights on what makes authoritarian regimes 
robust.  
The second component pertains to the transition process or how transitions occur. 
One of the assumptions of authoritarian transitions is that they occur in a set sequence of 
stages (Carothers 2002). First, there occurs an opening. For example, there are splits 
within the regime. After an opening, follows a breakthrough, or the collapse of the 
regime and the emergence of a new regime. After this, comes the process of regime 
consolidation. At this point, if the regime change was democratic in nature, democratic 
institutions are implemented. Many scholars have analyzed how transitions occur; some 
argue that transitions are negotiated by elites within the ruling regime and take an almost 
deliberate nature. Other scholars argue that transitions are noncooperative and are 
controlled by those that gain the support of the masses. When analyzing transitions into 
electoral authoritarianism, such insights provide the researcher with guidelines on what to 
examine. For this reason, this section discusses past literature on transitions from closed 
authoritarianism. 
 
Authoritarian Durability and Regime Change 
One important component of regime change pertains to how susceptible regimes 
are to regime change. The work of Barbara Geddes provides important insights on 
authoritarian durability. Geddes (1999) argues that single-party regimes are more stable 
than military regimes or personalistic dictatorships. With regard to military regimes, a 
group of military officers decide who will rule and who will have influence on policies 
(Geddes 1999, 121). In single-party regimes the ruling party dominates access to political 
office, though other parties may exist (Geddes 1999, 121). In a personalist regime, an 
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individual leader controls all of the power and the spoils of the office.   
Geddes finds that transitions from military regimes usually begin with splits 
within the ruling military elite. Geddes notes that most professional soldiers place a 
higher value on the survival and efficacy of the military than anything else (1999, 126). 
This is to say that most military officers will only agree to join coups if they believe that 
the civilian government prevents the achievement of the military’s goals. More 
importantly, they may join coups if they believe that the military’s institution is under 
threat (Geddes 1999, 126). Geddes notes that some military officers can easily intervene 
on the governing regime while others hesitate because of legal or constitutional 
ramifications; most officers, however, fall somewhere in the middle (1999, 126). For 
such reasons, the seeds of regime disintegration lie in the very nature of a military 
regime. 
Geddes argues that internal splits are more likely to occur because some officers 
want to stay in the barracks while others want government intervention. If intervention 
occurs, another split may occur among officers who want to stay in power and officers 
who want to go back to the barracks. For military officers there is usually life after 
regime disintegration since they can return to the barracks, sometimes with increased 
salaries and budgets made possible by nervous transitional governments (Geddes 1999, 
131). Geddes argues that because military regimes are more likely to negotiate orderly 
transitions, since they have the option of moving back to the barracks before a crisis is 
reached. 
While personalist regimes are less vulnerable to internal splits than military 
regimes, they are not as durable as single-party regimes. There are several reasons for 
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this. In personalist regimes political seats are formed from a network of friends, relatives, 
and allies that surround a leader. Personalist regimes rarely survive the death of their 
leader. Leadership succession is more difficult in personalist regimes. In order to survive, 
regime leaders usually eliminate followers that show high levels of ability, capacity, and 
ambition (Geddes 1999, 131). Another aspect that affects the durability of personalist 
regimes pertains to the relative narrowness of their support bases. When compared to a 
single party regime, the spoils or benefits of the office are given to a smaller proportion 
of citizens in a personalist regime. Moreover, since personalist regimes sustain the loyalty 
of their supporters through material rewards, they are more vulnerable to economic 
catastrophes. Therefore, Geddes argues that exogenous events (e.g., calamitous economic 
conditions) tend to disrupt the material underpinnings of personalist and single-party 
regimes (1999, 122). 
For Geddes single-party regimes are the most durable type of authoritarian 
regime. Within single-party regimes, rival factions have stronger incentives to cooperate 
with each other when compared to military regimes (Geddes 1999, 122). Unlike military 
regimes, in which some officers do not want to hold office, most party members simply 
want to stay in office. Geddes compares single party regimes to the staghunt game: 
everyone’s cooperation is needed to “kill the stag” or to stay in office. If anyone wanders 
off, it becomes more difficult to encircle a prey and everyone is worse off (Geddes 1999, 
129). Unlike personalistic regimes, single-party regimes can usually endure the death of 
founders and leaders. This is because the ruling party usually attempts to incorporate the 
loyalty, or at least the acquiescence of the most able and ambitious individuals in society 
(Geddes 1999, 134). Single-party regimes try to co-opt their opposition. In addition, 
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single-party regimes allow for greater participation without giving up dominant influence 
(Geddes 1999, 134). Along with Geddes, other scholars have looked at the sources of 
authoritarian durability. 
 Strong regime organization also contributes to authoritarian durability. Magaloni 
(2006) argues that parties enhance regime stability because they mobilize support that is 
critical to both deter challenges and defeat them when they arise. According to Jason 
Brownlee (2007) durable authoritarian regimes organize strong ruling parties by fostering 
elite cohesion. Magaloni (2008) and Svolik (2012) note that ruling parties enhance 
regime stability because they encourage elite cooperation over party defection. When 
governing parties are absent, elites seek power outside of the regime. Well-organized 
parties create opportunities for career advancement within the party.  
Brownlee (2007) notes that ruling parties generate a perception among elites and 
other power holders that their immediate and long-term goals can be best served by 
remaining within the party organization. This results in a perception of “collective 
security,” which enhances long-term cohesion and the maintenance of political stability 
(Brownlee 2007).1  Brownlee specifically focused on Egypt. Brownlee finds that Hosni 
Mubarak organized a party that alleviated conflicts among elites and made party 
membership the only vehicle to political success. Egyptian elites were offered seats in 
congress and other positions of leadership. In addition, conflict or splits among elites 
were kept at bay because the party institutionalized protocols for dealing with elite 
																																																						
 
1 Some argue that such institutionalized access to the spoils of public office is a 
weak source of cohesion (Slater 2010). Such parties discourage defection only during 
times of plenty: when the ruling party can guarantee career advancement and the spoils of 
public office. During crises, however, stability is more vulnerable. 
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conflicts (Brownlee 2007). Brownlee’s main conclusion is that durable authoritarian 
regimes find ways to incorporate elites or potential competitors. In a sense, durable 
regimes institutionalize elite behavior. 
Similarly, Lisa Blaydes (2011) also examines the strategies that autocratic leaders 
employ to stay in power. Blaydes specifically examined the role of elections in Egypt. 
Blaydes notes all elites, not just Mubarak’s close allies, had a chance to compete for 
government positions. This helped Mubarak gain allegiance from elites. Blaydes notes 
that government positions were “auctioned” off to elites. The elites that spent the most 
(i.e., vote buying) won government positions. Elections then worked as a “fair way” to 
manage elite competition. Blaydes also argues that managing elections this way was 
advantageous for Mubarak. Vote buying meant elites used their resources to gain support 
from the public, but such actions also meant the ruling regime gained some support 
without expending resources. Secondly, elections gave the ruling regime a feel for how 
much potential support the opposition had since elections provided information of how 
the public voted. Thus, even elections can help some autocratic regimes. 
Past literature supports the notion that authoritarian durability is closely linked 
with economic development. Poor economic performance affects authoritarian regime 
survival. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman examine the role that economic crises 
have on regime liberalization. Haggard and Kaufman note that economic crises can affect 
any type of regime whether democratic or authoritarian, yet there are differences. The 
key difference between the two regimes is that while democracies can fall back on 
legitimacy and support during periods of crisis, authoritarian regimes cannot (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995, 7, 13). First, despite the lack of legitimacy, authoritarian regimes are 
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still accountable to someone. Though they may only be accountable to a couple of sectors 
such as the military or state elites, authoritarian regimes must have the capacity to deliver 
material resources to key supporters, and this task can be undermined during economic 
crises (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 11, 29).2  
Dissatisfaction may give rise to regime splits that provide opportunities for 
oppositional politicians to mobilize support (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 32). One of the 
reasons why authoritarian regimes stay in power is because they can control political 
mobilization (protests, strikes, demonstrations). However, according to Haggard and 
Kaufman, such movements can originate in light of economic grievances such as 
unemployment, inflation and declines in real wages (1995, 31). Even more important, by 
linking economic circumstances to the authoritarian regimes, economic grievances 
provide opportunities for oppositional leaders to draw support (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995, 31). It is important to note that not all economic crises affect authoritarian regimes 
the same. In fact, Kaufman and Haggard note that the level of regime cohesion affects the 
political outcomes. When cohesion is high, regimes are able to adjust to economic crises, 
regain loyalty and reassert authority (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 38). In contrast, when 
cohesion is low, regimes are unable to control defections from elites and mass protests. In 






2 Bunce and Wolchik (2010) also find that economic performance affects 
authoritarian regime survival. Poor economic performance depletes public support for the 
regime and undercuts a regime’s ability to maintain patronage.  
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The Process of Regime Change  
Another crucial component of regime change pertains to the process of regime 
change and transitions. The process of how authoritarian transitions occur or how 
authoritarian regimes change is crucial to understanding the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. When it comes to the nature of transitions, or how transitions occur, 
Maria Ottaway provides some insights. Ottaway emphasizes the deliberateness of hybrid 
regimes. Much of the post-Cold War thinking centered around the notion of “waves” and 
“reverse waves” of democracy. The notion of “waves” was conceptualized by Samuel 
Huntington who argued that many countries embraced democracy in particular time 
periods or waves of democracy. Illustratively and figuratively, a wave propels countries 
forward; some countries ride the wave to dry land and develop as democracies while 
others float back into a nondemocratic sea as the wave recedes (Ottaway 2003, 9). The 
hope is that the latter countries will be pushed to land by the next wave of democracy in 
the future. Ottaway argues that many of the countries that did not reach the shore are not 
failed democracies, but they are countries that rode the wave as far as they wanted and 
managed to stop. Such regimes deliberately implemented democratic features while also 
keeping autocratic features (Ottaway 2003, 9). The notion of deliberateness is a crucial 
theoretical consideration. The notion of deliberateness, if correct, brings up several 
questions. Are authoritarian regimes transitioning into hybrid regimes on purpose? More 
importantly, what conditions lead them to make such a deliberate decision? 
When speaking about authoritarian transitions, especially ones that appear 
deliberate in nature, one has to cite the work of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter (1986). O’Donnell and Schmitter find that transitions occur through an almost 
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negotiated process. Several types of actors are involved in such transitions. Both 
hardliners and softliners are actors within the ruling regime or the ruling elites. Hardliners 
are those who believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 16). Softliners, in contrast, are those with the increasing 
awareness that they will have to provide some form of electoral legitimation (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, 16). Essentially, as opposed to hardliners, softliners recognize that 
eventually some kind of political opening or liberalization will be necessary, but the more 
important question is why? One reason for liberalization is to provide the illusion that the 
regime is democratizing and to remind the population that the authoritarian episode is 
necessary for democratization. Overall, softliners are the catalyzing force behind 
liberalization and transitions.  
For O’Donnell and Schmitter, transitions occur through a negotiated process 
between the ruling regime and other actors in the populace looking for openings. In 
essence, the process of political liberalization occurs through the strategic interaction 
between elites from the ruling regime on the one hand, and actors from society on the 
other hand. More importantly, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, a democratic 
transition is most likely to occur when soft-liners and moderate actors in society enter 
into “pacts” that navigate the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Pacts are 
arrangements that, first, limit the agenda of policy choice; second, discuss the distribution 
of benefits within the new regime; and finally, restrict the participation of outsiders in 
decision making (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 41). All three components are crucial 
for the success of transitions, and if they are not “pacted,” transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy are more likely to fail. Another scholar who describes 
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transitions as a negotiated process is Adam Przeworski. 
According to Przeworski, a common feature of authoritarian regimes is that they 
do not tolerate independent organizations (1991, 54). However, when an authoritarian 
regime decides to tolerate an autonomous organization in civil society, what we are 
witnessing is the start of liberalization (Przeworski 1991, 55). The question, then, is how 
liberalization occurs. For Przeworski, liberalization begins with fissures or splits within 
the authoritarian regime. Such splits are followed by mass mobilization and autonomous 
organization in civil society (1991, 57). Visible splits in the regime signal to the public 
that there may be an opportunity for mobilization. Moreover, popular mobilization or 
popular unrest signals to potential “liberalizers” within the ruling regime that there is the 
possibility of an imminent crisis, but that there are chances for alliances with popular 
organizations that want liberalization (Przeworski 1991, 57). Thus, splits in regimes and 
mobilization are said to feed off each other. In contrast to O’Donnell and Schmitter and 
Przeworski, McFaul argues that transitions are noncooperative.  
In his analysis of postcommunist regimes in Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
Michael McFaul concentrates on why some states abandoned communism for 
democracy, why others turned to authoritarianism, and why some states became hybrid 
regimes. McFaul proposes that transitions in postcommunist regimes in Europe and the 
former Soviet Union took a noncooperative approach. For McFaul, what determined the 
type of transition was the power distribution among democratic actors and autocratic 
actors. McFaul argues that democracy emerged in states where democratic actors enjoyed 
a decisive power advantage (2002, 222-229). Conversely, McFaul argues that autocratic 
regimes emerged in states where autocratic actors had a decisive power advantage (2002, 
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222-229). When the distribution of power was more equally divided, the outcome was a 
transition into a hybrid regime; sometimes this was after violent feuds between the two 
factions (McFaul 2002, 225). McFaul finds that there was minimal cooperation in the 
creation of the new regime. If the powerful believed in democratic principles, then 
democratic institutions were imposed, yet if the powerful endorsed autocratic principles, 
autocratic institutions were imposed (McFaul 2002, 225).  
Even when elections are allowed, autocratic incumbents can be difficult to defeat. 
Bunce and Wolchik (2010) argue that autocratic regimes are defeated when the 
opposition adopts specific electoral strategies. Additionally, Bunce and Wolchik argue 
that to defeat authoritarian regimes, the opposition must reform electoral or voting 
procedures. The logic here is that the ruling authoritarian regime already has tremendous 
influence in electoral institutions and procedures. Opposition groups can lose through 
various electoral manipulations such as via fraud, vote buying, and/or exclusion of 
candidates based on trifling technicalities. In some instances, this may spark further 
democratization. McFaul (2005) argues that Serbian, Georgian and Ukrainian cases of 
democratic breakthrough were sparked by a fraudulent national election. 
Another strategy involves uniting with other opposition groups (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2010). Van de Walle (2006) argues that opposition cohesion is often a 
prerequisite for successful regime transitions. Multiple opposition groups may split votes 
among the public, making it difficult for any oppositional group to win. Unity among 
opposition groups alleviates this problem and even has a symbolic effect. Unity among 
the opposition shows the public that oppositional groups have momentum and may even 
beat the ruling regime. The influence of opposition cohesion is compounded when the 
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ruling regime appears to be weak since this provides a greater incentive for opposition 
cohesion (Van de Walle 2006). Unity also tells the public that the ruling regime is so bad 
that separate opposition groups are willing to put aside their differences and unite just to 
beat the ruling regime. This also tells actors in the international scene that the opposition 
has a chance. INGOs or other governments can facilitate further unity among opposition 
groups.  
 
Development and Democratization 
The relationship between economic development and democracy is one of the 
most analyzed in comparative politics. Larry Diamond (1992) argued that the relationship 
between economic development and democratization ranks as one of the most powerful 
and robust relationships in the study of political development. Starting with the 
modernization theorists (Deutsch 1961; Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959), these scholars assert 
that many economic and sociological changes contribute to the notion that developed 
countries are more likely to democratize. Several aspects of development may contribute 
to democracy, the spread of education (Lipset 1959), the rising power of the middle class 
(Moore 1966), the rising power of the working class (Collier 1999; Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens 1992), or decreased inequality and increased capital mobility 
(Boix and Stokes 2003). In addition, some scholars argue that development creates 
transformations in individual values that stress political freedom (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005). Overall, modernization theorists assert that development alters the preferences of 
citizens and/or elites so that they prefer democracy over authoritarianism.  
One of the most famous hypotheses in political science is the modernization 
theory of democratization which posits that democracy is followed by economic 
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development. Lipset (1959) argued that democracy is related to economic development or 
modernization. Lipset argued that countries follow a path from traditional societies to 
developed ones. For Lipset, economic development creates the social conditions 
necessary for democracy to thrive. The causal logic of modernization consists of a 
gradual growth in social structures that make democracy possible. Developments in 
industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, and mobilization lead to a 
society ready to proceed to democratization. Decreases in poverty, inequality and hence 
class conflict set the stage for democracy. Lipset predicted that there would be an 
increase in civil society and voluntary organizations as well as an increased demand for 
political legitimacy. 
Economic development alone makes for a society that could make political 
demands on autocratic regimes. Economic growth can threaten the political survival of 
repressive governments by raising the likelihood that effective political competitors will 
emerge.  Economic growth leads to an increase in the number of individuals with 
sufficient time, education and money to get involved in politics. Education, for example, 
becomes vital to citizens who hope to develop the skills to communicate, organize, and 
develop a political presence. Hence, one of the effects of modernization is that it creates a 
larger pool of potential opposition leaders. Hadenius (1992), for example, finds that 
social factors such as literacy and education are the most powerful explanatory variables 
of democratic transitions. 
Other scholars argue that economic development is associated with changes in 
class structures that lead to democratization. Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) argued that 
capitalist economic development creates growing pressures for democratization by 
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fostering the emergence of a middle class. Moreover, scholars such as Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that without a burgeoning middle class it would be 
difficult for liberal democracy to become part of the political agenda. An increasing 
middle class is said to erode the power of the most antidemocratic forces and those that 
rely on the coercive state power for the control of the labor force. Even Lipset argued that 
a large middle class would reward moderate democratic regimes and punish extreme 
regimes (1959). For these scholars, class structure works as an intervening variable. First, 
economic development expands the size of the middle class and/or the working class in a 
nondemocratic regime; this increases the probability that the regime will collapse and 
transition toward democracy. For Inglehart (1988) the size of the middle class is 
positively associated with the stability of democracy once it is formed. The work of Boix 
helps to explain why the rise in the middle class could lead to democratization or the 
stability of democracy.  
In the book Democracy and Redistribution, Carles Boix (2003) argues that 
income equality effects democratization. When income inequality is high, the poor and 
middle classes have more of an incentive to push for redistribution and for more 
participation in the political system. The problem, however, is that when inequality is 
high the rich or the elites have more incentive to repress and more resources to do it. Boix 
(2003) argues that as countries become more developed, incomes become more equally 
distributed. As incomes become more equally distributed the poor and the middle class 
will have a better chance of participation in the political system. Before development, 
autocratic elites can stifle increased calls for a more liberal political system. With 
increasing development, however, the poor catch up with the elites and the costs of 
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repression rise, making it more difficult to stifle the desires for more participation. Boix 
(2003) also notes that the higher the inequality among classes, the more that elites have to 
lose from liberal regimes since they are already in a powerful position. In contrast, as 
inequality decreases, elites must face the fact that repression is more expensive and they 
may lose more if they continue to repress; therefore, elites desire to make some 
concessions rather than to risk losing everything.  
Some scholars challenge the notion that income equality increases 
democratization. Haggard and Kaufman (2012) analyze the role that income 
inequality/equality plays in democratization. Haggard and Kaufman are skeptical that 
income inequality plays a substantial role in transitions to democracy or in the fall of an 
existing democratic regime. In their analysis the authors find that a substantial number of 
democratic transitions occur when there are high levels of income inequality. 
Additionally, the authors find that conflicts over income equality do not play a substantial 
role in the “reversals” or the fall of existing democratic regimes. These findings are in 
opposition to the arguments posed by Carles Boix (2003).  
Evelyne Stephens (1989) argues that industrialization can bolster political effects, 
which can lead to democratization. Stephens (1989) finds that economic development, 
specifically industrialization, was related to democratization in South America. Stephens 
finds that countries in South America began to democratize once they began to diversify 
their economies. Industrialization raised pressures for democratization. Industrialization 
facilitates greater calls for political inclusion because it strengthens civil society and the 
interaction between the middle and working classes (Stephens 1989).  
Some scholars put a caveat to the modernization theory and argue that not all 
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types of developments lead to democracy. Robert Barro (1998) for example, finds that 
high levels of per capita GDP in oil-exporting countries do not have the same positive 
effect on democratization as in other countries. Others scholars such as Michael Ross 
(2001) call this a “resource curse.” The resource curse refers to the notion that many of 
the poorest and most troubled states in the developing world have high levels of natural 
resource wealth (Ross 2001). Ross finds that oil, and in some instances wealth from 
natural resources, is associated with less democracy. Ross cites several explanations for 
this. First, there is the notion of the “rentier effect” which refers to argument that oil rich 
governments use low tax rates and patronage to relieve pressures for inclusion and 
accountability coming from the public (Ross 2001).  Massive oil wealth means the state 
can bypass large tax rates; here the adage of “no taxation without representation” turns 
into no taxation so no representation. The rentier state also uses its oil wealth to provide 
excellent public goods. In other words, the state uses oil wealth to buy legitimacy and 
redistributes some of the oil wealth to the public. The public obliges since it is rewarded 
handsomely for not making demands of the government. Second, Ross cites that the 
rentier effect does not bring a “modernization effect.”  This is to say that growth based on 
oil does not bring about social and cultural changes that usually produce democracy. It is 
also important to note that for many scholars economic development is more likely to 
affect the survival of an established democracy, rather than the emergence of democracy.  
For some, the emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic 
development. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argue that economic development does not 
always lead to democratization. However, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argued that 
democratic institutions are extremely fragile in the face of economic crises. Overall, these 
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authors find that economic development has a strong impact on the survival of an already 
existing democracy. Only once democracy is established do economic constraints play a 
role, and the chances of democratic survival are greater when a country is rich 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997). While Przeworski and Limongi (1997) note that 
economic crises can be extremely fragile for democracy. Other scholars also find a link 
between democratic survival and economic development. 
Milan Svolik (2008) examines what factors contribute to democratic 
consolidation. While some democracies are in a state of transition or are transitioning into 
democracy, once such democracies consolidate they become more or less immune to 
authoritarian reversals. In other words, democratic consolidation means that countries are 
likely to remain democratic for the long term rather than having a short democratic stint 
(Svolik 2008). Svolik argues that low levels of economic development can reduce the 
chances that a democracy consolidates. Svolik finds that countries face the risk of 
reverting back to authoritarianism when they are less economically developed. Moreover, 
Svolik notes that economic recessions are associated with the timing of authoritarian 
reversals. Svolik also argues that transitional democracies that have survived an 
economic recession are more likely to be consolidated. Another interesting idea is to 
examine the effect that democratization has on economic development.   
 Some scholars argue that the causal direction of modernization theory is pointing 
in the wrong direction. Instead of economic development leading to democracy, such 
scholars argue that democracy leads to higher economic growth. Such scholars argue that 
freer societies tend to have freer markets. As Milton Friedman (1962) puts it, political 
freedom and economic freedom can be mutually reinforcing. More liberalization allows 
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for more efficient and robust economies. Moreover, such scholars argue that autocracies 
tend to have highly regulated economies which can stifle capitalist growth. 
 In Determinants of Growth, Robert Barro (1998) examines how democracy can 
affect economic growth. Barro argues that increases in political rights in places with low 
levels of democracy tend to increase economic growth and investment (1998). 
Interestingly, Barro finds that further increases in political rights in places where 
moderate amounts of democracy exist impair growth and investment; Barro argues that 
this is caused by a concern for income redistribution. Barro also subscribes to the main 
tenets of modernization theory and argues that a high standard of living is associated with 
democracy. 
Boix and Stokes (2003) assert that democracies lead to higher growth rates for 
several reasons. Democracies are more likely to increase accountability and reduce 
corruption from the government; this helps to reduce waste. Additionally, democracies 
are more likely to promote the development of the economy because they are more 
willing to provide public goods that promote development. Consider for instance that 
democracies provide sustainable courts of law. This means that democracies can secure 
property rights or intellectual property rights, which can both incentivize individuals to 
innovate and reassure such individuals that their innovations will be protected.  
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorf (2000) argue that democracies tend to have 
more liberal trade markets than autocracies. Democracies tend to have lower trade 
barriers when they trade with other democracies (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorf 
2000). In contrast, democracies have higher trade barriers when they trade with 
autocracies. The authors argue that democratic institutions lead to freer trade. 
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Democracies, both parliamentary and presidential have legislatures that can veto a chief 
executives or prime ministers trade proposals with other countries. The logic here is that 
legislatures work as a credible threat to veto trade proposals; therefore, trade proposals 
must be very advantageous or they will not be accepted (Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorf 2000). Hence, democratic institutions can have an effect on trading.  
Other scholars argue that capable government institutions lead toward economic 
development. Samuel Huntington (1968) was concerned with the stability of government 
regimes and did not care whether they were democratic or authoritarian. Huntington 
argued that the problem was not to hold elections but to create organizations capable of 
maintaining the public order necessary to develop. For Huntington it did not matter 
whether countries pursued capitalist or communist economies so long as 
institutionalization was achieved.  
In this discussion it also important to note that economic development can 
strengthen authoritarianism. In fact, some scholars suggest that the link between 
economic development and democratic transitions is actually quite weak (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). Several scholars argue that economic development can actually 
create more stability for autocratic leaders. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that 
dictatorships become more stable as countries become more affluent. Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that authoritarian regimes are showing that they can reap the 
benefits of economic development while evading any pressure to relax their political 
control. This is to say that economic growth, rather than fostering democratic growth, can 
actually be used to strengthen oppressive regimes. 
Part of the reason why this is happening is that authoritarian governments are 
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becoming more sophisticated with regard to their practices (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) also argue that authoritarian regimes are getting 
better at avoiding the political fallout that comes with economic growth. While it is true 
that increases in wealth can lead to increases in popular demand for political power, the 
ability of an oppressive government to fight off these demands has been underestimated. 
Authoritarian governments are becoming so sophisticated that economic growth actually 
increases their chance for survival.  
Autocratic states are not usually passive observers of political change. They may 
set the rules of the economic system so that it can suit their interests (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2003). This means that autocrats already have an advantage over the political 
opposition since they can shape institutions. Increased economic development gives 
citizens the illusion that the government regime is doing well and that they are benefiting 
from it. Economic development leads to growth in infrastructure, health care, and 
literacy, giving citizens the belief that life has gotten better or will eventually improve 
even under an autocratic regime. Additionally, increased economic development gives 
autocratic governments more access to resources, resources that they can use to control 
political events and activities. Autocratic governments can then stifle political opposition. 
Examples of countries that developed over a long period, became wealthy, yet 
maintained dictatorships include Singapore and Malaysia. Perhaps the best example is 
China. When Deng Xiaoping opened China’s economy over three decades ago, China’s 
economy experienced tremendous growth. Many thought that political reform would 
accompany this economic growth. Economic liberalization and development would lead 
to political liberalization and eventually democracy. This has yet to occur in China. In 
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terms of electoral authoritarian regimes, Russia is a prime example. Since the end of the 
Cold War, Russia has grown economically and seen some development. In the case of 
both China and Russia, government regimes have used their growing resources to stifle 
political opposition or repress political demands. In Russia for example, all national 
television networks are placed under strict government control. In China, simple things 
such as accessing Google’s language news services or forcing Microsoft to block the use 
of words such as “freedom” or “democracy” are just examples of how autocratic regimes 
can stifle the dissemination of information. 
Some scholars find interesting insights when they aggregate the effects of 
economic development with other factors. Kennedy (2010) finds that economic 
development increases the stability of authoritarian regimes. However, Kennedy (2012) 
finds that major institutional changes that occur at higher levels of economic 
development are more likely to result in democracy. Miller (2012) finds that development 
predicts democratization. Miller’s findings, however, are somewhat ambiguous. For 
instance, Miller finds that development strengthens autocratic regimes, as indicated by a 
reduced likelihood of violent leader removal. Even still, Miller finds that greater 
development predicts democratization, but only if a violent turnover has occurred in the 
past. This is somewhat ambiguous because economic development is both an autocratic-
strengthening force and a democratizing force.  
These studies provide one valuable insight: authoritarian stability may depend on 
economic development. The context of continuing or increasing poverty is an instigator 
of violence, especially violence from the masses (Staub 2000). As noted, economic 
development strengthens the authoritarian regime. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that 
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lack of economic resources limits the coercive apparatus of the state. Limited resources 
weaken the regime’s ability to respond in times of crisis, and tenuous moments for the 
ruling regime weaken regime cohesion. Stronger citizen opposition or a greater military 
threat compels the ruling regime to improve economic growth rates (Escriba-Folch 2011). 
At medium levels of economic development, state capacity increases, and the state can 
respond more appropriately to crises (Fearon and Laitin 2003). More importantly, more 
economic development creates a society with people and groups somewhat invested in 
the authoritarian institutions that led to prosperity.  
 
International Factors and the International Environment 
The rise of hybrid regimes can be attributed to international factors and the nature 
of the international environment. Specifically, some observers note that the proliferation 
of hybrid regimes is a post-Cold War phenomenon.3 In the late 1980s the international 
environment began to see major changes that undermined the stability of closed 
autocratic regimes while encouraging the rise of electoral ones (Levitsky and Way 2010, 
17). In other words, the end of the Cold War era brought changes to the international 
environment that raised the costs of maintaining authoritarian regimes. Overall, there are 
several factors that created a post-Cold War international environment ripe for the 
proliferation of hybrid regimes. 
																																																						
 
3 This is not to say that hybrid regimes did not exist prior to the Cold War. In fact, 
Levitsky and Way note that in the interwar period competitive authoritarian regimes 
arose in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. During the 
Cold War competitive authoritarian regimes arose in Argentina under Peron (1946-1955); 
Zambia in the late 1960s; the Dominican Republic during the 1970s; Senegal after 1976;  
and postcolonial Guyana, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe (2010, 17).  
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First, dictatorships sponsored by great powers saw less external support either 
from the United States or the collapsing Soviet Union (Levitsky and Way 2010, 17). This 
loss of external support or subsidies led to many economic crises that damaged the 
stability of fully authoritarian regimes. In many cases some states became bankrupt, 
patronage resources disappeared, and coercive apparatuses began to disappear (Levitsky 
and Way 2010, 17). Such a loss of international support made many regimes weaker. Not 
wanting to abandon power, these events constrained many autocrats to liberalize due to 
domestic and growing international pressures.4  
A second crucial factor pertains to the structure of the international system. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a shift in the global balance of power. In 
particular, the West, especially the United States, emerged as the dominant center of both 
military and economic power. This had a tremendous effect on many regimes as the 
diffusion of Western democratic models was increasingly encouraged. In fact, “many 
autocrats adopted formal democratic institutions” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 17). This was 
an effort to “position their countries favorably in the international contest for scarce 
development resources” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 182-83).  For some observers, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union pushed many to imitate Western institutions or the 
liberal capitalist democracies of the core regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010, 17; 
Whitehead 1996, 21). In short, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which served as an 
alternative source of influence and support, left many countries looking to the West. In 
																																																						
 
4 Studies that analyze these events include Herbst (2001) and Joseph (1997). 
Levitsky and Way (2010) note that outside of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
countries that were hit hard economically included Benin, Cambodia, Guyana, Haiti, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.  
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this instance the structure of the international environment played a crucial role.  
Carles Boix (2011) examines how international structure affects the promotion of 
democratization. Boix notes that the structure of incentives changes when the 
international system is multipolar or bipolar and several great powers are competing for 
hegemony (2011, 816). In such a system, great powers are more constrained to maintain 
alliances. There are fewer opportunities to focus on regime transitions since the focus is 
on competing with other great powers. Great powers may still promote democratization, 
but given the structure of incentives in the international system, great powers are more 
limited and constrained in doing so.   
Boix (2011) contends that the proportion of liberal democracies peaks under 
international orders governed by democratic hegemons, such as the post-Cold War 
period. This idea illustrates two important aspects of the international dimension of 
regime change. First, the structure of the international system is thus crucial to the spread 
of democratization. Boix argues that in “unconstrained” international systems (such as 
the United States after 1990) in which there is a single hegemon, the hegemon has the 
ability to pursue its most preferred policy (2011, 815).5 Boix posits that great powers shift 
their political strategies based on the structure of the international order, and in the case 
of the post-Cold War period, US hegemony promoted democracy (2011, 809). One 
incentive of promoting democracy pertained to sustaining the balance of power the US 
enjoyed in the post-Cold War period. The rationale or logic behind democracy promotion 
was a further means of advancing Western interests in the international arena (Boix 2011, 
																																																						
 
5 In contrast, Boix predicts that authoritarian hegemons would encourage 
authoritarianism. 




The third factor relates to the spread of democratic norms and conditionality. The 
proliferation of hybrid regimes is related to the fact that the United States and other 
Western powers intensified their efforts to encourage and defend democracy. The United 
States, for example, increased their funding for democracy-assistance programs from near 
zero in the early 1980s to $700 million at the start of the 1990s (Burnell 2000, 49). These 
efforts were manifested through a combination of external assistance, military and 
diplomatic pressure, and political conditionality. Conditionality became one of the most 
direct ways to exert democratic pressure. Conditionality stems from the idea that states 
will respond well to positive conditionality or incentives, and that states will seek to 
avoid negative conditionality or sanctions imposed by international actors. In the 
international context, ruling regimes acted according to the conditions set by international 
actors (often more powerful international actors). Consider for example that Western 
governments and other multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on 
the respect for human rights and the holding of elections (Nelson and Eglinton 1992; 
Stokke 1995). Besides material benefits (i.e., economic benefits), there were also political 
benefits (i.e., membership in international organizations). Essentially, there was a linking 
of concrete or tangible rewards (or punishments) to liberalization. This is a crucial point, 
because for regimes already in a tenuous position, the loss of international support would 
have had serious consequences (Donno 2013). Therefore, conditionality became a 
momentous factor in states where authoritarian regimes were weak. In many cases 
conditionality influenced ruling regimes to implement elections, or reduce electoral 
misconduct if elections already existed.  
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The fourth factor pertains to the changes occurring in the international 
environment, specifically a state’s region. The rise of hybrid regimes pertains to the 
emergence of an infrastructure of international organizations. This essentially included 
the rise of international party foundations, election-monitoring agencies, and many 
international nongovernmental organizations that were committed to the promotion of 
human rights and democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 18). Bunce and Wolchik (2010) 
argue that international actors can play a critical role in the reform of electoral 
procedures. The opposition gains an advantage when international actors pressure 
authoritarian regimes to reform electoral procedures. International actors can also 
monitor and deem the fairness of elections. When states engaged in repressive actions, 
such abuses were reported by international media groups and human rights groups. 
Moreover, such behavior drew international criticism and set into motion Western action. 
Violating states were compelled to make democratic concessions (Risse and Sikkink 
1999).  
International regional organizations also play an important role. Pevehouse (2002) 
argues that membership in certain regional organizations increases the probability of 
regime change, even when domestic factors are controlled for. Consider for example the 
role of the European Union (EU), where membership requires democracy. Also consider 
the Organization of American States (OAS) which according to Levitsky and Way 
adopted mechanisms for the protection of democracy. It is important to note that 
geographical linkages played a key role. Past literature shows that depending on 
geographical regions, some countries are either systematically more democratic or less 
democratic than domestic models of democratization would predict (Hannan and Carroll 
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1981; Helliwell 1994). The post-Cold War international environment did not affect all 
countries evenly. For example, Levitsky and Way (2006) contend that external 
democratizing pressures, diplomatic or military pressure, multilateral political 
conditionality, democracy assistance programs, and activities of transnational human 
rights were more intense and sustained in some regions (Central Europe, the Americas) 
than in others (sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union). Kopstein and Reilly (2000) 
find that geographic proximity affected the diffusion of norms, resources, and institutions 
that were necessary to the construction of democracies in postcommunist states. 
Geographic proximity to the West had a positive influence on the democratic 
transformation of postcommunist states, while geographic isolation hindered these 
transformations (Kopstein and Reilly 2000, 35).  
Furthermore, other scholars find significant effects for global, regional and 
neighbor induced democracy diffusion (Starr and Lindborg 2003). Brinks and Coppedge 
(2006) also find support for the notion of geographic proximity and diffusion. States tend 
to change their regimes to match the average degree of democracy or nondemocracy 
found among their neighbors (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, 463). Additionally, countries 
in the US sphere of influence tended to become more democratic in the period examined 
(1972-1996) (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, 463). Brinks and Coppedge (2006) argue that 
countries within the US sphere of influence during the third wave improved their 
democratic performance relative to their peers. Several other studies support these 
findings. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) find that democracy is more 
likely to survive in states that are in a more democratic region of the world. Moreover, 
democracy becomes more likely to survive as the total number of democracies in the 
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world rises (Przeworski et al. 2000).  
The fifth and final factor that contributed to the proliferation of hybrid regimes 
relates to the standards of liberalization. In some instances, the international standards for 
democracy made the proliferation hybrid regimes more feasible. It is important to note 
that while Western powers pushed for liberalization, a relatively low bar was set for 
democratic reforms. In many instances, the implementation of multiparty elections was 
seen as the standard. Other important aspects of democracy were not considered fully. 
Less attention was paid to whether such elections were actually free and fair. Less 
concern was placed on civil liberties or a level political playing field, and this allowed 
many autocrats to stay in power through electoral authoritarianism. Even in 
internationally monitored elections, incumbents routinely got away with harassing 
opponents, monopolizing media access, and manipulating electoral results (Carothers 
1997).  
Some scholars note that just implementing electoral institutions holds enough 
value to an international audience, even if they do not result in full-fledged democracy 
(Kinne and Marinov 2013). This is because elections still introduce some amount of 
accountability into the political process, and they work to constrain regime leaders 
(Kinne and Marinov 2013). Many thought that the implementation of elections was often 
seen as “good enough,” and that eventually full liberalization or democratization would 
ultimately result. This rigid focus on the occurrence of elections allowed many electoral 
authoritarian regimes to emerge. In fact, some scholars note that even after some 
autocrats fell, successor governments often maintained the authoritarian ways of their 
ousted predecessors (Levitsky and Way 2005, 30).  
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All five factors created an international environment that was ripe for the 
proliferation of electoral authoritarianism. An understanding of these factors provides 
important insights on the emergence of electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, 
such factors do not fully explain why there was variation in regime change. Take, for 
example, the fact that some regimes fully democratized, others transitioned into electoral 
authoritarian regimes, and some regimes even stayed fully authoritarian. What explains 
this variation? Other scholars have conceptualized frameworks that may provide some 
insights.  
In their analysis, Levitsky and Way (2010) conceptualize a new framework for 
analyzing the international dimension of regime change. For Levitsky and Way there are 
two major concepts that can affect democratization: Western leverage and Western 
linkage. In this instance, the West is defined as the United States or the European Union.6 
Levitsky and Way use the concepts of linkage and leverage to predict the trajectories of 
competitive authoritarian regimes, a type of hybrid regime. These scholars argue that 
competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize when both Western 
linkage and Western leverage are at high levels. While Levitsky and Way solely use the 
concepts of linkage and leverage to predict transitions in competitive authoritarian 
regimes, such concepts may be useful for examining transitions out of closed 
authoritarianism.  
Western leverage is defined as a government’s vulnerability to external 
democratizing pressure (Levitsky and Way 2006, 382). For Levitsky and Way, leverage 
																																																						
 
6 In this instance, Levitsky and Way (2010) define the European Union as pre-
2004 members.  
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is not an exercise of external pressure per se, but instead, leverage refers to a country’s 
vulnerability to that external pressure. Leverage first refers to a country’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the West, or the country’s capability to avoid Western pressures aimed at 
encouraging political liberalization (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41).7  Secondly, leverage 
also refers to the potential impact that punitive actions can have on the target state 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, 41). In other words, leverage also refers to how Western 
actions can affect one’s state. Levitsky and Way (2010) note that this definition is 
different from the one used by Vachudova (2005), who in fact defines leverage as the 
actual exercise of political and economic pressure. Leverage is said to be high in 
circumstances where countries lack bargaining power and are also highly affected by 
Western actions that are punitive (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41). On the other hand, 
leverage is low in circumstances where countries possess substantial bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the West and can withstand Western punitive actions without sustaining 
significant harm (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41). For Levitsky and Way leverage raised the 
costs of sustaining authoritarianism during the post-Cold War period. Leverage alone, 
however, rarely resulted in fully democratic transitions. Western linkage is also 
important.  
Linkage to the West is defined as the density of ties and cross-border flows 
among particular countries and the West (Levitsky and Way 2010, 43). The density of 
																																																						
 
7 Levitsky and Way (2010) note that their treatment of the “West” is a highly 
aggregate approach. The authors recognized that Western powers do not always act the 
same way. EU and US policies may differ and be inconsistent. In fact, Kopstein (2006) 
shows that the EU and the US have employed different democratization strategies in the 
past. However, Levitsky and Way treat the West as a unitary actor because their policies 
toward competitive authoritarian regimes were “sufficiently coherent” (2010, 41).	
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ties refers to economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational ties, and cross-
border flows refers to the flow of capital, goods and services, people, and information.8 
The concept of linkage refers to a “multidimensional concept that encompasses the 
myriad networks of interdependence” between the polities, economies, and societies of 
particular countries and the West (Levitsky and Way 2010). Linkage generates 
democratic pressure in several ways. First, linkage increases world awareness of 
autocratic abuse. More importantly, linkage increases the likelihood that Western 
governments will take action in response to such abuses since they are likely to perceive 
that interests are at stake. Second, linkage shifts domestic interests into a prodemocratic 
direction since many individuals, firms, and organizations that benefit from professional 
ties to the West are constrained to adhere to the democratic norms of the West and 
pressure their policymakers to do the same.  
Levitsky and Way utilize linkage and leverage as a way to explain democratic 
transitions that occurred in competitive authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way find that 
among competitive authoritarian regimes, high linkage and high leverage to the West are 
associated with democratic transitions. This leaves us with one crucial question: can 
Western linkage and leverage predict transitions from fully authoritarian regimes into 
electoral authoritarian regimes? In other words, does high Western linkage and leverage 
influence the emergence of electoral authoritarianism? This study will explore such 
																																																						
 
8 Levitsky and Way acknowledge that the concept of linkage draws from the work 
of Keohane and Nye’s concept of complex interdependence, which refers to multiple 
channels of contact among societies (1989, 33-34). However, Keohane and Nye focus on 
linkage among Western powers, while Levitsky and Way focus on ties from non-Western 
countries to Western powers. 






In the first section of this chapter, the literature on regime change is discussed. 
One of the major components of regime change pertains to the factors and variables that 
make authoritarian regimes more susceptible to transitions. From this discussion we learn 
a great deal about authoritarian robustness or the factors that make transitions more 
likely. From the work of Geddes we learn that authoritarian regime types matter. For 
Geddes, single-party regimes are the most durable. Haggard and Kaufman note that 
economic crises can affect the durability of authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way 
argue that regimes that arise from violent revolutionary struggles are more durable. From 
Brownlee (2007) we learn that authoritarian durability is associated with party cohesion 
and the regime’s ability to incorporate and control elites. Such scholars make claims as to 
why some regimes transition while others do not transition.  
 To understand regime change one must also inquire into how regime change 
occurs. From Ottaway we learn that there is a deliberateness to transitions. In many 
instances, regime leaders liberalize as much as they want to, stopping at a point that still 
preserves their power. From O’Donnell and Schmitter, as well as Przeworski, we learn 
that transitions may be instigated by splits among the ruling elites and can be almost 
cooperative among the elites. On the other hand, McFaul argues that transitions in 
Eastern Europe were noncooperative. Instead, McFaul finds that transition types relate to 
the power distribution among democratic and autocratic actors. Those with the most 
power implemented their institutions. These ideas provide a starting point or a list of 
variables that can be useful for explaining transitions into electoral authoritarianism.  
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 The second section of this chapter covers the relationship between development 
and democratization. Understanding this literature is crucial because it is possible that 
development plays a role in the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Modernization 
theory is discussed. The essence of modernization theory is that developed countries are 
more likely to democratize. Modernization theory posits that economic growth can 
threaten the political survival of repressive governments. In contrast, some studies find 
that economic development does not lead to democratization, but instead, development 
increases the chances of survival or consolidation for an already democratic regime. 
Other studies argue that the causal direction of modernization theory is pointing in the 
wrong direction, and that democracy causes more development. In this section we also 
learn that development can actually strengthen authoritarian durability. The literature on 
development and democratization sparks several questions related to electoral 
authoritarianism. For example, does development inhibit the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism, or does development increase the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism?  
 In the last section of this chapter the international dimension of regime change is 
examined. With regard to international variables, I discuss five major factors that the 
literature ties to the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. The first factor pertains to 
the fact that many authoritarian regimes lost external support during the post-Cold War, 
which contributed to loss of power for some regimes and liberalization emerged. Another 
factor pertains to the structure of the international system. When democratic powers 
maintain secure dominance in the international system, they have leeway to implement 
democratic pressures to other states. A third factor that impacts the emergence of 
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electoral authoritarianism is the spread of democratic norms by the West and the use of 
conditionality to pressure regimes into liberalizing. The fourth factor emphasizes how 
international organizations and regional aspects can affect the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. The final factor illustrates how a rigid focus on the occurrence of 
elections allowed many regimes to continue authoritarian practices and not fully 
democratize. In this section, I also discussed the concepts of linkage and leverage. Such 
concepts along with the factors listed above are crucial to understanding the emergence 
of electoral authoritarianism. More importantly, in this study I provide an empirical 





































Simply put, electoral authoritarian regimes refer to regimes that have both 
democratic characteristics and authoritarian characteristics. These types of regimes are 
not exactly fully democratic, nor are they fully authoritarian. In these regimes some 
democratic institutions exist (i.e., elections and legislatures), but incumbent governments 
still employ authoritarian practices to limit the success of the opposition. The incumbent 
regime may strive to create an unfair electoral playing field, or it may utilize other 
practices that make it difficult to label the regime as fully democratic. The central 
question motivating this study relates to why these regimes emerge. What factors cause 
the emergence of electoral authoritarianism?  
In this study, I argue electoral authoritarian regimes are likely to emerge out of 
states that have experienced a violent origin. A violent origin refers to a revolution, a 
civil war, an insurgency, or a military coup. When addressing the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism, violent origins are only part of the answer. I do not claim that violent 
origins explain all transitions to electoral authoritarianism. Moreover, violent origins are 
not a prerequisite to electoral authoritarianism since electoral authoritarianism can 
emerge from several different conditions and contexts. However, violent origins are a 
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crucial part of the puzzle. The role of violent origins is fairly simple to understand when 
we analyze all of the factors that contribute to the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. 
There are two main factors or forces that contribute to the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism in closed or fully authoritarian regimes. The first factor is the most 
obvious: liberalization must occur. Regimes may be influenced, pressured or even 
compelled to liberalize and implement democratic reforms. The pressures or influences 
may come from domestic origins, or as explained in the previous chapter, the nature of 
the international environment may compel many autocrats to liberalize. In some 
instances, regimes fully democratize after liberalizing reforms are implemented. In 
electoral authoritarian regimes full democratization does not occur, which leads us to a 
second crucial aspect.  
The second, and perhaps the most crucial, factor is authoritarian durability. This 
refers to how durable or robust the means of autocratic practices are within any given 
state. In states where authoritarian durability is highly robust or continues, authoritarian 
practices do not easily disappear. Hence, it is authoritarian durability that halts 
liberalization from fully manifesting into full democracy. Even when liberalization is 
implemented, authoritarian practices linger and the ruling regimes continue to employ 
them. For example, incumbent regimes can continue to employ elements of the state’s 
repressive apparatus (military forces or security forces) if it is well organized, loyal, and 
cohesive. The ruling regime can also keep key members of the regime from defecting if 
there is high cohesion and loyalty within the ruling regime. In essence, the ruling regime 
can still employ authoritarian practices if the means to implement them are robust and 
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unwavering. More importantly, I argue that violent origins are intimately connected with  
authoritarian durability. Regimes that arise from violent origins are likely to develop 
robust and durable authoritarian characteristics. Hence, if liberalization occurs, regimes 
that arise out of violent origins are more likely to transition to electoral authoritarianism. 
Instead of transitioning directly into a full democracy, states with violent origins are more 
likely to transition into electoral authoritarianism first. Table 3.1 illustrates the trajectory 
of states with violent origins.      
In summary, I argue that two factors cause the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism: liberalization and authoritarian durability. Liberalization activates the 
state transition out of closed authoritarianism, but authoritarian durability inhibits the 
transition to full democracy. The result is electoral authoritarianism. In this chapter, I 
address some of the crucial questions associated with the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. Specifically, I address how violent origins increase authoritarian 
durability. Another of the central questions associated with the concept of electoral 
authoritarianism pertains to why some liberalization occurs in fully authoritarian regimes.  
Is this liberalization allowed by regime leaders? Is it imposed on them? Why is it 
that only some liberalization occurs, as opposed to full democratization? The answers to 
these questions are ultimately complicated, and there are many factors and variables at 
work. Briefly put, liberalization can be imposed, but some autocrats are comfortable with 
allowing liberalization if there are worse alternatives. Authoritarian regimes do not 
voluntarily liberalize unless some pressure is applied to the regime. The pressure for 
liberalization can come from both indigenous and exogenous origins; international 
influences or domestic grumblings can initiate liberalization. If the regime does not have  
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enough leverage to avoid such influences and pressures, the ruling regime may 
begrudgingly liberalize due to international and domestic pressures.  
While it is true that most authoritarian regimes have major reservations about 
allowing liberalization, there are several reasons why autocrats may succumb to pressures 
of liberalization. In fact, if they can manage to stay in power, many autocratic regimes 
can ultimately benefit from allowing liberalization to occur. Liberalization is a risky 
endeavor, and if a regime does not have the resources for authoritarian durability, full 
democratization may even occur. However, if autocrats play their cards right, they can 
maintain power while allowing some openings. In this context, it is important to 
understand the perspective of the authoritarian regime or why autocrats liberalize.  
The notion that regimes can maintain power even in the face of liberalization 
leads us to another central question: how do authoritarian regimes stay in power? 
Additionally, if a regime does change, why do authoritarian practices linger? Part of the 
answer relates to authoritarian durability. If regimes can continue to employ authoritarian 
practices, they become more likely to stay in power, even when liberalization occurs. 
Regime leaders may allow opposition parties to compete electorally or even have some 
political influence, but regime leaders maintain power by repressing the opposition or 
creating unfair electoral advantages. The notion of authoritarian durability makes us 
wonder why some states have more characteristics of authoritarian durability than others. 
In other words, why is it that some authoritarian regimes fully democratize in the face of 
liberalizing pressures, while others only allow some openings but maintain power. The 
main argument of this study is that this question is immensely explained by the nature of 
a regime’s origin. Regimes that arise from violent origins are more likely to have 
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enduring authoritarian practices and are therefore less likely to fully democratize under 
liberalizing pressures. The result is a state that is neither fully authoritarian nor fully 
democratized; the result is electoral authoritarianism. Table 3.2 presents a comparison of 
the regime origins of electoral authoritarian regimes; regime years are in parentheses.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses why 
autocratic leaders may allow liberalization to occur, as opposed to fighting it. Autocratic 
leaders can in fact reap some of the benefits of liberalization. The second section 
discusses how violent origins contribute to authoritarian durability, or the factors that 
keep regimes from fully democratizing. The final section of this chapter concludes and 
summarizes the arguments made in this chapter.  
 
The Logic of Liberalization 
Given the choice between keeping a tight authoritarian grip or liberalizing most 
autocrats would likely stay fully authoritarian. Why is it then that fully authoritarian 
regimes have liberalized to the point that they become electoral authoritarian? As 
explained in the previous chapter, autocrats are often influenced or pressured to 
liberalize. Such liberalizing forces may come from the international environment or in 
some cases from domestic actors. It is also important to note hybrid regimes can be 
deliberate in nature. Autocratic leaders may deliberately implement liberalization. This 
possibility of deliberateness is a crucial theoretical consideration. Deliberateness signifies 
that regime leaders can carefully liberalize to a point where they can appease pressures to 
liberalize yet maintain control of the state. 
Of course, liberalization has its obstacles. Even while under pressure to liberalize, 
members of the ruling regime may have difficulty providing openings to the opposition.  
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The obvious drawback of liberalization is that the ruling regime may one day lose power 
through electoral means. While liberalization is not always ideal for many autocrats, 
liberalization can be beneficial for some authoritarian regimes. Whether intentional or 
unintentional, the effects of liberalization may even allow autocrats to stay in power for a 
longer duration. It is therefore important to discuss the benefits of liberalization from the 
perspective of an autocrat. In this section, I will discuss the benefits of liberalization as 
well as the obvious potential pitfalls associated with liberalizing.   
 Though it may be an unintended consequence, liberalization may help the stability 
of the ruling regime in the long term. One reason why regimes tend to liberalize is 
because of international pressures or influences. In many instances foreign aid is tied to 
democratic reform, which pushes many regimes to liberalize. Liberalization allows the 
regime to maintain international support, and in some cases it may even help the regime 
to garner more international support. This maintenance of international support networks 
is financially crucial for many states and allows many regimes to stay in power.  
Although it may seem counterintuitive, there are some instances in which 
democratic practices may help the ruling regime. Allowing a legislative assembly has 
been linked with authoritarian regime survival. Many electoral authoritarian regimes have 
legislatures (Malesky and Schuler 2010). Even monarchies and personalist authoritarian 
regimes are likely to have legislative assemblies, especially in the post-Cold War era 
(Wright 2008). Several studies find that authoritarian regimes with legislative institutions 
are more durable than authoritarian regimes without legislative institutions (Boix and 
Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Given this evidence, there has to be a 
rationale for why authoritarian regimes decide to implement legislative assemblies.  
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If done correctly, legislatures can provide political benefits to the ruling regime. 
Scholars argue that legislatures help in the cooptation process by providing a more 
efficient way to allocate rents and promote targeted spending (Escriba-Folch 2008; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2009; Wright 2008). Legislatures 
provide rent-seeking opportunities to key opposition elites who then demobilize their 
supporters in the populace (Reuter and Robertson 2014). Therefore, regime leaders can 
use legislatures to reduce social protests. In some instances, domestic turmoil can be 
avoided by allowing the opposition to gain some form of representation. Some studies 
even find that legislatures are likely to reduce the rise of terrorist groups in authoritarian 
regimes. When the opposition is active and operates in the absence of legislatures, the 
opposition increasingly turns to terrorism (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012).1  
Other scholars note that the opposition uses legislatures as a medium to regularly 
criticize the ruling regime and garner political support (Malesky and Schuler 2010). In 
the legislature, the opposition has an opportunity to express grievances and shape 
policies. When stripped of this opportunity, the opposition may use other means, such as 
violence against the state. Legislative assemblies therefore allow the ruling regime to 
avoid potential problems, at least in the short term. On the one hand, the presence of 
legislatures makes the opposition less likely to engage in terrorist activities against the 
state (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012). On the other hand, legislatures provide a means 
																																																						
 
1 Other scholars find other conclusions. In comparison to military autocracies and 
democracies, single-party authoritarian regimes are even less likely to experience 
domestic and international terrorism (Wilson and Piazza 2013). This is because 
authoritarian regimes can easily use coercion and repression to deter individuals and 
groups from engaging in terrorist activities (Wilson and Piazza 2013). 
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for the opposition to legally and openly organize and garner some political support, and 
this newfound power can be used against the ruling regime in the long term. 
Authoritarian regimes can also benefit from the use of elections. The decision to 
implement elections is not a thoughtless or reckless decision made by the ruling regime. 
The decision to implement elections is often preceded by ideas and strategies designed to 
make winning an easy task. When the ruling regime creates changes in political 
institutions the goal is to manipulate them to the regime’s advantage. The goal is to create 
a political playing field that is favorable to the ruling regime. The successful regime 
creates a difficult environment for the opposition to win. When the ruling regime allows 
elections to be implemented, regime leaders are confident and believe that they can 
outsmart the opposition. They believe that with the proper strategies and practices, the 
ruling regime can achieve electoral success.  
Elections allow regimes’ leaders to see how much support they have from the 
populace. Elections allow leaders to identify where they are most popular and where they 
are least popular. Information provided by elections allows regimes to identify where 
potential opposition forces exist. Once this information is identified, regimes can 
implement a strategy to counter oppositional strategies (e.g., co-optation, rents, coercion, 
repression). Another major benefit of elections is that they institute some predictability to 
otherwise unpredictable forms of succession procedures.  
By implementing some form of liberalization the ruling regime may scale back 
violent conflict with the opposition. It is crucial for the ruling regime to drive the 
opposition toward nonviolent means. This is why it is momentous that the ruling regime 
provide other means for the opposition to channel political frustrations. Liberalization 
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allows the opposition to channel frustrations through elections and legislature, and the 
ruling regime reduces the likelihood of dealing a with violent and dangerous opposition. 
Liberalization can also be part of a reconciliation process. Although sometimes 
implemented begrudgingly by the ruling regime, liberalization can help with this healing 
process and alleviate tension within opposition groups. 
Another major benefit of elections is that they institute some predictability to 
unpredictable forms or procedures of succession. In most closed authoritarian settings 
regime change is often unpredictable, unceremonious, and violent. Authoritarian leaders 
may be removed from power in a violent fashion (i.e., they will be killed). In contrast, 
election procedures are predictable in that regimes know when they will be removed from 
power: when they lose an election. Of course the goal is to stay in power, so elections can 
be manipulated and incumbents can implement some forms of autocratic practices. 
Elections may even give ruling regimes a second chance to regain power. 
In the context of elections, the worst-case scenario is that the ruling regime will 
lose an election to the opposition. Still, the losing regime can always regroup, reorganize 
and attempt to regain power later (this especially true of regimes that already have 
established political parties). One poignant example is the case of Nicaragua. After a 
successful revolution in 1979, the Sandinistas ruled Nicaragua over a decade. However, 
the combination of international pressures and fighting with the opposition (the Contras) 
compelled the regime to hold elections in 1990, which they lost. Instead of violently 
protesting the elections, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega conceded defeat. Nevertheless, 
the Sandinistas and Ortega competed in each subsequent election, and won in 2006. 
In a closed authoritarian context, the worst-case scenario is that the ruling regime 
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will be removed from power violently and leaders of the regime will likely be killed or 
exiled. There is usually no recovery from this (both politically and literally). From the 
perspective of the opposition, the route of democratic institutions is less risky than taking 
up arms and challenging the ruling regime through violent means. Often liberalization 
means that the opposition can legally participate in the electoral arena. Although 
liberalization may not lead to full fledge democracy, the opposition still gains some room 
to operate. Losing elections and seats in the legislature means losing political influence. 
The opposition can eventually recover from this. Losing a violent encounter with the 
ruling regime means literally losing your life. There is no coming back from death. This 
is a pertinent point to consider if the opposition is relatively weak and unorganized. From 
the perspective of the ruling regime, there are some obvious drawbacks to liberalization.  
The main drawback is the fact that the regime could lose power through electoral 
means. Interestingly, the concept of confidence is also crucial when examining why 
authoritarian regimes liberalize. In this context, confidence refers to the belief that the 
ruling regime is popular and widely accepted throughout the state. In other words, how 
confident or optimistic is the regime when it comes to electoral competition. Does the 
regime believe it can win? In some instances, regime leaders may lose power to 
overconfidence. In the case of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet was confident that he 
would win a plebiscite and easily return to power. Pinochet was counting on a divided 
opposition (17 parties). The opposition, however, formed a coalition and defeated 
Pinochet. This loss legally compelled Pinochet to hold elections in 1989, and afterwards, 
Chile began its journey towards democracy. 
In some circumstances regime leaders just have to be “good enough” to win. 
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Since regimes can fall back on authoritarian practices, they do not have to count on the 
support of majority of the country. They only have to come close enough and rely on 
authoritarian practices to gain the edge needed to win. To be clear, this is not to say that 
liberalization is always a voluntary act. Often, authoritarian regimes are compelled to 
liberalize and implement quasidemocratic institutions and practices. Howbeit, in many 
instances regime leaders believe they have the capacity to control how far liberalization 
goes.   
Using liberalization, the incumbent regime can also devise strategies to divide and 
eventually weaken the opposition. One strategy is to increase the likelihood of 
factionalism. In some opposition parties factions exist. The opposition may be divided by 
“hardliners” and “softliners,” or “moderates” and “radicals.” Furthermore, generational 
differences or cohorts can naturally divide the opposition into factions. Although the goal 
of all opposition members is to regain power or to at least weaken the incumbent regime, 
such divisions often dictate the means to how these goal can be achieved. Consider for 
example, that radicals may take a more violent or militant approach to defeating the 
ruling regime. Moderates within the opposition may scale back the violence and rely on 
organizational strategies and legal tactics. These divisions or factions can be of service to 
the ruling regime. 
For instance, the ruling regime may offer terms of reconciliation to the opposition. 
Forms of reconciliation can vary, but there are several key strategies. Take for example 
that if the opposition is exiled to foreign countries, the ruling regime may allow them to 
come back. The ruling regime may allow opposition parties to hold public conferences or 
conventions. Finally, the ruling regime may even legalize political parties and allow the 
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opposition to compete politically. Of course, these forms of liberalization may come with 
some strings attached. The opposition, for example, may not be allowed to publicly 
condemn the ruling regime. Perhaps the opposition’s political participation may be 
limited (i.e., a cap on the number of legislative seats for the opposition). 
The opposition may be weakened from these forms of liberalization if 
factionalism is rampant within the ranks. On the one hand, the radical faction of the 
opposition may reject such forms of “reconciliation” entirely. Instead, this faction of the 
opposition may opt to stay the course and violently overthrow the ruling regime. In 
contrast, moderates within the opposition may view such liberalization as a way to return 
from exile and at least gain legal status for their party. Though the chances of winning 
may be slim, moderates may see the reconciliation process as better for the opposition in 
the long term. If each faction is adamant about their suggested course of action, it could 
result in a split or divided opposition party. Some members of the opposition may accept 
the olive branch, while others may ignore it. The main point, however, is that the ruling 
regime has created a scenario in which potential rifts are created for the opposition. 
Obviously, such an olive branch can only be extended in circumstances where the ruling 
regime believes the opposition has minute odds of obtaining executive office through 
electoral means, and even slimmer odds of obtaining power through violent 
confrontation. From the perspective of the ruling regime two major accomplishments can 
be had. First, if such terms are accepted, the ruling regime can essentially weaken the 
opposition by splitting it. Second, from a practical perspective, the ruling regime has 
essentially achieved a ceasefire from certain factions of the opposition and can devote the 
resources of conflict elsewhere. 
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Ultimately, the ruling regime wants to protect its interests. Letting liberalization 
go forward while simultaneously limiting civil liberties and manipulating elections may 
serve several interests. First, liberalization may garner some international support, or at 
the very least it may alleviate international pressures to democratize. Depending on the 
case, these pressures to liberalize may also exist at the domestic level; therefore, some 
liberalization would address these domestic pressures. In the eyes of the ruling regime, 
some liberalization should buy some legitimacy from both the international sphere and 
the country’s populace. Liberalization also creates the aura that times are changing (even 
if in reality circumstances are still harsh), and the ruling regime is going in the right 
direction. If there is any legitimacy to be had, elections provide the ruling regime with a 
little bit of it. 
 Democratic institutions can also provide the ruling regime with information and 
allow the ruling regime to monitor the opposition closely. Elections show regimes how 
much support they have. Legislatures allow a glimpse into the political strategies of the 
opposition. In addition, legislatures provide an arena for bargaining (co-optation, rents, 
etc.) with the opposition. Democratic institutions are still a double-edged sword since 
they also provide the opposition with some information about the ruling regime and 
access to power. More importantly, democratic institutions give the opposition an 
opportunity (though sometimes a long shot) of overthrowing the ruling regime. 
 
Violent Origins and Authoritarian Durability 
In this section I address how violent origins are related to the emergence of 
electoral authoritarianism. Briefly put, violent origins have a tendency to create an 
environment in which variables of authoritarian durability are bolstered. Thus, the ruling 
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regime is more likely to continue its use of authoritarian practices. Such practices then 
linger and make it difficult for states to fully democratize. Hence, violent origins are 
associated with enduring authoritarianism. Before addressing the causal mechanisms at 
work, let us first acknowledge the relation between democratization and violent origins. 
Although brief, let us consider if there is a connection between violence and transitions 
toward full democratization.  
Some scholars argue that democracy stems from significant conflict (Berman 
2007; Bermeo 1997; Rustow 1970; Wantchekon 2004; Wood 2001). The logic behind 
this idea is that serious conflict can disrupt the autocratic order and reveal regime 
weaknesses (Pevehouse 2002; Robinson 2006; Weingast 1997). Once such weaknesses 
are exposed, an opportunity for democratization opens. This is especially important to 
consider when there is a violent transition from one autocrat to another. Splits within an 
autocracy have been known to weaken the popular perception of the regime’s strength 
(Londregan and Poole 1990; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Given the authoritarian 
regime’s weakness, the period following violent removal is seen as a period of high risk 
for democratization. Once such weaknesses are exposed, an opportunity for 
democratization opens. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that violent removal of a 
regime rarely leads to immediate democratization. According to Miller there only exist 
13 cases since 1875 of democratization concurrent with the violent removal of an 
autocratic leaders (2012, 1006). The literature has not sufficiently explained how a 
violent process relates to a peaceful democratic transition.  Therefore, the notion that 
violence precedes democratization remains an open question.  
Electoral authoritarian regimes emerge for several reasons, but their emergence is 
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especially tied to violent origins. Regimes that emerge from violent origins retain 
authoritarian practices for several reasons. Simply put, violent origins contribute to the 
durability of authoritarian practices, which make it less likely that a state will fully 
democratize in the face of liberalizing pressures or influences. At work are several causal 
mechanisms that are often linked with one another. First, regimes that arise from violent 
origins are very likely to have a strong capacity for repression. The ability to repress and 
repress effectively leads to the durability of authoritarian practices. Secondly, regimes 
that arise out of violent origins are likely to enjoy regime cohesion. Regime cohesion 
comes from strong partisan identities that are forged or reinforced during violent conflict. 
Regime leaders can rely on such partisan identities to create a durable regime. 
Compatriots or comrades are entrusted to guide the state’s repressive apparatus. Lastly, 
regimes that arise out of violent origins may gain tolerance or even legitimacy in their 
rule. Often the country is so exhausted from violent conflict, that any form of stability is 
welcomed, even if its autocratic stability. The ruling regime may therefore be tolerated or 
even legitimized since it brought stability to the country. Even if this tolerance wears off, 
the time bought often gives the regime an opportunity to solidify its rule and organize a 
capable state apparatus.   
 
Conflict Fatigue, Tolerance, and Legitimacy 
Regimes that arise from violent origins also have another important advantage; 
the country will most likely be exhausted from conflict. Violent conflict is taxing for all 
those involved. This is especially true when the conflict is lengthy and bloody. Constant 
conflict with the opposition exhausts security forces, negatively affects economic 
development, and makes the public uneasy. At some point, the masses and even key 
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members of the opposition will want some type of stability for the country. The fact that 
the country eventually wants peace is a momentous advantage for the ruling regime. As 
long as the ruling regime can bring stability and some remnant of peace, authoritarian 
rule may be tolerated, at least temporarily. This is to say that authoritarian leaders may 
gain some form of legitimacy or at least a “pass” to continue their rule. Overall, leaders 
that arise from violent origins gain some legitimacy if they can accomplish peace and 
stability or they may be widely tolerated because they offer the country its only chance 
for stability.  
Leaders that arise out violent origins may even gain actual approval and 
legitimacy. In some instances, leaders that arise out of violent origins may even be 
perceived as extraordinary and highly capable given their success on the battlefield. This 
is especially true of revolutionary origins. Charismatic leaders can even utilize their 
recent success to mobilize the masses. One classic example that illustrates this possibility 
is the case of Cuba under Fidel Castro. For the vast majority of the Cuban people, the 
downfall of Fulgencio Batista in 1959 signaled the end of an illegitimate and violent 
episode in Cuban history (Buckman 2008, 135).  Castro, the young and charismatic 
leader, enhanced his heroic image and promised an end to political corruption. At least 
initially, Castro had real legitimacy and received almost unanimous applause from the 
Cuban people (Buckman 2008, 135). As Castro’s reign pressed on, many became 
disillusioned. However, by that point it was too late to seriously challenge the regime. 
Like many autocratic regimes, initial legitimacy bought Castro enough time to build and 
organize a capable state apparatus.   
In instances when leaders cannot gain actual legitimacy, they strive for tolerance. 
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It is commonplace for authoritarian leaders to legitimize their rule as “temporary” or 
“transitional.” This is because authoritarian leaders do not often have the legitimacy that 
comes from democratic elections. Often authoritarian leaders will justify their rule as a 
necessary episode to bring economic prosperity or to steer the country in the right 
direction. Along with these justifications, leaders that arise out of violent origins can also 
justify their rule by claiming that they are restoring peace and stability. They may even 
justify repressing the opposition by claiming that it is a necessary step to avoid another 
bloody confrontation.  
One of the effects of a violent origin is that everything must eventually be rebuilt. 
After years of conflict, essential elements of the state must be reconstructed or repaired. 
Social services, welfare programs, and infrastructure must be mended. In some 
circumstances violent origins displace millions, and people may wish to come back and 
salvage what they have left of their old lives. In Zimbabwe, for example, 15 years of 
guerrilla warfare and civil conflict displaced a million refugees (Dickovick 2012, 330). 
Given the circumstances, Robert Mugabe gained some tolerance from the masses and 
rival politicians. In fact, Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU), even gained a majority of legislative seats in 1980 during Zimbabwe’s first 
postindependence elections (Dickovick 2012, 329).     
Even the ruling regime’s enemies have to consider rebuilding. The opposition also 
has to regroup and reorganize, especially after a violent conflict. If the opposition has 
been thoroughly defeated, they may have no choice but to initially tolerate the new 
regime in order to eventually defeat it. Once regime change has occurred, the defeated 
opposition has to heal from its losses. Continued conflict with the ruling regime equates 
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to deepening vulnerability, which at some point will make recovery unattainable. Long 
term success for the opposition may involve concessions to new ruling regime. The fact 
that the defeated opposition has to rebuild gives the ruling regime several advantages. 
The ruling regime benefits greatly from this initial window of tolerance or 
legitimacy. The time gained allows the regime to establish their regime and rule. This 
window of tolerance allows the ruling regime time to organize and build a state apparatus 
that will prolong the state’s tenure. The new ruling regime can reorganize the state to its 
liking and reinforce military and security forces. Essentially, the state can use this time to 
plant the seeds of authoritarian durability. Even if the regime cannot bring complete 
stability or prosperity to the country, their hold on power may be solidified by a capable 
state apparatus. The ruling regime must eventually deliver on stability though. The 
window of tolerance may be short-lived and can close swiftly if the direction of the 
country is perceived to be getting worse.  
Economic development often plays a crucial role. Economic development has 
been found to reduce violent political stability in both democracies and autocracies (Feng 
1997; Goldstone et al. 2010; Jones and Olken 2009; Londregan and Poole 1990; Sanders 
1981). Londregan and Poole, for example, find that higher GDP/capita reduces the 
likelihood of both attempted and successful military coups; in essence, “coups are almost 
non-existent in developed countries” (1990, 151). Additionally, Goldstone et al. (2010) 
find that less infant mortality (a major measure of development) is associated with fewer 
cases of civil wars, genocide and collapses of state authority.  
Admittedly, violent conflict can still flare up and may be the outcome of historical 
continuities. Some regimes may not have enough time to rebuild the country or a state 
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apparatus designed for long term rule. In some states constant violence is the norm. For 
example, although Guinea-Bissau has held numerous free and fair elections since the 
country’s independence (1974), heads of state rarely finish their allotted term of office 
due to assassinations, military coups, and intraparty conflicts (Dickovick 2012, 99-101). 
Leaders must therefore prepare to deal with violence and not assume that the country will 
thirst for stability. 
 
Repressive State Apparatus 
One of the most important sources of authoritarian durability is repression. The 
ruling regime relies on an effective repressive apparatus to stay in power. As explained 
above, authoritarianism can often lead to discontent among the masses. While discontent 
is commonplace and there are many instances of disaffection and dissatisfaction toward 
ruling regimes, successful revolutions are still rare events (Skocpol 1979). In other 
words, while grievances toward a ruling regime have existed since time immemorial, 
overthrowing the ruling regime has never been an easy endeavor. For Theda Skocpol, this 
divergence is explained by the strength of the state and the state’s capacity to maintain a 
monopoly on the means of coercion (1979). When the state’s coercive or repressive 
apparatus remains effective, the ruling regime can survive disaffection, illegitimacy, and 
even a sense of relative deprivation among its populace (Skocpol 1979).  
In authoritarian regimes an intact and effective coercive apparatus has the 
capacity to crush full democratic transitions. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, states 
that experienced democratic transitions also saw the decomposition of military and 
security establishments (Herbst 2001). For some scholars the democratic fate of many 
states was tied to the strength of the military establishment (Bratton and van de Walle 
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1997). More importantly, continued repression is the key to the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. The capacity to repress or the instruments of repression are some of the 
most powerful sources of authoritarian durability and the reason why authoritarian 
practices often continue.  
The threat or potential for repression must always be available for autocratic 
regimes to survive. What is crucial, however, is a continued monopoly on the use of 
violence. The ruling regime still has to have the capacity to carry out violence and 
threaten the opposition. When repression and violence are used, it chips away at the 
morale of the opposition. A highly capable coercive apparatus allows the ruling regime to 
take on most challenges from the opposition. One way that the opposition can gain 
strength is through violent means. It is crucial for the ruling regime to avoid an 
opposition capable of extreme violence. One obvious reason is that a violent opposition 
can challenge the ruling regime. Another reason is that a violent opposition can commit 
violence against civilians, which can cause several potential problems for the ruling 
regime. In fact, Wood (2001) finds that weaker insurgent groups tend to violently target 
civilians because they lack sufficient capacity to provide benefits that entice loyalty. In 
essence, violence is used as a warning to those who support the government or those who 
defect. In addition, opposition coalitions, most notably insurgents, may target civilians to 
underscore the government’s inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to protect civilians 
(Wood 2001). Civilians may tolerate (or even support) the ruling regime if they feel 
somewhat secure, but tolerance wanes as they become more and more insecure. This is 
why it is crucial for the ruling regime to maintain a monopoly on violence.  
Civilians are often motivated by immediate survival and security concerns 
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(Migdal, 1974). Civilians will not support the opposition if it is perceived as weak, 
especially if the ruling regime is perceived as strong and repressive. Some scholars find 
that civilians will not support a violent but weak opposition even if the government has 
historically repressed civilians (Kalyvas 2006, 167). More importantly, a regime with 
highly repressive capacities will weaken violence-prone opposition groups. Therefore, 
the ruling regime must deter the opposition from using violence both against the 
government and against civilians. In addition to halting the opposition, the capacity to 
repress often deters many in the masses from challenging the ruling regime. The threat of 
violence or repression is already enough to keep many civilians apolitical. Even the most 
politically motivated civilians still weigh the costs and benefits of challenging the ruling 
regime. The likelihood of severe punishment may deter many, so just having a capable 
coercive apparatus may save the ruling regime some trouble.  
Regime survival is tied to a successful coercive or repressive state apparatus. The 
durability of authoritarian practices is tied to strength in the means of coercion and 
repression. Even more important is the fact that durable regimes must have a monopoly 
on the means of violence or repression to stay in power. It is not enough to have some 
guns and soldiers, since it is far better to have all of the guns and soldiers. To achieve 
durability, it is best to have a monopoly on violence and repression. When it comes to 
achieving this objective, regimes that arise out of violent origins have several relative 
advantages.  
Violent origins are tied the robustness of a regime’s coercive apparatus. When it 
comes to controlling the means of repression or having a monopoly on violence, regimes 
that arise out of violent origins have several distinct advantages. First, there is the fact 
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that the ruling regime arose to power by violently defeating the opposition forces or 
rivals. By gaining power and defeating the opposition through a violent conflict, the 
ruling regime most likely eliminated many of the opposition’s means to challenge the 
ruling regime. In their defeat, the opposition most likely lost supporters, resources (e.g., 
weapons or money), and more importantly, influential leaders. It is extremely difficult to 
challenge the ruling regime when one has incurred major losses. In an especially bloody 
conflict many of the soldiers likely died in defeat. Furthermore, it may be extremely 
difficult to recruit others when defeat has occurred or is imminent.  
Even in less bloody conflicts, the opposition still loses highly influential leaders. 
Even in “bloodless” coups key members of the opposition are either killed or exiled out 
of the country. Such losses may be more momentous than losing large numbers of 
soldiers since influential leaders have the ability to organize effectively and recruit others 
within the state. With their death or even exile, such leaders either no longer have a hand 
in the political future of the country or a very minute role. The winning side will most 
likely purge the state of the opposition in the most important facets of society. It will be 
very difficult for the opposition to have influence fresh off defeat. Even after the conflict 
is over, the opposition will likely experience harassment, torture, or death. In extremely 
bloody origins any faction that is seen as potentially dangerous to the new regime is 
eliminated. The best example is that of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and leader 
Solath Sar (better known as Pol Pot). Supporters of the preceding regime were executed, 
and much of the middle class was eliminated as part of the Khmer Rouge’s communist 
order. This case illustrates the unfortunate consequences of being on the losing side. 
Winning a violent conflict puts the ruling regime in an advantageous position for future 
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endeavors. Even if the opposition can heal and recuperate, it will take time. In the 
meantime, the ruling regime will have access to state resources to reorganize, rebuild, and 
create a repressive state apparatus. Thus, victory through a violent conflict makes for a 
much easier path to an effective and repressive state apparatus.  
Secondly, regimes that come from violent origins have no problem with 
exercising repression. First, there is the fact that the regime will most likely have 
experience with carrying out repression. This experience becomes valuable when it is 
time to implement repressive strategies or create repressive security forces. Regime 
leaders that arise from violent origins also have the experience to stomach even the most 
unfathomable forms of repression. Participants of violent conflict see conflict itself as a 
notable part of their identity. Studies on the social psychology of conflict reveal that 
participants of conflict find it difficult to overcome the brutal legacy of violence, and 
many individuals even become nostalgic when reminiscing about the armed struggle 
(Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood 2007). Psychologically, participants of conflict 
change as they engage in violent acts against others. In some instances, participants may 
begin to morally devalue members of the other group (Staub 1990). After the conflict is 
over, this perception of “us-vs.-them” carries over as the ruling regime reconstructs state 
institutions. Past conflict and a negative perception of a foe makes it much easier to 
implement institutional change that harms them politically.   
 
Regime Cohesion and Partisan Identities 
As noted above, the means of repression represent a double-edged sword. While it 
takes a strong repressive apparatus to maintain control, the aspects that make up such an 
apparatus (i.e., security forces or the military) can turn on the ruling regime. To avoid 
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this, the ruling regime must have unrestrained loyalty from leaders in the security 
apparatus. The ruling regime and the repressive state apparatus must either be one in the 
same or have tremendous cohesion for a durable authoritarian regime. Regimes that arise 
from violent origins are likely to have strong cohesion with the state’s repressive 
apparatus, and often the ruling regime and the state’s repressive apparatus are one in the 
same.  
For authoritarian practices to remain durable, the ruling regime must be cohesive. 
There are several pathways to achieving regime cohesion. Cohesion can be bought or it 
can be gained. Regime leaders have been known to literally buy off potential opposition 
or even potential rivals within the regime that have the potential to cause trouble. This is 
to say that regimes can purchase cooperation with rewards, perks and privileges (Gandhi 
and Przeworski 2006). Regime leaders can offer prestigious leadership positions within 
the government such as cabinet seats or ministry positions. Such positions often come 
with immunity from prosecution and substantial monetary benefits. Regime leaders can 
also offer personalized benefits, such as opportunities for lobbying business interests, and 
preferential access to state leaders (Blaydes 2011; Lust-Okar 2005). Lastly, regime 
leaders can literally buy support. Consider for example that Joseph Mobutu, president of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, would literally hand out cash in exchange for 
political support (Le Billon 2003). Patronage can contribute to authoritarian durability. 
Eva Bellin (2004), for example, contends that patrimonial militaries have contributed to 
the stability of authoritarian systems in the Middle East. Patrimonial militaries are 
constructed by cultivating “a loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary 
patronage,” and by making military officers “perceive that they will be ruined by reform” 
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(Bellin 2004, 149).     
Overall, ruling regimes strive to co-opt anyone who can seriously affect the future 
of the regime. There is some debate as to who exactly is co-opted. Consider for instance 
that some scholars argue that patronage in favor of cities or urban locations ultimately 
undermines the regime survival in the long run (Wallace 2013). In addition, some 
scholars argue that those with an affinity toward the ruling regime are more likely to be 
bought off because their support is the cheapest to acquire (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003). In contrast, others argue that regime resources are more likely to go to those who 
are discontented and capable of challenging the ruling regime (Oi and Zhao 2007). Either 
position is possible and likely, but the most important individuals to co-opt are those with 
leverage. Hence, whether they are core supporters or potential opposition, ruling regimes 
make an effort to co-opt those with the ability to challenge the regime. The ruling regime 
places much stock on the coercive apparatus and the security elites in charge of the 
state’s security apparatus. One major problem that ruling regimes face is that these 
security elites can turn against regime leaders later on (Gandhi 2009; Haber 2006).  
While all sources of cohesion have the potential to eventually fade, cohesion that 
is bought through co-optation or patronage has the potential to backfire on the ruling 
regime. Economic development plays a crucial role when regimes trade financial rewards 
for loyalty. Loyal members of the regime have access to the spoils of power and the 
resources of a productive economy. Hence, having strong development helps to solidify 
loyalty. In times of economic turmoil, there will be fewer resources for patronage and 
many may turn on the ruling regime. While patronage and co-optation are still important, 
there are much stronger sources of regime cohesion. More importantly, regimes that arise 
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out of violent origins have such sources of cohesion at their disposal.  
Conflict and cohesion are closely linked. Strong cohesion is required to 
successfully win a conflict. A regime that rises from a violent origin has cohesive 
tendencies, at least initially. This is because violent circumstances require individuals to 
form close bonds. Civil wars, revolutions, insurgencies and even coup d’états are often 
lethal instances. When lives are on the line individuals collaborate closely to eliminate 
threats. Scholars have acknowledged the relation between conflict and cohesion. Coser 
(1956) argues that violent conflict generates a sense of serious threat to a given group and 
thereby increases cohesion. Additionally, international relations scholars have long noted 
that the use of external conflict has a tendency to increase internal cohesion and political 
centralization (Sirin 2011; Stein 1976). The bonds formed in conflict lead to mutual 
feelings of trust. Once the conflict is over, the bonds of trust do not simply disappear. 
Once the ruling regime gains power, the tight bonds and relationships formed during the 
violent conflict can be reinforced again and again, leading to strong regime cohesion. In 
an attempt to conjure up support, leaders can remind regime members of their past 
struggles and rely on moments of cohesion from the past. In essence, groups that have a 
history of being engaged in violent conflicts form tight bonds and relationships to deal 
with a threatening environment. This source of cohesion is associated with the role that 
partisan identities play in regime durability.  
Another important source of authoritarian durability is partisan identities. 
Identities themselves are often politically significant. Political party identification, 
ideology, nationality, ethnicity and religion can be crucial aspects of identities. Though 
the description of a political identity is certainly important, what is more important in the 
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context of this study is the notion that individuals cling to such identities and have some 
difficulty deviating from them. The concept of partisan identities refers to idea that 
individuals can remain extremely loyal and unwavering to their political identity and 
political beliefs. Partisan identities cause feelings of intense solidarity. Emotions and 
affect are tied to partisan identities; therefore, partisan identities induce behaviors. Group 
identification has the potential to result in intense sentiments: affection, hatred, a 
willingness to sacrifice and die. Partisan identities may be overpowering and coercive, to 
the point where regime elites can manipulate such sentiments to gain political influence 
and power. Establishing regime cohesion becomes much easier and more longstanding 
when partisan identities and are attached to normative beliefs. Individuals give support to 
the regime because they believe it is morally right and ideologically correct.   
The notion of partisan identities is amplified when identities are tied to 
primordialism. Primordialism refers to the theory that identity is tied to the “natural” or 
the God-given. This is to say that political identities are tied to notions of kingship, 
culture, language, race and ethnicity (Drogus and Orvis 2012, 147). Such sources of 
political identity have the potential to create unwavering partisan identities. The impact 
of partisan identities is especially seen if the country is divided by ethnic or tribal lines. 
Ethnic divisions have the potential to magnify the “us vs. them” mentality that 
consolidates in-group loyalty. Ethnic divisions in the country may increase repressive 
tendencies especially when such divisions are also split among political lines. However, it 
is important to note that partisan identities are not always affected by primordial 
variables. In some instances, partisan identities may be formed through socioeconomic 
status or classes. More importantly, conflict tends to cement partisan identities.    
   
 
87 
Historical memories of conflict can intensify partisan identities. A history of a 
struggle with various enemies leads to a sense of community, and it serves as a source of 
inspiration for future generations. Roger Petersen (2002) finds that emotions like fear, 
hatred, and resentment trigger conflict. During periods of conflict combatants tend to 
demonize their rivals (Guelke 1995). For some, these effect may be difficult to do away 
with. Thus, conflict augments partisan identities because individuals have difficulty with 
forming any type of relation with former enemies (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 
2001). Partisan identities increase regime durability, and in an authoritarian context, 
autocrats can rely on partisan identities to stay in power and continue to employ 
autocratic practices. As mentioned above, patronage or buying support can ultimately be 
a weak source of cohesion. The ruling regime must rely on cohesion and unwavering 
loyalty to effectively run the state and wield a repressive state apparatus. This can be a 
major problem for the ruling regime if loyalty has to be purchased. This is especially true 
during financial crises when the military cannot be compensated for its loyalty. Even 
small grumblings within the military can lead to regime collapse. Consider for example 
that even a tiny minority of the military or even junior military officers have been 
successful at ousting newly formed regimes (Reno 1998).  
However, regimes formed through violent origins have roots that go beyond 
patronage. After a violent regime change it is in the best interest of the successors to 
conduct a “purge” of the state. The newly formed regime must disintegrate sympathizers 
from the old regime and install compatriots in places of power. For instance, if factions of 
the vanquished regime retain power in the military, the new regime may have disloyalty 
at the heart of the state. At any moment, the military may try to seize back control of the 
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state. Regimes that arise from violent origins prepare for the likelihood of more violence. 
Such regimes are more likely to place partisan cadres in places of power so that there is at 
least loyalty from those at the top. 
Regimes of violent origins are more likely to place partisan cadres as heads of the 
security forces. To head the security apparatus, regime leaders promote comrades that 
they fought with and went to war with. They share the same experiences, struggles and 
ideologies. In some cases, they may be linked through bonds of blood, sect, or ethnicity. 
In many instances such linkages have the potential to strengthen regime cohesion. 
Cohesion rises when members of the regime believe they are defending their identity, 
worldview, or ideology and not just their privileged status. 
In countries with violent origins, leaders of the security apparatus are more likely 
to have partisan identities and are extremely loyal to regime leaders. Defection for them 
is a matter of morality and ideology, and not just a simple cost-benefit analysis. The 
leaders of the security apparatus are highly invested in the survival of the ruling regime. 
If the regime falls, they will likely be purged out, replaced, or killed. Although security 
defections are still possible, states with violent origins are less likely to have security 
forces turn against regime leadership. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical framework of this dissertation is laid out. Overall, I 
argue that there two significant factors that contribute to the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. First, liberalization must occur. Second, authoritarian practices must 
persist even in the face of liberalization. The second factor relates to authoritarian 
durability or the persistence of authoritarian practices. Authoritarian durability is crucial 
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to the rise of electoral authoritarianism, but more importantly, violent origins are likely to 
increase authoritarian durability. These statements raise some prudent questions. One 
glaring question relates to why durable authoritarian regimes would liberalize in the first 
place. 
In an ideal world most closed authoritarian leaders would not choose to liberalize. 
However, in the real world most autocratic leaders are influenced, pressured, or 
compelled to liberalize. Despite this harsh reality, many autocratic regimes can turn some 
liberalization into serious advantages. Liberalization allows the regime to maintain 
international support, especially when foreign aid is tied to democratic reform. 
Democratic institutions such as legislatures provide a medium for cooptation. 
Implementing elections allows the regime to gauge popularity and provides information 
on which regions the regime can clamp down on. Liberalization may even scale-back 
violent conflict with the opposition. While legislatures give the opposition a medium to 
criticize the ruling regime, it is better than the opposition resorting to violent means. 
Elections may also institute some predictability to succession procedures. The worst case 
scenario about elections is that the ruling regime may lose an election to the opposition. 
In the context of closed authoritarianism, the opposition may have no other choice but to 
remove the ruling regime in a violent manner. Losing an election allows for recovery; 
being removed violently may spell the literal end of a regime. Offering political openings 
may even confound and divide the opposition. When liberalization is instituted, the 
opposition has to decide on whether to participate and legitimize it, or search for other 
alternatives. If the opposition contains factions, such difficult decisions can splinter the 
opposition and eventually weaken it.  
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A second glaring question pertains to how violent origins affect authoritarian 
durability. Violent origins are likely to create environments in which authoritarian 
durability is bolstered. There are several causal mechanisms that connect violent origins 
with authoritarian durability. Regimes that arise from violent origins have a strong 
capacity for repression. A strong repressive apparatus allows the regime to employ 
authoritarian practices. Regimes that arise from violent origins are also likely to enjoy 
strong regime cohesion. Regime cohesion is maintained by strong partisan identities that 
are reinforced during violent conflicts. Finally, regimes that arise from violent origins 
may be tolerated due to the fact that the country is likely fatigued from conflict. The 
regime may even gain actual legitimacy if it can bring stability to the country. More 
importantly, tolerance allows the regime time to construct a highly capable state 




























    
METHODS AND PROCEDURES OF ANALYSIS 
 
How do we know a regime is electoral authoritarian when we see it? In this 
chapter the method for measuring electoral authoritarianism is discussed in great detail. 
There are many difficulties associated with measuring the concept of electoral 
authoritarianism. Schedler argues that the main methodological difficulty in identifying 
electoral authoritarianism pertains to the visibility of manipulative practices (2006, 7). 
One difficulty is that authoritarian practices are not easily accessible to the public, and 
repression during elections or unfair political playing fields cannot be directly observed 
in all circumstances. Consider for example that authoritarian practices such as the 
alteration of electoral lists, the purchase and intimidation of voters, or the falsification of 
ballots cannot easily be detected (Schedler 2006, 8).  
Although we can find some empirical evidence of such practices after the fact, we 
can never truly be sure of the extent that regimes go to implement authoritarian practices. 
Fortunately, we can at least observe some aspects of an unfair electoral playing field. For 
instance, the enactment of discriminatory election laws, the exclusion of candidates from 
the ballot, and electoral competition that can be accounted for and verified. Although 
such conditions do not account for all attributes of the concept, they are a good starting 
point for identifying electoral authoritarian regimes.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized in the following manner. In the first section 
of this chapter, I explain the features of the dataset that is utilized in this study. In this 
section, I also justify the parameters of the dataset. The second section of this chapter 
provides a discussion on the methods used to measure electoral authoritarianism. In this 
section, I provide a step-by-step process on how electoral authoritarian regimes are 
classified. Additionally, the reliability and validity of this measurement method is 
explained. In the final section, I briefly discuss the analyses performed in the proceeding 
chapters of this dissertation. Specifically, large-N analysis and illustrative case studies are 
completed in this study. 
 
Dataset Description 
This study utilizes an original cross-national longitudinal dataset.1 This dataset 
aggregates information on 108 countries from 1975-2012. This timeframe (1975-2012) 
essentially includes the “Third Wave” era (Huntington 1991), while also incorporating 
the post-Cold War era. This dataset only includes countries that were not fully democratic 
during the years 1975-1989. In essence, this excludes states that were full democracies, 
but it does include countries that were either fully authoritarian or electoral authoritarian 
during this timespan. Democratic backsliding occurs, but the design of this dataset 
excludes cases that were fully democratic and then transitioned to full authoritarianism or 
electoral authoritarianism post-1989. There are several reasons for implementing this 
cutoff date. Empirically, transitions toward electoral authoritarianism increased during 
the post-Cold War era. This dataset allows me to test hypotheses claiming that 
																																																						
 
1 Sometimes referred to as panel data.  
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liberalization in the authoritarian world occurred because of the nature of the post-Cold 
War environment. Though this study is dedicated to studying the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism, providing insights on this endeavor also requires studying authoritarian 
durability. Since this dataset only includes fully authoritarian and electoral authoritarian 
regimes, the dataset allows me to examine authoritarian durability, including how it 
works and the factors that contribute to it.  
One of the challenges of creating this dataset pertained to which countries should 
be included or excluded from the dataset. In order to decide which states to include in the 
dataset, I rely on the measurement guidelines of Andreas Schedler (2013). To draw 
distinctions between democracy, full authoritarianism, and electoral authoritarianism, 
Schedler utilizes Freedom House’s annual reports on Freedom in the World. Before 
proceeding, it is important to note that several scholars have been critical of Freedom 
House. In fact, scholars such as Munck and Verkuilen (2002) have been especially 
critical of Freedom House. Such scholars argue that Freedom House has problems with 
conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation. In my opinion, however, there are few 
alternatives that cover countries around the world on an annual basis. In addition, many 
leading scholars in the study of hybrid regimes have relied on Freedom House datasets, 
including Schedler.2  
Freedom House rates countries around the world in terms of political rights and 
civil liberties. Schedler specifically relies on Freedom House’s conceptualization of 
																																																						
	
2 In their study on liberalizing electoral outcomes, Marc Morje Howard and Philip 
G. Roessler (2006) relied on both Freedom House and the Polity democracy indices to 
measure competitive authoritarian regimes.  
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political rights. Freedom House rates political rights on a scale of 1-7. A score of 7 is 
associated with countries in which there are few or no political rights because of severe 
government oppression, while a score of 1 is associated with countries with a wide range  
of political rights, including free and fair elections.3 Essentially, the lower the score the 
more protected political rights are, while a higher score is associated with fewer political 
rights. For Schedler, countries with a political rights score of 7 are associated with closed 
or fully authoritarian regimes. Additionally, Schedler treats countries that received a 
political rights score in the 1-3 range as democratic. Schedler argues that electoral 
authoritarian regimes score in the 4-6 political rights score range. Using these guidelines, 
I created a case universe for the dataset. Table 4.1 presents the countries included in the 
dataset. Included in the dataset are countries that were fully authoritarian or electoral 
authoritarian according to these guidelines (for the years 1975-1989). Hence, states that 
received a Freedom House political rights score in the 1-3 range for this timeframe were 
excluded from the dataset, but states that received a score in the 4-7 range were included 
in the dataset. Even though this guideline is utilized for the creation of the dataset, 
measuring electoral authoritarianism requires additional specifications.  
 
Measuring Electoral Authoritarianism 
The overarching goal of this study is to examine how and why electoral 
authoritarian regimes emerge. To measure electoral authoritarianism, I rely on the 
guidelines set by Schedler (2013), and I rely on data from the National Elections across  
																																																						
 
3 For more information, please refer to www.freedomhouse.org. This website 
provides access to the dataset used for this analysis and explanations for ratings 
methodology and ratings explanations.  
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Table 4.1 States in Dataset 
   
Afghanistan  Albania  Algeria  
Angola  Armenia Azerbaijan 
Bahrain  Bangladesh Belarus 
Benin Bhutan Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bulgaria Burkina Faso  Burundi  
Cambodia  Cameroon   Central African Republic 
Chad  Chile  China 
Comoros  Congo-Brazzaville  Congo-Kinshasa  
Croatia Cuba  Czech Republic 
Djibouti  Egypt  Equatorial Guinea  
Estonia Ethiopia  Fiji 
Gabon  Georgia Ghana  
Guinea Guinea-Bissau  Guyana 
Haiti  Hungary Indonesia  
Iran  Iraq  Ivory Coast  
Jordan  Kazakhstan Kenya  
Kuwait  Korea, North Kyrgyzstan 
Laos  Latvia Lebanon  
Lesotho  Liberia  Libya  
Lithuania Macedonia  Madagascar  
Malawi  Malaysia Mali  
Mauritania  Moldova Mongolia  
Montenegro Morocco Mozambique 
Myanmar (Burma) Nepal Nicaragua  
Niger  Nigeria  Oman 
Panama Paraguay  Poland  
Qatar  Romania  Russia 
Rwanda  Saudi Arabia  Serbia 
Sierra Leone Singapore  Slovakia 
Slovenia Somalia  South Africa  
Sri Lanka Sudan  Swaziland  
Syria  Taiwan Tajikistan 
Tanzania  Togo  Tunisia  
Turkmenistan  Uganda  Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates  Uzbekistan Vietnam  
Yemen Zambia  Zimbabwe 
   
N= 108   
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Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Utilizing 
Freedom House, Schedler argues that electoral authoritarian regimes score in the 4-6 
political rights score range. In addition, Schedler argues that states should be coded as 
electoral authoritarian if they remain in the specified range of political rights scores for at 
least four consecutive years, including an election year. Moreover, Schedler argues that a 
state is only classified as electoral authoritarian if multiparty competition existed during 
an election year. To measure multiparty competition, I incorporate the NELDA dataset 
(Hyde and Marinov 2012). 
The NELDA dataset was conceptualized by Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. 
The NELDA dataset provides detailed information on election events from 1945-2012.4  
The unit of analysis for the NELDA dataset is the election round and all elections 
(legislative or executive) are coded. The NELDA dataset is extremely useful for several 
reasons. First, the NELDA dataset provides some insight on the competitiveness of 
elections. Second and closely related, the NELDA dataset provides details on the 
autocratic practices of incumbents. Additionally, the NELDA dataset incorporates 
information on how opposition groups are treated. The NELDA dataset includes 
information on whether the opposition was legally allowed to run for election, if multiple 
political parties were legal, and if specific opposition candidates were harassed or 
prevented from running.5 In essence, the NELDA dataset helps to clarify whether 
																																																						
	
4 Since the NELDA dataset does not include data for countries with populations 
less than 500,000, such countries were excluded from my analysis.  
 
5 This is not an exhaustive list. In fact, NELDA provides data for other factors, 
though they are not utilized for the purposes of this study.  
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multiparty competition exists in a given case. For such reasons, the NELDA dataset is 
especially useful for this research endeavor.6  
In order to classify as electoral authoritarian three requirements have to be met. 
The first step in the process includes determining if a state fits the 4-6 range in the 
Freedom House political rights score. Second, a state has to meet this specified range for 
the length of at least four consecutive years, including an election year during such a 
timeframe. Elections could be at the beginning, middle, or the end of this four-year time 
frame. Third, in addition to the political rights score requirement and the timeframe 
requirement, regimes also have to hold multiparty competition during election years. 
Three variables from the NELDA dataset are examined to assess whether multiparty 
competition exists: is opposition allowed, is more than one party legal, and are opposition 
leaders prevented from running? To determine if multiparty competition took place, I 
examined three variables. Regimes were classified as electoral authoritarian only if the 
NELDA variables were coded as follows:  
1. Was opposition allowed: Yes 
 
2. Was more than one party legal: Yes 
 
3. Were opposition leaders prevented from running: No 
 
All three requirements have to be fulfilled for a case to be classified as electoral 
authoritarian. Even if only one requirement is not met, a case is coded as closed or fully 
authoritarian. In other words, cases are coded as closed or fully authoritarian if only one 
																																																						
	
6 For more information on the procedures utilized in the NELDA dataset, please 
refer to http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/. The NELDA dataset, codebook, and detailed 
information on methodology and intercoder reliability are all available on this site.  
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of these variables is coded as follows: 
1. Was opposition allowed: No 
 
2. Was more than one party legal: No 
 
3. Were opposition leaders prevented from running: Yes 
 
After assessing the requirements for electoral authoritarianism, countries are coded 
accordingly in the dataset. Table 4.2 presents the states that were coded as electoral 
authoritarian with regime’s timeframe in parentheses.  
I chose this method to measure electoral authoritarianism for several reasons. 
First, this method of measuring electoral authoritarianism is extremely straightforward 
and can be applied systematically for almost all countries around the world. This method 
of measurement can be applied to a large universe of cases since both Freedom House 
and NELDA have extensive data on states around the world. This method of 
measurement can therefore be applied in a systematic fashion without having to solely 
rely on “cross the line” judgment calls. This brings solid reliability to measuring electoral 
authoritarianism since there is consistency and dependability. Problems of interrater or 
interobserver reliability are minimal, and this method of measurement can easily be 
replicated. Overall, this method of measurement is reliable, but it is also a valid measure 
of electoral authoritarianism. 
Although improvements are always welcomed, the validity of this measurement is 
adequate. There is ample evidence that this measurement method is in fact measuring 
what it is intended to measure (electoral authoritarianism). Researchers should not take 
the issue of validity lightly, and questions about the validity of the measurement should 
be welcomed. To assess the validity of this measurement method, let us first review the  
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Table 4.2 Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
  
Afghanistan (2002-09) Albania (1997-2000) 
Algeria (1998-2006) Angola (2005-12) 
Armenia (1995-2007) Azerbaijan (1991-94, 1996-2004) 
Bahrain (1999-2009) Bangladesh (1981-90, 2002-08)  
Belarus (1991-2003) Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-2012) 
Burkina Faso (1989-2012) Burundi (2002-12) 
Cambodia (1998-2012) Central African Rep. (1989-92, 2002-12) 
Chad (1993-2006) Comoros (1988-91, 1993-2005) 
Congo-Brazzaville (1999-2012)  Congo-Kinshasa (2003-12) 
Croatia (1992-99) Djibouti (1993-96, 1999-2012) 
Egypt (1994-98, 2000-05)  Ethiopia (1991-2004) 
Fiji (1987-98, 2000-2012)  Gabon (1990-2012) 
Georgia (1993-96, 2000-03, 2007-11) Ghana (1990-95) 
Guinea (1990-2007) Guinea-Bissau (1998-04, 2006-12) 
Guyana (1978-91)  Haiti (1994-2003) 
Indonesia (1967-1992)  Ivory Coast (1990-94) 
Jordan (1990-2006)  Kazakhstan (2005-11) 
Kenya (1990-94, 1997-2002, 2007-12)  Kyrgyzstan (1991-94, 2002-2012) 
Lebanon (1989-2012)  Lesotho (1994-2001)  
Liberia (1997-2005) Macedonia (1994-97) 
Madagascar (2006-12)  Malawi (2004-08) 
Malaysia (1984-2007) Mauritania (1995-2000, 2002-2012) 
Moldova (1991-95) Morocco (1979-1996, 1999-2012) 
Mozambique (1991-94, 2009-12) Nicaragua (1981-1989, 2008-12)  
Niger (1999-2003) Nigeria (1998-2012) 
Panama (1981-88) Paraguay (1973-90, 1994-2002) 
Romania (1990-95) Russia (1998-2012) 
Sierra Leone (1998-2006) Singapore (1975-90, 1994-2012) 
Sri Lanka (1989-95, 2007-2012) Tajikistan (97-2004, 2007-12) 
Tanzania (1992-2009) Taiwan (1984-89) 
Togo (1994-2002, 2006-12) Tunisia (1976-80, 1987-92, 1996-2002) 
Uganda (1993-2005, 2008-12)  Ukraine (2000-04)  
Yemen (1993-2011) Zambia (1998-2005)  
Zimbabwe (1980-2003, 2009-2012)  
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definition of electoral authoritarianism. Schedler defines electoral authoritarianism as a 
regime in which elections are inclusive (universal suffrage), at least minimally pluralistic 
(opposition parties are allowed participation), minimally competitive (incumbent 
dominated, but opposition win votes and seats), and minimally open (opposition parties 
experience repressive treatment though not massive repression) (2006, 3). While no 
method of measurement can perfectly capture the concept of electoral authoritarianism, 
the method utilized in this study incorporates measures that closely approximate the 
concept. Since I utilize Schedler’s definition of electoral authoritarianism, I also utilized 
Schedler’s guidelines for classifying which states are electoral authoritarian. This strategy 
comes with some advantages. First, Schedler’s guidelines are extremely straightforward 
in requirements: Freedom House political rights score, a four-year time frame, and 
multiparty electoral competition. Secondly, Schedler has extensively researched the 
concept and is a leading authority on the study of electoral authoritarianism.  
The Freedom House political rights score is utilized because it brings several 
advantages to the measuring process. Freedom House has some limitations, but 
ultimately, it helps to validly measure and classify electoral authoritarian regimes. 
Admittedly, Freedom House has some methodological problems. One problem that 
scholars recognize relates to the fact that Freedom House scores combine concerns about 
elections with concerns about governance or the exercise of power (Schedler 2006, 11). 
In other words, the aggregation of concepts is too high. Another obvious issue pertains to 
the nature of the Freedom House scoring system. For some, it is rather unclear how 
qualitative judgments on various dimensions translate into the seven-point scale 
(Schedler 2006, 11). One difficulty of working with this score is that cries of arbitrariness 
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and skepticism are put forth when there is an attempt to translate this numerical scale into 
qualitative regime categories. Such concerns are certainly justified, but Freedom House is 
a useful tool for observing electoral authoritarianism because it asks similar questions 
that are asked when conceptualizing the definition of electoral authoritarianism.   
The Freedom House political rights score accounts for the nature of elections. The 
score is based on whether the chief executive and the legislative are elected through free 
and fair elections.7 Additionally, the political rights score is also based on fair electoral 
laws, equal campaign opportunities, fair polling and fair tabulation of votes. In essence, 
the score also helps to account for specific aspects of electoral manipulation or political 
repression that opposition parties may experience. The political rights score also takes 
into account the potential for electoral competition. The political rights score accounts for 
the presence of opposition parties and how such opposition parties fare during elections. 
Obviously, constructing such a measurement requires a great deal of judgment on the part 
of the Freedom House survey team. Even so, scholars note that judgments on the quality 
of the electoral processes seem fundamentally reasonable (Schedler 2006, 11). While 
certainly limited, the Freedom House measure of political rights is a helpful guide for 
classifying electoral authoritarianism. This is especially true when Freedom House data 
are complemented with other electoral data.   
When it comes to the validity of electoral authoritarian measurements, the 
NELDA dataset certainly helps. Measures from the NELDA dataset mainly account for 
the inclusivity of elections. More specifically, NELDA helps to account for whether 
																																																						
 
7 For a full or more detailed discussion on the Freedom House methodology 
process, visit https://freedomhouse.org.  
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opposition parties are legally allowed to participate and if they are not inhibited from 
participating. Although this is not a direct measure of electoral competition, it is still 
useful because it helps to account for the opposition’s opportunity to compete. 
Additionally, many of the measures are coded independently and in such a 
straightforward manner that there is clarity on what each measure represents. Again, such 
a dataset requires a great deal of judgment on the part of researchers who assembled the 
dataset, but intercoder reliability was well over 90% for the variables utilized in this 
study. When utilized together, the Freedom House and NELDA datasets provide a 
reliable and valid mechanism for measuring electoral authoritarianism. Nonetheless, I 
implement several analyses to further assess the validity of this method of measurement.  
Overall, this method of measuring electoral authoritarianism has face validity, 
which is to say that it appears to measure what it is supposed to measure. In addition, this 
measurement of electoral authoritarianism certainly has construct validity, meaning that 
this particular measure relates as it should to other measures or as one would expect. For 
example, since one major aspect of electoral authoritarianism is repression, this measure 
of electoral authoritarianism should correlate well with measures of repression.  
Calculating correlations is a typical way to validate the construct validity of a 
measurement. This is because correlation coefficients work fairly well for indicating the 
strength and direction of the relationship between variables. To check the construct 
validity of my electoral authoritarian measure, I employ the use of correlation analysis.   
To utilize correlation analysis, I first create a simple ordinal measure of electoral 
authoritarianism. Using the electoral authoritarian regime guidelines outlined above, I 
create an ordinal scale that accounts for full authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism 
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and full democracy. The ordinal scale ranges from 0-2, and cases are coded as follows: 
full authoritarianism is coded as 0, electoral authoritarianism is coded as 1, and 
democracy is coded as 2. This ordinal measure correlates well with other ordinal 
measures of democratization. For instance, the Pearson correlation coefficient for this 
ordinal scale and the combined Freedom House-Polity score is +0.86.8 This is to be 
expected since both measures utilize Freedom House data. Even so, this coefficient still 
indicates that this ordinal scale of electoral authoritarianism is highly correlated with a 
measure of liberalization that is highly recommended and noted to be extremely useful by 
Hadenius and Teorell (2005). In addition, this constructed ordinal measure correlates well 
with measures closely associated to electoral authoritarianism.  
Consider for example that this measure of electoral authoritarianism correlates 
well with measures of repression. Abstractly, the concept of electoral authoritarianism is 
closely tied with repression. Additionally, repression is a crucial element of fully 
authoritarian regimes; therefore, signs of repression should be evident in any regime 
where authoritarian practices exist. For data on repression, I utilize human rights data 
from David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards (2010), also known as the CIRI dataset. 
Specifically, I utilize CIRI’s physical integrity rights index, which is an additive index 
constructed from the torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and 
disappearance indicators from CIRI.  
These indicators essentially account for violent forms of repression. With regard 
																																																						
	
8 The combined Freedom House-Polity score is an ordinal measure of 
liberalization that ranges from 0-10, where 10 signifies the most liberalization and 0 
indicates the smallest amount of liberalization. Generally, cases that score 7-10 are 
considered democracies (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). 
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to the torture indicator, CIRI accounts for “the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, 
whether mental or physical, by government officials” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 
17). By extrajudicial killings, Cingranelli and Richards refer to “killings by government 
officials without due process of law… [and] the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of 
lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state” (2014, 7). The 
political imprisonment indicator accounts for “the incarceration of people by government 
officials because of speech; their non-violent opposition to government policies or 
leaders; their religious beliefs…or their membership in a group, including ethnic or racial 
groups” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 21). The CIRI disappearance indicator refers to 
“cases in which people have disappeared, agents of the state are likely responsible, and 
political motivation may be likely” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 12).  
The CIRI physical integrity rights index ranges from 0 (indicating no government 
respect for those four rights) to 8 (indicating full respect for those four rights). This index 
is a solid measure of how repressive a country is. The Pearson correlation coefficient for 
this index and the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale is +0.36, which indicates a positive 
correlation that is moderately high. This indicates that increases in the electoral 
authoritarian ordinal scale are correlated with increases in CIRI’s physical integrity rights 
index. Essentially, more democratization is positively correlated with increased respect 
for human rights. In other words, the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale correlates with 
measures of repression in the manner that one would expect. The CIRI physical integrity 
rights index essentially accounts for violent forms of repression. Even so, the CIRI 
dataset includes additional data that help to account for repression in the political rights 
arena, as well as data that account for repression of social rights. These CIRI data are 
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utilized to further assess the construct validity of my measure for electoral 
authoritarianism. 
In particular, I examine how aspects of political rights and social rights relate to 
the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale employed in this study. With regard to political 
rights or the repression of political rights, I constructed an additive index that aggregates 
CIRI indicators that account for freedom of assembly and association, independence of 
the judiciary, freedom of speech, women’s political rights, and electoral self-
determination. The CIRI indicator for “freedom of assembly and association” accounts 
for the “right of citizens to assemble freely and to associate with other persons in political 
parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other groups” (Cingranelli and Richards 
2014, 52). The indicator for “independence of the judiciary” accounts for “the extent to 
which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch 
of the government or the military” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 85). Freedom of 
speech refers to “the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by 
government censorship” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 27). With regard to women’s 
political rights, this CIRI indicator accounts for whether women have the right to vote, 
run for political office, hold elected and appointed government positions, join political 
parties, and petition government officials (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 71). The term 
“electoral self-determination” refers to “the rights of citizens to freely determine their 
own political system and leadership,” and “the legal right and ability in practice to 
change the laws and officials that govern them through periodic, free, and fair elections” 
(Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 59).    
CIRI codes these five variables independently, but for the purposes of this study, I 
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aggregated all five variables into a single scale. The scale essentially adds up the 
independently coded scores to form an aggregate score. This constructed aggregate scale 
ranges from 0 (indicating no government respect for these five variables) to 11 
(indicating full respect for these variables).9 This index essentially accounts for aspects of 
political rights and political participation. Although serious conclusions should not be 
taken from this correlation analysis, it does help to uncover the validity of my measure 
for electoral authoritarianism. Measures of democratization or liberalization scales should 
be positively correlated with such an index of political rights. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient for this index and the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale is +0.71, which 
signifies that there is a positive correlation that is relatively high. This coefficient 
essentially means that an increase in the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale is correlated 
with an increase in the aggregate scale that accounts for political rights and political 
participation. This is an expected result, since one would expect increases in 
democratization to be correlated with increased respect for political rights. In addition to 
measures of political rights and participation, I utilized CIRI data to examine the 
relationship between aspects of social rights and my measure of electoral 
authoritarianism.  
When it comes to aspects of social rights, I constructed an additive index that 
aggregates CIRI data such as freedom of travel and foreign movement, freedom of 
domestic movement, freedom of religion, workers rights, and women’s economic rights. 
																																																						
 
9 With the exception of the women’s political rights score, which is coded on a 0-
3 scale, the other variables are coded on a 0-2 scale, with 0 indicating no respect for 
rights and 2 indicating full respect for rights.  
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These variables essentially account for the social freedoms allowed in a country. CIRI 
accounts for these variables and codes them into an ordinal scale.10 Specifically, the 
indicator for “freedom of travel and foreign movement” simply accounts for “the freedom 
to leave and return to one’s country” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 46). Similarly, the 
indicator for “freedom of domestic movement” accounts for “the freedom to travel within 
one’s own country” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 40). With regard to freedom of 
religion, CIRI accounts for the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious 
beliefs without government restrictions (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 31). When it 
comes to the worker’s rights indicator, CIRI accounts for the freedom of association in 
the workplace, the right of workers to bargain collectively, prohibition of forced or 
compulsory labor, minimum age of employment, and acceptable conditions of work 
(Cingranelli and Richards 2014, 65). Finally, the CIRI indicator for women’s economic 
rights essentially accounts for women’s rights to equal pay and benefits, freedom in 
choice of employment, and equality in hiring and promotion practices (Cingranelli and 
Richards 2014, 77). 
To perform a correlation analysis, I aggregated these variables into a single 
variable or scale. The scale ranges from 0 (indicating no government respect for these 
five variables) to 11 (indicating full respect for these variables). The main point of 
implementing this correlation analysis is to assess how the electoral authoritarian ordinal 
scale correlates with aspects of social freedom. Measures of democratization or 
																																																						
 
10 With the exception of the women’s economic rights score, which is coded on a 
0-3 scale, the other variables are coded on a 0-2 scale, with 0 indicating no respect for 
rights and 2 indicating full respect for rights. 
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liberalization should correlate positively with measures of social freedoms. Rather than 
making serious generalizations, the point of this correlation is to assess the construct 
validity of my electoral authoritarian measure. Overall, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is +0.57 for the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale and the aggregated social 
rights index. This means that there is a relatively high and positive correlation between 
the two scales. Increases in the electoral authoritarian scale (or more democratization) are 
correlated with increases in the social rights scale (or more social freedoms). In other 
words, this measure of electoral authoritarianism positively correlates with social rights 
and freedoms. This is what is expected from a reliable measure of liberalization.   
Another way to check the construct validity of this electoral authoritarian 
measurement is to examine how well it correlates with proxies of electoral manipulation. 
One such example is election results. In particular, we can analyze how dominant the 
governing regime is in the legislative arena. The simplest way to assess this is to examine 
the percentage of legislative seats the incumbent government holds. An alternative route 
is to examine the percentage of legislative seats that the opposition holds. In countries 
where authoritarian practices or electoral manipulations are widely employed, the 
opposition is expected to hold fewer legislative seats. Conversely, the governing regime 
is expected to hold more legislative seats in the same circumstances. For this correlation 
analysis, information about the legislature is drawn from the World Bank (2012) World 
Development Indicators dataset.   
First, let us examine the relation between the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale 
and the percentage of legislative seats that the incumbent regime or government holds. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient for these variables is -0.46, which is a negative 
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correlation that is moderately high. This coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
percentage of legislative government seats is correlated with a decrease in the electoral 
authoritarian ordinal scale. This is to say that the more dominant a government is in the 
legislature, the less democratic the regime is. The second correlation of interests is the 
relation between the number of legislative seats the opposition holds and the electoral 
authoritarian ordinal scale. The results of this correlation also yield some expected 
results. With regard to the relation between the electoral authoritarian ordinal scale and 
the percentage of legislative seats that the opposition holds,11 the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is +0.59. This means that there is a high and positive correlation between 
these two variables. Increases in the percentage of legislative seats that the opposition 
holds is correlated with increases in democratization.  
These results provide evidence for the construct validity of the electoral 
authoritarian measurement utilized in this study. The measure of electoral 
authoritarianism correlates as one would expect when it comes to the makeup of the 
legislature. In more authoritarian regimes we would expect the government to be more 
dominant in the legislative arena, while in more democratic regimes we would expect the 
opposition to increase its share of legislative seats. For the most part, these results are 
expected, and they help to validate the measuring method of electoral authoritarianism 




11 It is important to note that this only accounts for the percentage of seats that the 
major opposition party holds. Obviously, there may be more than one opposition party 
involved in the legislature, but this variable only accounts for the most popular opposition 
party.  
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Methodology and Procedures of Analysis 
In this dissertation, I conduct both statistical analysis on a large number of cases 
(large-N analysis) and case studies. This approach improves the overall confidence in the 
central findings of the study. In combining both approaches one can improve the quality 
of conceptualization and measurement. The goal is to provide a more valid, more reliable 
and more powerful causal explanation than could be achieved with one method. Large-N 
analysis is useful for drawing out broad patterns across cases, and it is useful for 
assessing which factors or variables are important. Case studies illustrate how such 
factors matter. The case study portion of this dissertation allows for a more detailed look 
at the causal processes. In some ways the case studies answer questions left open from 
large-N analysis.  
In this study, large-N analysis is conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, I 
analyze the connection between economic development and electoral authoritarianism. In 
addition, Chapter 5 explores the connection between international factors or the 
international environment and electoral authoritarianism. Chapter 6 is devoted to the 
connection between violent origins and electoral authoritarianism. In both chapters, I rely 
heavily on both logistic regression analysis and multinomial regression analysis. This 
large-N analysis will examine broad patterns across cases and will help determine which 
factors and variables are important.    
This study also utilizes brief case studies. Case studies allow close inspection of 
the characteristics of electoral authoritarianism. Furthermore, these case studies allow us 
to observe transitions into electoral authoritarianism. Most importantly, the case studies 
are conducted in order to illustrate the causal mechanisms of violent origins. This helps to 
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clarify how violent origins contribute to authoritarian durability. Case studies also 
illustrate the connections between violent origins and electoral authoritarianism. Two 
cases have been chosen. The first case is Nicaragua (1979-1990), under Sandinista rule. 
The second case is that of Paraguay (1954-1989), under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner. 
Both cases offer a variety of similarities and a variety of differences.  
Both cases represent different subtypes of electoral authoritarianism. The case of 
Nicaragua represents competitive electoral authoritarianism. In contrast, the case of 
Paraguay represents hegemonic electoral authoritarianism. As noted previously, the 
central difference between hegemonic and competitive electoral authoritarian lies in the 
political strength of the ruling regime. In hegemonic regimes the incumbent or ruling 
party enjoys overwhelming electoral dominance (e.g., often winning over 70% of votes) 
(Donno 2013, 703). This is in contrast to competitive regimes in which the opposition 
poses a greater challenge. When it comes to the emergence of electoral authoritarianism, 
each case transitioned at different points in history. With Paraguay, the emergence of 
electoral authoritarianism (late 1960s to early 1970s) occurred significantly before the 
international environment of the post-Cold War era. In the case of Nicaragua, electoral 
authoritarianism emerged very close to the post-Cold War era (mid-1980s to late 1980s) 
and was certainly influenced by the international environment similar to that of the post-
Cold War era.    
The path to electoral authoritarianism is slightly different in both cases. For the 
Nicaragua case, electoral authoritarianism began emerging almost immediately after the 
regime’s revolutionary origin. In contrast, Paraguay was fully authoritarian for some time 
after experiencing a military coup, but eventually transitioned into an electoral 
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authoritarianism under the same ruling regime. Hence, this study includes a case in which 
electoral authoritarianism emerged almost immediately after a violent origin, and an 
example of case in which electoral authoritarianism emerged long after a violent origin.  
Each case also represents a different type of violent origin. In the case of Nicaragua, the 
regime arose through a bloody revolution. In the case of Paraguay, the regime arose 
through a military coup. Another difference between the cases is that the ruling regime 
represented different philosophical sides of the political spectrum. In Nicaragua, the 
regime was a left-wing socialist regime. In the case of Paraguay, the ruling regime was a 
right-wing conservative regime.   
The cases do share some similarities. Obviously, both cases share the same 
geographic region of Latin America. In both cases, pressure and influence from the 
United States played a major role in liberalization. Another interesting similarity is that 
both countries fully democratized after experiencing electoral authoritarianism. 
Additionally, both countries backtracked into electoral authoritarianism after 
experiencing full democratization. Nicaragua once again experienced electoral 
authoritarianism from 2008-2012, and Paraguay backtracked from democracy and into 








   














The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter examines the relationship 
between electoral authoritarianism and economic development. The connection between 
economic development and democracy is one of the most studied relationships in 
comparative politics. Modernization theory posits that democracy is often followed by 
economic development. For such theorists, development leads to the social prerequisites 
needed for democracy to thrive. Economic development creates a society that can make 
political demands which threaten autocratic regimes. Furthermore, economic 
development has a strong impact on the survival of democracy. In many cases, 
democracy consolidation is strongly affected by the nature of economic development. 
Economic development is also tied to the stability of autocratic regimes. Economic crises 
have the potential to dwindle autocratic power. Conversely, there is ample evidence that 
economic growth can make authoritarian regimes more durable. Past literature has shown 
that there is a connection between democracy and economic development, but the 
literature has not specifically examined the relationship between electoral 
authoritarianism and economic development. Though more research will certainly need 
to be done, this analysis provides some insights. 
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To examine the relationship between economic development and electoral 
authoritarianism, the analysis first begins with logistic regression analysis. Logistic 
regression allows for the creation of a model that predicts the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. In addition, several robustness checks can be estimated while utilizing 
logistic regression. Logistic regression is useful for predicting electoral authoritarianism, 
but because the dependent variable is coded dichotomously, we lose some valuable 
information. For instance, logistic regression does not allow us to compare how the 
predictor variables affect electoral authoritarianism on the one hand, and full 
democratization on the other hand. For this reason, this analysis also incorporates 
multinomial regression analysis in which the dependent variable has three categories: full 
authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and democracy. With multinomial regression 
we can assess how economic development predicts both electoral authoritarianism and 
full democratization, when compared to full authoritarianism. This is extremely useful 
because independent variables can differ in how they predict democracy versus electoral 
authoritarianism. The use of both logistic and multinomial regression will be valuable for 
the second goal of this chapter.  
The second goal of this chapter is to examine the relationship between electoral 
authoritarianism and international factors or the nature of the international environment. 
In past literature, the rise of electoral authoritarianism has been attributed to international 
factors and variables. In particular, the proliferation of electoral authoritarianism has been 
linked to the international environment of the post-Cold War era. In this environment, 
many fully authoritarian regimes lost external support, and Western powers pushed for 
the diffusion of democracy. In fact, when examining the trajectories of hybrid regimes, 
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some scholars find that increased linkage with the West is associated with full 
democratization in hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). Past literature, however, 
does not examine how linkage with the West affects fully authoritarian regimes. In this 
analysis, one factor that is closely examined is that of Western influence. More 
specifically, I examine if Western linkage, or the density of ties and cross-border flows 
with the West, affects liberalization in fully authoritarian states. In other words, this 
analysis examines if Western linkage or Western influences are connected to the rise in 
electoral authoritarianism. This analysis also utilizes both logistic regression and 
multinomial regression.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first portion of this chapter 
analyzes the relationship between development and electoral authoritarianism. This part 
of the chapter begins with a discussion of the dependent and independent variables of the 
analysis. Next, the models and methods of analysis are discussed in detail. Finally, the 
results of the analysis are presented and discussed. The second part of this chapter 
examines the relationship between electoral authoritarianism and international factors or 
the international environment.  Once again, the dependent and independent variables are 
first presented. Following this, the models and procedures of analysis are discussed. 
Lastly, the results are provided and discussed. The final section of this chapter is the 
conclusion.  This section summarizes the chapter as whole and presents the implications 
of the findings in this chapter. 
 
Economic Development: Logistic Regression 
	
In this logistic regression analysis, I create several models to predict the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. This means that the dependent variable of 
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interest is the presence of electoral authoritarianism within a state. As explained in 
chapter four, I measure electoral authoritarianism through a series of steps adopted from 
Andreas Schedler’s guidelines of electoral authoritarianism. In this particular analysis, 
the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of electoral authoritarianism. Electoral 
authoritarianism is coded as 1, and other regime types (democracy or fully authoritarian) 
are coded as 0. The independent variables of interest include variables that measure 
economic development.  
To account for a state’s economic prosperity, I utilize several measurements. 
First, I account for a country’s gross domestic product per capita or GDP per capita 
(logged) (data from Gleditsch 2002). I also account for GDP annual percentage growth 
(data from World Bank 2012 and International Monetary Fund 2014).1 The 
unemployment rate is also accounted for (data from World Bank 2012). It is also crucial 
to gauge the perception of economic growth in a country, or how the public perceives the 
economic well-being of the country. To do this, I also utilize a variable that accounts for 
the perception of economic growth in the country, as reported by media sources (data 
from Hyde and Marinov 2012). This variable essentially accounts for the public’s 
perception of economic growth, though it may or may not correspond with actual 
economic growth. This variable is coded dichotomously; the perception of good 
economic growth is coded as 1 while the perception of no economic growth is coded as 0. 
Similarly, a variable that accounts for the perception of an economic crisis is also utilized 
(data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). Again, this variable accounts for the public’s (as 
																																																						
 
1 For this variable, I average the GDP growth variable of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund since both measures sometimes vary.  
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reported by media sources) perception of an economic crisis, rather than objective 
measures of an economic crisis, which may or may not correspond with an actual 
economic crisis. This variable is also coded dichotomously; the perception of an existing 
economic crisis is coded as 1, while no perception of an economic crisis is coded as 0. 
These economic variables help account for the idea that economic crises affect regime 
stability (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski et al. 2000).  
I also include variables that account for the economic openness of a state or how 
internationally interdependent a state is. I account for a state’s exports as a percentage of 
GDP (data from UN statistics 2014), and a state’s imports as a percentage of GDP (data 
from UN statistics 2014). Globalization is another crucial aspect of the international 
environment. To help account for how globalized a state is, I utilize a globalization index 
that accounts for economic, social, and political globalization (data from Dreher 2006). 
This variable helps to account for international interdependence, and is an ordinal 
measure from 0-100, in which a score of 100 is associated with the most globalization. In 
addition, I account for a state’s fuel exports as a percentage of GDP (data from World 
Bank 2012).2 Measuring fuel exports is useful since dependence on oil production has 
been shown to affect democratization (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Morrison 2009; Ahmed 
2012). Lastly, regime duration (in years) is controlled for (data from Marshall, Jaggers 




2 Missing data for the fuel exports variable were filled with the previous five-year 
average. However, if there were no data in the previous five years, items were left empty 
and excluded from the analysis. 
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Models and Procedures of Analysis 
The dependent variable, a dichotomous measure of electoral authoritarianism, is 
estimated through logistic regression or maximum likelihood estimation. Model 1 
accounts for the economic variables of interests: the public’s perception of economic 
growth in the country (Economic Growth), the public’s perception of an economic crisis 
in the country (Economic Crisis), the natural log of GDP per capita (GDP/Capita), the 
country’s GDP as a percentage of exports and imports (Exports and Imports), annual 
GDP growth percentage (GDP Growth), percentage rate of unemployment 
(Unemployment), percentage of exports from fuel (Fuel Exports), and how globalized a 
country is (Global Index). Model 1 also controls for regime duration (Reg Duration). In 
models 2-4, I exclude variables on the basis of missing observations. I begin with the 
variable with the most missing observations, and in subsequent models I continue to 
exclude variables based on the number of missing observations. Model 2 accounts for the 
same covariates as Model 1, but excludes Unemployment because this variable has the 
most missing observations among variables measured. In Model 3, Economic Crisis and 
Unemployment are both excluded. Finally, Model 4 excludes Unemployment, Economic 
Crisis and Economic Growth. It is also important to note that all of the covariates (in all 
models) are lagged by one year to help control for issues of reverse causation.3  
 
Results and Discussion 
The results show that there is no strong support for the notion that economic 
development affects electoral authoritarianism. At best, the relation between economic 
																																																						
	
3 The exception is Reg. Duration, for which I see no issues of reverse causation.  
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development and electoral authoritarianism is ambiguous based on the results of this 
study. However, future research needs to be conducted to assess the relationship between 
development and electoral authoritarianism. Table 5.1 presents the results predicting 
electoral authoritarianism.  
Model 1 includes all of the variables related to economic development. In Model 
1, Economic Growth is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that electoral 
authoritarianism is negatively associated with the public’s perception that economic 
growth is occurring. With regard to Economic Crisis, the coefficient is also negative and 
statistically significant. This coefficient suggests that electoral authoritarianism is 
negatively associated with the public perception that the country is experiencing an 
economic crisis. GDP per Capita is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
an increased GDP per capita is negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. In 
other words, as GPD per capita rises, the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism 
decreases. The covariates for Unemployment, Fuel Export, and Global Index are positive 
and statistically significant. Though the coefficients are relatively weak, these 
coefficients provide evidence that increases in unemployment and fuel exports are 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. In addition, electoral authoritarianism is 
associated with more globalized states. Other covariates, Exports, Imports, GDP Growth, 
and Regime Duration were not statistically significant in Model 1. The results of Model 1 
provide some insights, but unfortunately, Model 1 is relatively limited with regard to the 
amount of observations.   
Model 2 excludes the variable Unemployment, or the economic variable with the 
most missing observations. In Model 2, Economic Growth is still negative and  
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Table 5.1 Logistic Regression of Economic Development 
DV: Electoral 
Authoritarian Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
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Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. DV = Dependent Variable. + p < .1. * p < .05. ** 
p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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statistically significant, but the coefficient is relatively weaker and only significant at the 
0.10 level of analysis. This still suggests electoral authoritarianism is negatively 
associated with a public’s perception that economic growth is occurring in the country. In 
Model 2, Economic Crisis is not statistically significant. GDP per Capita is negative and 
statistically significant, which again suggests that increases in GPD per capita are 
negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. GDP Growth and Global Index are 
positive and statistically significant in Model 2. Though these coefficients are relatively 
weak, they suggest that increases in GDP growth and increases in a state’s globalized 
status are associated with electoral authoritarianism. In this model, the evidence shows 
that Reg. Duration is negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. The 
covariates of Exports, Imports, and Fuel Exports were not statistically significant in 
Model 2.  
Model 3 excludes the variables for both Unemployment and Economic Crisis, or 
the variables with most missing observations. Excluding the coefficient Economic Crisis 
increased the number of observations. In this model Economic Growth is again negative 
and statistically significant, which provides evidence that electoral authoritarianism is 
negatively associated with a public’s perception of economic growth. GDP per Capita is 
again negative and statistically significant, providing evidence that increases in GDP per 
capita are negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. The results show that 
GDP Growth, Fuel Export, and Global Index are positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism and statistically significant. Regime Duration in this model is negatively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. Exports and Imports are again not statistically 
significant.  
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The final model (Model 4), includes most observations of economic development, 
but excludes the Economic Growth variable as well as Unemployment and Economic 
Crisis. In this model we see that GDP per Capita is still negatively associated with 
electoral authoritarianism. In fact, the GDP per Capita is negative and statistically 
significant across all model specifications. In Model 4, Exports, GDP Growth, and 
Global Index are positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Regime Duration 
is again negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. The Fuel Exports and 
Imports coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Overall, it is difficult to make any clear conclusions about the relationship 
between economic development and electoral authoritarianism. The results seem 
ambiguous in some instances. On the one hand, GDP per capita was significant and 
negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism across all model specifications. 
Other covariates such as Fuel Exports, GDP Growth, Exports, Imports, and Global Index 
varied in their significance across the model specifications. The results show that 
Economic Crisis, or the public’s perception that the country is experiencing an economic 
crisis, is not strongly associated with electoral authoritarianism. Although the covariate 
was significant in Model 1, the coefficient was not significant in Model 2, which included 
more observations. Economic Growth, or the public perception of economic growth was 
negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism in all models for which the covariate 
was included in (models 1-3). From these logistic regression results it is unclear why this 
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Economic Development: Multinomial Regression 
In this multinomial analysis the dependent variable has three outcomes or three 
categories: fully authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and democracy. As noted, I utilize 
Schedler’s guidelines for measuring not only electoral authoritarianism, but democracy 
and full authoritarianism as well. In this analysis the fully authoritarian category is the 
reference or the base category. Therefore, there will be two sets of coefficients, one for 
the electoral authoritarian category and another for the democracy category. The two sets 
of coefficients will be interpreted in comparison to the base category (full 
authoritarianism). This means that we will be able to compare and contrast how each 
independent variable affects electoral authoritarianism on the one hand, and full 
democratization on the other hand. In other words, this analysis will provide some insight 
into how each covariate affects levels of liberalization.  
With regard to the independent variables, I include the same variables that are 
utilized in the logistic regression conducted above. I account for a state’s GDP per capita 
(logged) (data from Gleditsch 2002); GDP growth (data from World Bank 2012 and 
International Monetary Fund 2014); unemployment rate (data from World Bank 2012); 
the perception of economic growth among the public (data from Hyde and Marinov 
2012); the public’s perception of an economic crisis (data from Hyde and Marinov 2012); 
the state’s exports as a percentage of annual GDP (data from UN statistics 2014); the 
state’s imports as a percentage of annual GDP (data from UN statistics 2014); fuel 
exports as a percentage of GDP (data from World Bank 2012); and lastly, I include the 
state’s globalization index, which accounts for how economically, socially, and 
politically a state is. The duration of the regime in years is controlled for (data from 
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Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013).  
 
Models and Procedures of Analysis 
For the multinomial analysis three models are estimated. The multinomial models 
are similar to the models estimated for the logistic regression analysis presented above. 
The first model (Model 1) includes Economic Growth, Economic Crisis, GDP/Capita, 
Exports, Imports, GDP Growth, Unemployment, Fuel Exports, and Global Index. In 
addition, regime duration is controlled for (Reg. Duration). The second model (Model 2) 
accounts for the same covariates as Model 1, but excludes Unemployment because this 
variable has the most missing observations. Finally, the third model (Model 3) includes 
the same covariates as Model 1, but excludes Unemployment, Economic Growth and 
Economic Crisis because such variables also have a number of missing observations. All 
of the covariates (in all models) are lagged by one year to help control for issues of 
reverse causation.4  
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of this multinomial analysis are ambiguous. The multinomial analysis 
does not provide a clear indication of how economic development affects electoral 
authoritarianism or even full democratization. There are a total of three multinomial 
models for economic development, but the effects that economic variables have on 
electoral authoritarianism vary from model to model. While this analysis provides some 
insights, it is still unclear how and to what extent development affects the likelihood of 
																																																						
 
4 The exception is Reg. Duration, for which I see no issues of reverse causation.  
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electoral authoritarianism.   
The results of the first model are presented on Table 5.2. In this analysis the base  
category is full authoritarianism. Therefore, in this model we see two sets of coefficients, 
coefficients for democracy and coefficients for electoral authoritarianism. The electoral 
authoritarian coefficient for Economic Growth is statistically significant and negative. 
Therefore, in comparison to full authoritarianism, a higher public perception that the 
country is experiencing economic growth is associated with a lower likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism. The democracy coefficient for Economic Growth is also 
statistically significant and negative. This means that in comparison to full 
authoritarianism, an increase in the public’s perception that the country is experiencing 
economic growth is associated with a lower likelihood of democracy. One way to 
interpret these results is that a high public perception of economic growth makes a 
transition away from full authoritarianism less likely.  
The electoral authoritarian coefficient for Economic Crisis is statistically 
significant and negative. In comparison to full authoritarianism, an increase in the 
public’s perception that the country is experiencing an economic crisis lowers the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. When it comes to the democracy coefficient for 
Economic Crisis, the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. The GDP per 
Capita coefficients for both electoral authoritarianism and democracy are negative and 
statistically significant. This means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, an 
increase in GDP per capita lowers the likelihood of both electoral authoritarianism and 
democracy.  
The results are similar for the Fuel Export and Reg. Duration coefficients for both  
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Table 5.2 Development Multinomial Analysis Model 1 
Base: Full Authoritarian Democracy Electoral Authoritarian 
   
Economic Growth -0.46 (0.24)+ -0.82 (0.19)*** 
   
Economic Crisis -0.11 (0.21) -0.39 (0.17)* 
   
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.32 (0.15)* -0.57 (0.11)*** 
   
Exports -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
   
Imports -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
   
Unemployment -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)+ 
   
GDP/Growth 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)+ 
   
Fuel Exports -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
   
Global Index 0.18 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.04 (0.01)*** 
   
N= 1389     
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electoral authoritarianism and democracy. These coefficients are both negative and 
statistically significant. Hence, in comparison to full authoritarianism, an increase in fuel 
exports and/or regime duration lowers the likelihood of both electoral authoritarianism 
and democracy. With regard to the Global Index, the coefficients for both electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy are positive and statistically significant. This means that 
in comparison to full authoritarianism, the more globalized a state is, the higher the 
likelihood of both electoral authoritarianism and democracy. The coefficient for GDP 
Growth is positive for both democracy and electoral authoritarianism, but only 
statistically significant for electoral authoritarianism. The electoral authoritarian 
coefficient for Unemployment is positive and significant, which means that in comparison 
to full authoritarianism, an increase in unemployment makes electoral authoritarianism 
slightly more likely. The democracy coefficient for Unemployment is negative but not 
significant. For both democracy and electoral authoritarianism, the coefficients for 
Exports and Imports are not statistically significant.  
As we move from Model 1 to Model 2, the results are similar for some variables 
but drastically different for other variables. The results of Model 2 are presented on Table 
5.3. Model 2 excludes the Unemployment variable from the analysis and therefore 
includes more observations. In the second multinomial model the coefficients for Fuel 
Exports, Global Index, GDP Growth, and Regime Duration have similar interpretations 
to the first multinomial model for both the electoral authoritarian and democracy 
coefficients. One major difference between the first and second model pertains to the 
Economic Growth coefficients. In the second model, the Economic Growth coefficient 
for democracy is positive, while the Economic Growth coefficient for electoral  
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Table 5.3 Development Multinomial Analysis Model 2 
Base: Autocracy Democracy Electoral Authoritarian 
   
Economic Growth 0.15 (0.19) -0.09 (0.14) 
   
Economic Crisis 0.45 (0.17)** 0.10 (0.13) 
   
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.05 (0.12) -0.09 (0.08) 
   
Exports -0.02 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01) 
   
Imports -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
   
GDP/Growth 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)** 
   
Fuel Exports -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
   
Global Index 0.17 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.10 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.00)*** 
   
N= 2090     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 
authoritarianism is negative. Both coefficients, however, are not statistically significant.  
In addition, there are some differences in the second model when it comes to  
Economic Crisis. The Economic Crisis coefficient for both electoral authoritarianism and 
democracy are positive, yet only the democracy coefficient is significant. This means that 
in comparison to full authoritarianism, an increase in the public’s perception that the 
country is experiencing an economic crisis increases the likelihood of democracy. For 
Exports, only the democracy coefficient is significant. The Exports democracy coefficient 
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is negative which means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, higher exports  
decrease the likelihood of democracy. In the second model, the Import and GDP per 
Capita coefficients are not statistically significant. 
The final model, or Model 3, excludes Unemployment, Economic Growth, and 
Economic Crisis. The results of this model are presented on Table 5.4. This third model 
includes more observations than the previous two. In this third model the coefficients for 
Fuel Exports, Global Index, GDP Growth, and Regime Duration have similar 
interpretations to the previous two models. One caveat is that the GDP Growth 
coefficient for democracy is statistically significant in this model. Unlike the previous 
two models, the Imports coefficient for democracy is statistically significant in the third 
multinomial model. GDP per Capita coefficients for both democracy and electoral 
 
Table 5.4 Development Multinomial Analysis Model 3 
Base: Autocracy Democracy Electoral Authoritarian 
   
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.14 (0.10) -0.31 (0.07)*** 
   
Exports 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
   
Imports -0.01 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00) 
   
GDP/Growth 0.02 (0.01)* 0.02 (0.01)*** 
   
Fuel Exports -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.00)** 
   
Global Index 0.15 (0.01)*** 0.09 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.10 (0.01)*** -0.07 (0.00)*** 
   
N= 3168     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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authoritarianism are both negative, but only the coefficient for electoral authoritarianism 
is significant. In comparison to full authoritarianism, increases in GDP per Capita 
decrease the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. The Exports coefficients are not 
significant. 
The multinomial results provide some insight on how economic variables affect 
electoral authoritarian transitions versus full democratic transitions. Still, the results are 
unclear and ambiguous. For example, the introduction of more observations from the first 
to the second multinomial model created some cause for ambiguity. Take for instance the 
fact that the Economic Growth coefficients for both democracy and electoral 
authoritarianism are significant in the first model but not in the second model. Also, with 
the exception of the electoral authoritarian coefficient in the second model, the Economic 
Growth coefficients change from a negative direction to a positive direction as we move 
from the first multinomial model to the second model.   
One small insight is that fuel exports have a negative effect on liberalization since 
increases in fuel exports decrease the likelihood of both democratization and electoral  
authoritarianism across all model specifications. In contrast, the level of globalization a 
country experiences has a positive effect on liberalization. Increases in the global index 
score increase the likelihood of both democratization and electoral authoritarianism 
across all model specifications.  
 
International Dimension: Logistic Regression 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
In this logistic regression analysis the dependent variable is the presence of 
electoral authoritarianism. The dependent variable is coded dichotomously; electoral 
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authoritarianism is coded as 1 while other regime types (democracy or fully authoritarian) 
are coded as 0. The main independent variables of interest measure aspects of the 
international environment and the presence of international influences, Western 
influences in particular. First, this analysis accounts for a country’s relations with the US 
(data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). Does a state have good relations with the US or 
poor relations with the US? Though it does not directly measure how much influence the 
US exerts over a country, this independent variable helps to account for how much 
potential linkage the US can have with a state. States that have good relations are likely 
to be more linked than states that have poor relations. More importantly, linkage to the 
US is associated with democratization. This variable is coded dichotomously; if a country 
is in good relations with the US it is coded as 1, and if a country does not have good 
relations it is coded as 0.  
This analysis also includes a variable that accounts for a country’s relations with 
Western countries or international governmental organizations (data from Hyde and 
Marinov 2012). This variable measures whether a state has a substantial economic, 
military, or political relationship with a Western country or Western international 
governmental organizations (IGO) that can provide substantial economic and military 
benefits (e.g., World Bank or International Monetary Fund).5 This independent variable is 
measured dichotomously; states with substantial relations to Western countries or IGO 
are coded as 1 and states with no substantial relations are coded as 0. I also consider how 
economically interdependent a country is with the West. One variable that helps to 
																																																						
 
5 According to Hyde and Marinov (2012) the UN does not count as this type of 
IGO.  
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account for Western interdependence is exports to the West. Therefore, I include a 
variable that aggregates a country’s total annual exports to the West or the percentage of 
the country’s exports that went to Western countries (data from Barbieri, Keshk and 
Pollins 2009). In addition, I include a variable that aggregates a country’s total imports 
from the West or the percentage of the country’s imports that came from the West (data 
from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009).   
To examine how the international environment affects electoral authoritarianism, 
an indicator variable for the post-Cold War era is included. This variable is coded as 1 for 
observations post-1990 and coded as 0 for observations pre-1990. A globalization index 
is utilized to account for how globalized a country is. I specifically utilize a globalization 
index that accounts for economic, social, and political globalization (data from Dreher 
2006). This variable is ordinal and scores range from 0-100, with a score of 100 
representing the most globalization. This measure of globalization helps to account for 
possible international linkages, which can contribute to regime liberalization (Levitsky 
and Way 2010). Furthermore, international foreign aid is accounted for. Specifically, I 
account for the annual sum of financial aid (logged) from international organizations 
(data from Tierny et al. 2011). This variable is helpful since foreign aid is often tied to 
political reform and can influence liberalization (Miller 2015).  
The point of this particular analysis is to examine the effect that the international 
environment or international influences have on electoral authoritarianism. Although this 
is certainly not an exhaustive list of variables, these variables help to account for the 
international environment and international factors. Furthermore, many of these variables 
essentially account for the idea of linkage or interdependence with the West. This is 
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important because these variables help to account for the notion that strong linkage with 
the West is associated with increasing odds of democratization (Levitsky and Way 2010). 
In addition to these independent variables, several control variables are included. The 
control variables include GDP per capita (data from Gleditsch 2002); GDP growth (data 
from World Bank 2012 and International Monetary Fund 2014); fuel exports as 
percentage of GDP (data from World Bank 2012); and regime duration in years (data 
from Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013).   
 
Models and Procedures of Analysis 
The dependent variable of interest, electoral authoritarianism, is first estimated 
through logistic regression or maximum likelihood estimation (Model 1). The 
independent variables of interest in this model include a state’s relations with the US (US 
Relations), a state’s relations with Western countries or international organizations (West 
IO Relations), a state’s exports to Western countries (West Exports), imports from 
Western countries (West Imports), how globalized a state is (Global Index), and the sum 
of financial aid a state receives (Foreign Aid). Furthermore, the model includes an 
indicator variable that accounts for years in the post-Cold War era (Post-Cold War). In 
the second model, the dependent variable is also estimated through a complementary log-
log model. Model 2 includes the same covariates as Model 1. Both maximum likelihood 
estimation and complementary log-log models yield similar results, but complementary 
log-log models work well for data observed in discrete intervals such as years (Allison 
2010). Equally important, the complementary log-log model helps to check for 
robustness. For both the maximum likelihood estimation and the complementary log-log, 
I control for GDP growth (GDP Growth), GDP per capita (logged) (GDP/Capita), fuel 
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exports as a percentage of GDP (Fuel Exports), and the duration of the regime in years 
(Reg. Duration). In addition, all of the covariates (in all models) are lagged by one year 
to help control for issues of reverse causation.6  
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of this logistic regression analysis are presented on Table 5.5. The 
results provide evidence that the international environment has a substantial effect on 
electoral authoritarianism. Overall, the evidence suggests that post-Cold War 
international environment is positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. The 
evidence also suggests that a state’s relations with the West are strongly associated with 
electoral authoritarianism.  
The first model of interest is a logistic regression analysis, which is also known as 
maximum likelihood estimation model (also known as MLE). In this model, the US 
Relations coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This result suggests that 
electoral authoritarianism is positively associated with a state’s relation to the US. In 
other words, positive relations with the US are associated with the presence of electoral 
authoritarianism. Similarly, the West IO Relations coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, which means that electoral authoritarianism is positively associated with a 
state’s relations to Western countries or international organizations. Positive relations 
with Western countries or international organizations are associated with the presence of 
electoral authoritarianism. These coefficients suggest that good or positive relationships 
with the West increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism.  
																																																						
	
6 The exception is Reg. Duration, for which I see no issues of reverse causation.  
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Table 5.5 Logistic Regression and International Environment 
DV: Electoral 
Authoritarian 
Model 1  
(MLE) 




    
US Relations 0.52 (0.15)*** 0.45 (0.12)*** 1.67 
    
West IO Relations 0.79 (0.18)*** 0.63 (0.16)*** 2.22 
    
West Exports -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** 0.99 
    
West Imports -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
    
Post-Cold War 1.00 (0.13)*** 0.86 (0.11)*** 2.70 
    
Global Index -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
    
Foreign Aid 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** 1.13 
    
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 1.01 
    
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.19 (0.07)* -0.16 (0.06)** 0.83 
    
Fuel Exports 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)** 1.00 
    
Reg. Duration -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)** 0.99 
    
Observations 2174 2174   
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. DV = Dependent Variable. MLE = Maximum 
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The West Exports and West Imports coefficients are both negative, though only 
West Exports is statistically significant. Though the coefficient is relatively weak, this 
suggests that an increase in Western exports is associated with a decrease in electoral 
authoritarianism. With regard to Foreign Aid, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. This result suggests that financial aid from international organizations is 
positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. The Post-Cold War coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant, which means that the post-Cold-War era is positively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. The Global Index coefficient was not 
statistically significant. With regard to control variables, GDP per Capita, Fuel Exports, 
and Reg. Duration were statistically significant. Both GDP per Capita and Reg. Duration 
were negative, suggesting that such coefficients are negatively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism. The Fuel Export coefficient is relatively weak, but does suggest a 
positive relationship between fuel exports and electoral authoritarianism in this 
estimation. GDP Growth was not statistically significant in this estimation.  
The results of the complementary log-log model (abbreviated as CLL on Table 
5.5) can be interpreted similarly to the results of the maximum likelihood estimation 
model. The coefficients for US Relations and West IO Relations are again positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, the Post-Cold War coefficient and the Foreign Aid 
coefficient are also positive and statistically significant for the complementary log-log 
model. The results of the complementary log-log model suggest that US Relations, West 
IO Relations, Foreign Aid, and Post-Cold War are positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism. In contrast, these results also suggest that increased West Exports, GDP 
per Capita, and Reg. Duration are negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. 
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To substantively interpret the results of the maximum likelihood estimation, odds 
ratios were estimated and are also presented on Table 5.5. Electoral authoritarianism is 
positively associated with US Relations. The odds ratio for US Relations (1.67) indicates 
that substantively, when other predictors are held constant, a one-unit increase in US 
Relations multiplies the odds of electoral authoritarianism by 67%. In other words, the 
presence of electoral authoritarianism is more likely in regimes that have a good 
relationship with the US. Similarly, West IO Relations are positively associated with 
electoral authoritarianism. Moreover, the odds ratio (2.22) indicates that when other 
predictors are held constant, a one-unit increase in West IO Relations multiplies the odds 
of electoral authoritarianism by 122%. This signifies that the presence of electoral 
authoritarianism is substantially more likely in regimes that have positive relations with 
Western international organizations.  
The odds ratio for Post-Cold War (2.70) indicates that when other predictors are 
held constant, the post-Cold War era increases the odds of electoral authoritarianism by 
170%. With regard to Foreign Aid, each one-unit increase in Foreign Aid multiplies the 
odds of electoral authoritarianism by 13% when all other predictors are held constant. In 
contrast, each one-unit increase in West Exports decreases the odds of electoral 
authoritarianism by 1% when all other predictors are held constant. Likewise, each one-
unit increase in Reg. Duration decreases the odds of electoral authoritarianism by 1% 
when all other predictors are held constant. The odds ratios for West Imports and GDP 
Growth are not statistically significant. Finally, the odds ratio for Fuel Exports (1.00) is 
unfortunately difficult to interpret since a one-unit increase in Fuel Exports increases the 
odds of electoral authoritarianism by less than 1%. 
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From these results we see that the international environment and international 
influences are crucial factors when it comes to electoral authoritarianism. The results 
from the maximum likelihood estimation and the complementary log-log were similar. 
Overall, several of the variables were strongly associated with electoral authoritarianism. 
The post-Cold War international environment is associated with increased odds for 
electoral authoritarianism. The role of Western influence also seems to play a crucial 
role, and Western ties positively affected the odds of electoral authoritarianism. 
According to this analysis, good relations with the United States were positively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. Furthermore, electoral authoritarianism is 
positively associated with positive relations with Western international organizations.  
In addition, financial aid from international organizations was positively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. It important to note, however, that Western 
exports negatively affected the odds of electoral authoritarianism, though the effects were 
relatively weak. While these results are certainly not conclusive of all international 
factors or Western influences, this analysis provides support for the argument that 
international factors influence liberalization. Nonetheless, this analysis only illustrates the 
relation between international factors and electoral authoritarianism. Further analysis may 
provide insights into how international factors affect full democratization. More 
specifically, multinomial analysis can be utilized to assess how international factors 
affect the likelihood of both electoral authoritarianism and full democratization. 
 
International Dimension: Multinomial Regression 
In this multinomial analysis the dependent variable has three categories: fully 
authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and democracy, which are determined by the 
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measurement guidelines laid out above. In this analysis the fully authoritarian category is 
the base or the reference category. This means that there will be two sets of coefficients, 
one for the electoral authoritarian category and another set of coefficients for the 
democracy category. These two sets of coefficients will be interpreted in comparison to 
the base category, which is full authoritarianism. With this analysis we will be able to 
compare and contrast how each independent variable affects electoral authoritarianism 
and full democratization. This is a strength of multinomial analysis since it provides some 
insight into how each predictor variable affects the two regime types.  
In this multinomial analysis only one model is estimated. The independent 
variables included in analysis are the same independent variables that are utilized in the 
logistic regression analysis. The main independent variables of interest measure aspects 
of the international environment and the presence of international influences, namely 
linkages with the West. Again, I account for the status of state’s relations with the US 
(US Relations), whether good or poor (data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). This variable 
is coded dichotomously; good relations with the US are coded as 1, and if a state did not 
have good relations with the US it is coded as 0. This analysis also accounts for a state’s 
relations with Western countries and international governmental organizations (West IO 
Relations), or if a state has substantial relations with such actors (data from Hyde and 
Marinov 2012). This variable is also measured dichotomously; states with substantial 
relations are coded as 1, while states without such relations are coded as 0. I also account 
for exports to the West (West Exports) and include a variable that aggregates the 
percentage of a state’s exports to the West (data from Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). 
Additionally, imports from the West are accounted for (West Imports), and I include a 
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variable that aggregates the percentage of a state’s imports from the West (data from 
Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009).  
An indicator variable for the post-Cold War era (Post-Cold War) is included to 
help examine how the nature of international environment affects electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy. This variable is coded 1 for observations post-1990 and 
coded as 0 for observations pre-1990. I include a variable that accounts for how 
economically, socially, and politically globalized a state (Global Index). This variable is 
ordinal and scores range from 0-100, with a 100 score representing the most globalization 
(data from Dreher 2006). How much foreign aid a state receives is accounted for 
(Foreign Aid), and included is a variable that accounts for the annual sum of financial aid 
(logged) from international organizations (data from Tierny et al. 2011). In this model, I 
also control for GDP growth (GDP Growth) (data from World Bank 2012 and 
International Monetary Fund 2014), GDP per capita (GDP/Capita) (data from Gleditsch 
2002), fuel exports as a percentage of GDP (Fuel Exports) (data from World Bank 2012), 
and the duration of the regime in years (Reg. Duration) (data from Marshall, Jaggers, and 
Gurr 2013). It is also important to note that all of the covariates (in all models) are lagged 
by one year to help with issues of reverse causation. In addition to the one model, odds 
ratios for the model are calculated. Odds ratios are estimated in order to interpret the 
results of the multinomial regression analysis substantively. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of this multinomial analysis are presented on Table 5.6. Overall, the 
results provide support for the influential effects of the international environment and 
international factors. This analysis provides evidence that the post-Cold War international  
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Table 5.6 Multinomial Analysis of International Environment 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian  Democracy 
    
US Relations 0.86 (0.16)*** 1.55 (0.25)*** 
    
West IO Relations 0.51 (0.22)* 0.05 (0.27)  
     
West Exports 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)*** 
     
West Imports -0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01)*** 
     
Post-Cold War 1.32 (0.14)*** 2.06 (0.24)*** 
     
Global Index 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.01)*** 
     
Foreign Aid 0.19 (0.04)*** 0.20 (0.05)*** 
     
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)  
     
GDP/Cap (ln) -0.02 (0.09) 0.11 (0.12)  
     
Fuel Export -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
     
Reg. Duration -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.09 (0.01)*** 
     
N= 2013     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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environment and Western influence do indeed contribute to liberalization and the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. It is important to note that the base category or 
the reference point in this analysis is full authoritarianism. Hence, the coefficients are 
always in comparison to full authoritarianism. In this analysis, there are two sets of 
coefficients estimated, coefficients for democracy and coefficients for electoral 
authoritarianism. First, let us begin with a discussion of the electoral authoritarian 
coefficients.  
The electoral authoritarian coefficient for US Relations is both positive and 
statistically significant. This means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, a good 
relationship with the US is associated with an increased likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. Put differently, good relations with the US increase the odds of electoral 
authoritarianism in a state. When it comes to the West IO Relations coefficient for 
electoral authoritarianism, the coefficient is both positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, in comparison to full authoritarianism, a good relation with Western countries 
or IGOs increases the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism.  
The electoral authoritarian coefficient for Post-Cold War is also positive and 
statistically significant. In comparison to full authoritarianism, an increased likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism is associated with the post-Cold War era. This supports the 
notion that electoral authoritarianism proliferated in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, 
the Global Index coefficient for electoral authoritarianism is positive and statistically 
significant. This means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, a rise in the 
globalization score is associated with a higher likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. 
The more globalized a state is, the higher the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. 
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Likewise, the electoral authoritarian coefficient for Foreign Aid is positive and 
statistically significant, which means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, 
increases in financial aid from international organizations are associated with an 
increased likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Some international factors were not 
significant in this analysis. For example, the electoral authoritarian coefficients for West 
Exports and West Imports were not statistically significant in this instance.  
This multinomial regression analysis also estimated coefficients for democracy. 
The US Relations coefficient for democracy is positive and statistically significant. 
Interpreted, this means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, a good relationship 
with the US is associated with an increased likelihood of democracy. While positive, the 
West IO Relations coefficient for democracy was not statistically significant in this 
analysis. The West Exports coefficient for democracy is both positive and statistically 
significant. This coefficient suggests that in comparison to full authoritarianism, an 
increase in a state’s exports to the West is positively associated with democracy. 
Interestingly, the West Import coefficient is negative though statistically significant. This 
signifies that in comparison to full authoritarianism, an increase in imports from the West 
decreases the likelihood of democracy. In contrast, the democracy coefficient for Post-
Cold War was positive and statistically significant.  
In comparison to full authoritarianism, an increased likelihood of democracy is 
associated with the post-Cold War era. The Global Index coefficient for democracy is 
positive and statistically significant. This means that in comparison to full 
authoritarianism, an increase in the globalization score is associated with an increased 
likelihood of democracy. In other words, the more globalized a state is, the higher the 
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likelihood of democracy. Similarly, the Foreign Aid coefficient for democracy is positive 
and statistically significant. This signifies that in comparison to full authoritarianism, an 
increase in financial aid from international organizations increases the likelihood of 
democracy.   
Multinomial odds ratios were estimated to substantively interpret the results of 
this analysis. The odds ratios are presented on Table 5.7. The odds ratios presented are 
for both electoral authoritarianism and democracy. In addition, the odds ratios correspond 
with the independent and control variables of interest. Let us first examine the odds ratios 
for electoral authoritarianism relative to full authoritarianism. 
The odds ratio for US Relations (2.37) signifies that good relations with the US 
increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Specifically, a one-unit increase in 
US Relations means that the odds of a state being electoral authoritarian, as opposed to 
fully authoritarian, would be expected to increase by 137% while holding other variables 
in the model constant. The odds ratio for West IO Relations (1.67) indicates that good 
relations with Western countries or international governmental organizations increase the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, when compared to full authoritarianism. A one-
unit increase in West IO Relations signifies that the odds of a state being electoral 
authoritarian, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, increase by 67% while holding 
other variables constant. In addition, the Post-Cold War odds ratio (3.75) indicates that 
the post-Cold War era increased the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, when 
compared to full authoritarianism. A one-unit increase in Post-Cold War (or being in the 
post-Cold War era), means that the odds of state being electoral authoritarian, as opposed 
to being fully authoritarian, increase by 275% when holding other variables in the model  




Table 5.7 International Environment Multinomial Odds Ratios 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian     Democracy 
    
US Relations 2.37 4.73  
    
West IO Relations 1.67 1.05  
    
West Exports 1.00 1.02  
    
West Imports 1.00 0.98  
    
Post-Cold War 3.75 7.86  
    
Global Index 1.06 1.13  
    
Foreign Aid 1.21 1.22  
    
GDP Growth 1.00 1.00  
    
GDP/Cap (ln) 0.98 1.11  
    
Fuel Export 0.99 0.95  
    
Reg. Duration 0.96 0.91  
    
N= 2013    









In terms of globalization, the Global Index odds ratio (1.06) means that more 
globalization increases the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. In particular, a one-
unit increase in Global Index, or a one-unit increase in the globalization score of a state, 
multiplies the odds of a state being electoral authoritarian, as opposed to being fully 
authoritarian, by 6% while other variables are held constant. The odds ratio for Foreign 
Aid (1.21) indicates that more financial aid from international organizations increases the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, when compared to full authoritarianism. A one-
unit increase in Foreign Aid multiplies the odds of a state being electoral authoritarian, as 
opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 21% while holding other variables in the model 
constant. Unfortunately, the odds ratios of West Exports and West Imports are not 
statistically significant for electoral authoritarianism. Let us now move on to the 
substantive interpretation of the odds ratios for democracy.  
With regard to US Relations, the odds ratio (4.73) indicates that good relations 
with the US increase the likelihood of democracy. In particular, a one-unit increase in US 
Relations signifies that the odds of a state being democratic, as opposed to fully 
authoritarian, increase by 373% when other variables are held constant. However, the 
results reveal that the odds ratio for West IO Relations is not statistically significant.  
Measures of economic interdependence were somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
West Exports odds ratio (1.02) indicates that exporting to the West increases the odds of 
democracy. For instance, a one-unit increase in West Exports multiplies the odds of a 
state being democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 2% when holding 
other variables constant. On the other hand, the West Imports odds ratio (0.98) signifies 
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that importing from the West decreases the odds of democracy. Consider for example that  
a one-unit increase in West Imports decreases the odds of a state being democratic by 2% 
when other variables are held constant.  
The results also indicate that the post-Cold War era increased the likelihood of 
democracy. For instance, the odds ratio for Post-Cold War (7.86) indicates that a one-unit 
increase (or being in the post-Cold War era) increases the odds of state being democratic, 
as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by a substantial 686% while holding other 
variables in the model constant. When it comes to globalization, the results reveal that a 
more globalized state is more likely to be democratic. In fact, the odds ratio for Global 
Index (1.13) indicates that a one-unit increase in Global Index (or how globalized a state 
is) multiplies the odds of a state being democratic, as opposed to being fully 
authoritarian, by 13% when other variables in the model are held constant. Likewise, 
financial aid from international organizations increases the odds of democratization. The 
results show that a one-unit increase in Foreign Aid multiplies the odds of a state being 
democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 22% when holding other variables 
constant.  
These results provide several insights. The multinomial regression analysis helps 
to confirm and enhance some of the findings of the logistic regression analysis. In 
particular, the multinomial analysis supports the finding that international factors do 
indeed have a substantial influence on electoral authoritarianism. Moreover, the 
multinomial analysis also reveals that international factors influence democracy as well. 
Specifically, these results reveal that good relations with the West are associated with a 
higher likelihood of liberalization (whether the liberalization results in electoral 
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authoritarianism or full democracy). The nature of the international environment also 
seemed to be crucial since the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism and democracy 
increased during the post-Cold War era.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter had two major goals, to analyze the relationship between economic 
development and electoral authoritarianism, and the relationship between electoral 
authoritarianism and the international dimensions of regime change. Important findings 
were uncovered throughout the process. This study also examined the relationship 
between development and full democratization, as well the relationship between 
international factors and full democratization. Several conclusions and implications can 
be drawn from the analyses conducted in this chapter.  
With regard to economic development, the results were somewhat ambiguous. 
The logistic regression analysis did not provide strong support for the notion that 
economic development affects electoral authoritarianism. Still, some covariates are 
noteworthy. For example, GDP per capita was significantly associated with electoral 
authoritarianism across all the model specifications; the results show that GDP per capita 
is negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Additionally, the relation 
between electoral authoritarianism and the public’s perception of economic growth is 
noteworthy. In the models for which the variable was included, the public’s perception of 
economic growth was negatively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Other 
measures of economic development, such as GDP growth, imports and exports, varied in 
their significance across model specifications.  
When it comes to multinomial analysis, the results were also ambiguous and did 
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not provide a clear indication of how economic development affects electoral 
authoritarianism or even full democratization. Many of the development covariates were 
not consistently significant across all of the model specifications. Consider for instance 
that in Model 1 of the multinomial analysis, GDP per capita seemed to have a negative 
and significant association with both the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism and full 
democratization. Nevertheless, as more observations were included in the preceding 
models (Model 2 and Model 3), these relationships remained significant in only one 
instance (the electoral authoritarian coefficient in Model 3). The multinomial analysis did 
not provide much insight into how the public’s perception of economic growth or 
economic crises affect the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism on the one hand, and 
the likelihood of democracy on the other hand. With such results it is difficult to make 
any clear conclusions at this point. Even with these findings, more research should be 
conducted on the relation between economic development and electoral authoritarianism. 
Although more research does need to be conducted, this analysis finds only minimal 
support for the notion that economic development affects electoral authoritarianism. In 
contrast, several conclusions can be made about the effects of international factors.  
The results indicate that there is a crucial relationship between electoral 
authoritarianism and the international environment. The logistic regression analysis 
shows that post-Cold War era is positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. 
Strong linkages with the West also increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. 
In particular, good relations with the US increased the likelihood and the odds of 
electoral authoritarianism. Additionally, the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism 
increases when states have good relations with Western countries or international 
   
 
150 
organizations. The results of the multinomial analysis also supported some of these 
findings. The post-Cold War era was positively associated with both electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy. The results also show that positive relations with the US 
increased the likelihood and odds of both electoral authoritarianism and democracy. The 
results of these analyses suggest that international factors do indeed contribute to the 
liberalization of full authoritarian regimes. Moreover, several of the international factors 
that account for linkages to the West are positively associated with electoral 


































In this chapter the relationship between violent origins and electoral 
authoritarianism is examined. To examine this relationship two types of analyses are 
utilized. First, electoral authoritarianism is estimated through logistic regression analysis 
or maximum likelihood estimation. Secondly, multinomial regression analysis is also 
utilized. The purpose of logistic regression is to analyze which covariates affect the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Logistic regression is widely used by political 
scientists and is fairly accessible. In addition, there are several procedures that can be 
utilized to check for the robustness of the logistic regression. Though useful, logistic 
regression is limited just by the fact that the dependent variable has to be coded 
dichotomously; a state is coded as electoral authoritarian or nonelectoral authoritarian. 
With multinomial regression, the dependent variable has several categories (e.g., 
democracy, electoral authoritarian, or full authoritarianism). Multinomial regression is 
very useful for examining how variables affect the multiple categories of the dependent 
variable.    
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, the logistic regression analysis 
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is presented. In this portion of the chapter, the dependent and independent variables are 
first discussed. Following this, the models and procedures of analysis of logistic 
regression are presented. Afterward, the results of the logistic regression are presented 
and discussed. The second portion of this chapter presents the multinomial regression 
analysis. This section begins with a discussion of the dependent and independent 
variables. Then the models and procedures of analysis are presented. Lastly, the results of 
the multinomial analysis are presented and discussed. The concluding section of this 
chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses the implications of these findings. 
 
Violent Origins: Logistic Regression 
Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable in this logistic regression analysis is electoral 
authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism is coded dichotomously: coded as 1 for the 
presence of electoral authoritarianism and coded as 0 otherwise. One of the main 
independent variables of interest is the occurrence of a violent regime origin in a state. To 
code this independent variable, this analysis relies on the “Autocratic Regimes” dataset 
by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014). The “Autocratic Regimes” 
dataset by Geddes et al. includes a categorical variable marking the means by which a 
regime ended (noted as “fail-type”).1 Utilizing this dataset, I created a binary indicator 
variable that accounts for whether a regime change occurred through violent means. In 
																																																						
	
1 For this categorical variable Geddes et al. account for: regime insiders changing 
rules of regime; incumbent losing elections; election won by opposition; popular 
uprisings; military coups; insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war; 
foreign imposition or invasion; new autocratic leader selected; and state 
failure/government loses control of most of country’s territory. 
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essence, a violent origins indicator was created. This violent origins indicator is defined 
as follows: regime change due to military coup, revolution, or insurgents/combatants 
fighting a civil war. This variable is initially coded dichotomously, meaning that it is 
coded as 1 if the description of a violent origin applies and is coded as 0 in other 
instances. However, this variable is only coded 1 during the year that the violent origin 
occurs. Afterwards, a historical depreciation is applied. With this independent variable it 
is important to account for the effect that time has on the impact of violent origins. Since 
the effects of violent origins can decrease over time (Levitsky and Way 2012), the violent 
origin indicator is adjusted accordingly. To account for the diminishing effects of time, I 
mirror the “historical effect” approach of Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro (2012) and Miller 
(2015). The first year of a violent event is coded as 1; for each subsequent year I apply a 
1% annual depreciation to the violent origin indicator. For example, the year during 
which the violent origin occurred is coded as 1, and the year after that is coded as 0.99. 
The following year after is coded as 0.98 and so on. This historical effect is applied until 
regime change occurs or the ruling regime that emerged from a violent origin is no longer 
in power.2 This approach still captures the long-term effects of violent origins, but helps 
to account for the effect of time.  
This violent origins indicator variable has many strengths, but admittedly, the 
measure still has some limitations. Measures of violent origins are used for several 
reasons. First, violent origins are relatively common events, especially in fully 
authoritarian states. Second, violent origins are fairly pertinent events which signal a 
																																																						
 
2 In rare cases where the age of the regime reaches 100 years, the violent origin 
indicator is coded as 0, or the same as cases in which there was no violent origin.  
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significant shift in power and are even widely recognized in the international arena. 
Third, violent origins are more concretely measurable than other concepts (e.g., regime 
crisis). Fourth, though not completely alike in every circumstance, measures of violent 
origins are fairly comparable across time and country. Still, this measure of violent 
origins has some limitations.  
With this variable, one cannot claim to measure how bloody a regime change was, 
or the magnitude of violence that occurred. More importantly, this variable cannot 
capture how exactly such violence affected the psyche or the decision making process of 
the ruling regime. However, this variable does capture the fact that regime change 
occurred under violent circumstances. This variable allows us to differentiate between 
regime origins that were violent on the one hand, or peaceful on the other hand. More 
importantly, having this knowledge is a crucial step in assessing the notion that violence 
or violent origins have an effect on the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism.  
The violent origins indicator variable is useful because it incorporates several 
types of violent means. However, for some, the aggregation of many violent means may 
be a limitation of violent origins indicator. This is because some useful information is lost 
because the measure aggregates several types of violent origin types. To address such 
concerns, the analysis also includes independent variables that disaggregate the violent 
origins indicator. For instance, I create a variable that only accounts for military coups or 
the military coups indicator. This variable is coded dichotomously, meaning that it is 
coded as 1 if the regime origin was due to a military coup and coded as 0 if otherwise. 
Additionally, I create a variable that accounts for revolutions and civil wars. 
Unfortunately, these two types of violent means are not coded separately by Geddes et al. 
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(2014), and are therefore coded together. This variable, or the revolutions/civil war 
indicator, is coded dichotomously. Observations are coded 1 if the regime origin was due 
to a revolution or combatants fighting a civil war; otherwise observations are coded as 0. 
These variables are extremely useful because they allow us to observe the effects of 
revolutions/civil wars and military coups separately. This analysis also includes 
independent variables that account for violence and the capacity to repress. 
Several independent variables in this analysis account for whether regime change 
was rooted in a violent origin. While these variables tell us that violence is the means of 
regime change, these variables do not tell us the level of violence that occurred or how 
bloody the regime change was. To address this, a variable that accounts for the level of 
violence during regime changes is included in this analysis. I utilize the “Autocratic 
Regimes” dataset from Geddes et al. (2014), which includes an ordinal variable marking 
the estimated amount of deaths that occurred during regime changes.3  
To account for a regime’s potential capacity to repress, the analysis accounts for 
the state’s active military personnel (data from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972 version 
4.0 and data from World Bank 2012).4 The analysis also accounts for whether the 
regime’s chief executive is an unretired military officer (data from World Bank 2012). 
This variable is coded dichotomously; coded as 1 if the chief executive was an unretired 
military officer and coded as 0 otherwise. This variable accounts for a leader’s 
																																																						
	
3 Geddes et al. (2014) code this variable on an ordinal scale from 1-4, 1 = no 
deaths, 2 = 1-25 deaths, 3 = 26-1000 deaths, 4 = more than 1000 deaths. 
	
4 Unfortunately, the correlates of war dataset only includes the years 1975-2007, 
so missing data were supplemented with the World Bank dataset. 
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experience, potential methods of repression, and a personal connection to the state’s most 
coercive apparatus.  
This analysis also includes international factors and variables. The main 
independent variables of interest measure aspects of the international environment and 
international influences, such as linkages to the West. The first variable accounts for a 
state’s relations with the US (data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). This variable is coded 
dichotomously, meaning that it is coded 1 if a state has good relations with the US and 
coded as 0 if otherwise. Another variable accounts for a state’s relations (economic, 
military, or political) with Western countries or international governmental organizations 
(data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). The variable is coded dichotomously; good 
relations are coded as 1 and poor relations are coded as 0. A variable that accounts for a 
state’s exports to the West is also included in the analysis (data from Barbieri, Keshk and 
Pollins 2009). For this variable, I aggregate a state’s total annual exports to the West or 
the percentage of a country’s exports that went to the West. Similarly, a variable that 
accounts for total imports from the West is also included in this analysis (data from 
Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). This variable is the percentage of imports that a 
country received from the West.  
This analysis also includes a variable that accounts for foreign aid. Included is a 
variable that accounts for the sum of financial aid (logged) from international 
organizations (data from Tierney et al. 2011). This variable is useful since foreign aid is 
often times related to political reform and can influence liberalization (Miller 2015). To 
examine how the international environment affects electoral authoritarianism, an 
indicator variable for the post-Cold War era is included. This variable is coded as 1 for 
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observations post-1990 and coded as 0 for observations pre-1990. Additionally, I account 
for how globalized a state is using a globalization index that accounts for economic, 
social, and political globalization (data from Dreher 2006). All together, these variables 
help to account for aspects of international linkage and interdependence, which according 
to some contribute to liberalization (Levitsky and Way 2010).  
 
Models and Procedures of Analysis 
In this analysis a total of six models are initially estimated. The dependent 
variable of interest for the models is electoral authoritarianism. In the first three models 
(Models 1-3), electoral authoritarianism is estimated through logistic regression or 
maximum likelihood estimation. For Model 1, the main independent variable of interest 
includes whether a state had a violent origin (labeled as Violent Origin). Model 1 also 
accounts for the level of violence experienced during a violent origin (labeled Violence 
Level), if the chief executive was a military officer (labeled Mil. Officer), and the state’s 
active military personnel (labeled Mil. Personnel). In addition, Model 1 accounts for 
international factors such as a state’s relations with the US (labeled US Relations); a 
state’s relations with Western countries or international organizations (labeled West IO 
Relations); a state’s exports to Western countries (labeled West Exports); a state’s 
imports from Western countries (labeled West Imports); the sum of financial aid a state 
receives from international organizations (labeled Foreign Aid), and how globalized a 
state is (labeled Global Index). Additionally, Model 1 includes an indicator variable that 
accounts for years in the post-Cold War era (labeled Post-Cold War).  
In Model 2, instead of including Violent Origin, the main independent variable of 
interest accounts for whether a state had a revolutionary/civil war origin (labeled 
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Revolution/Civil War). Essentially, Model 2 includes the Revolution/Civil War variable 
instead of the aggregated Violent Origins variable included in Model 1. This change 
allows us to examine the sole effects of revolutionary or civil war origins. Besides this 
change, the other covariates in Model 2 are the same as Model 1. The main independent 
variable of interest for Model 3 includes whether a state had a military coup origin 
(labeled Military Coups), instead of the variables Violent Origins (used Model 1) or 
Revolutions/Civil War (used Model 2). This Military Coups variable allows us to 
examine the sole effects of military coups on electoral authoritarianism. The other 
covariates for Model 3 are the same as Model 1 and Model 2.  
In models 4-6, electoral authoritarianism is estimated through complementary log-
log analysis. Maximum likelihood estimate and complementary log-log models yield 
similar results, but complementary log-log models work especially well for data observed 
in discrete intervals such as years (Allison 2010). Furthermore, complementary log-log 
models allow for robustness checks. Models 4-6 include similar independent variables to 
Models 1-3. For example, Model 4 mirrors Model 1 with regard to independent variables. 
Moreover, Model 5 mirrors Model 2, and Model 6 mirrors Model 3. With regard to 
control variables, all models control for annual GDP growth percentage (GDP Growth), 
GDP per capita (logged) (GDP/Capita), fuel exports as percentage of GDP (Fuel 
Exports), and the duration of the regime in years (Reg. Duration). It is also important to 
note that all of the covariates (in all models) are lagged by one year to help control for 
issues of reverse causation.5  
																																																						
 
5 The exception is Reg. Duration, for which I see no issues of reverse causation. 
  
   
 
159 
In addition to these models, robustness checks are implemented. First, robustness 
checks are implemented for Model 1 and Model 4, for which the main independent 
variable of interest is Violent Origins. For comparison, Model 1 (maximum likelihood 
estimation) and Model 4 (complementary log-log) are included in the results and are 
labeled as Baseline. The first robustness check (labeled as Geddes Types) includes two 
analyses, a maximum likelihood estimation and a complementary log-log model, which 
account for the autocracy categories coded in Geddes et al.  (2014). This robustness 
check essentially aggregates the Geddes regime types (i.e., single-party, military, and 
personalist) into Model 1 and Model 4. A second robustness check (labeled Regions) 
aggregates geographical region indicators into Models 1 and 4. The next robustness 
check (labeled Probit) estimates the covariates of Model 1 using probit regression 
analysis. Finally, the last robustness check (labeled Probit Geddes Types) estimates the 
covariates of Model 1 using probit regression, but the Geddes et al. (2014) autocracy 
categories are implemented. Overall, a total of six robustness checks are implemented.  
Additionally, robustness checks are implemented for Model 3 and Model 6, for 
which the main independent variable of interest is Military Coups. As a point of 
comparison, Model 3 (maximum likelihood estimation) and Model 6 (complementary 
log-log) are included in the results and are labeled as Baseline. The first robustness check 
(labeled as Geddes Types) includes two analyses, a maximum likelihood estimation and a 
complementary log-log model, that aggregate the Geddes autocracy categories into 
Models 3 and 6. A second robustness check (labeled Regions) aggregates geographical 
indicators into Models 3 and 6. Another robustness check (labeled Probit) estimates the 
covariates of Model 3 using probit regression. Lastly, the final robustness check (labeled 
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Probit Geddes Types) estimates the covariates of Model 3 using probit regression, but 
this analysis aggregates the Geddes autocracy categories. A total of six robustness checks 
are implemented in this instance. Robustness checks were not necessary for Model 2.  
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of this logistic regression analysis are presented on Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2. On Table 6.1 Models 1-3 are presented. Models 4-6 are presented on Table 
6.2; these models represent the complementary log-log models. We begin with the results 
of Model 1. In this model, the Violent Origins coefficient is both positive and statistically 
significant. This indicates that electoral authoritarianism is positively associated with 
violent origins. These results mean that violent origins increase the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. 
Personnel are not statistically significant for Model 1.  
From Chapter 5 we learn that international factors play a crucial role in the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. This model, however, incorporates several more 
independent variables. Even still, when it comes to international factors, the results of this 
model suggest that international factors play a crucial role in the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. With regard to the coefficient for US Relations, the covariate is positive 
and statistically significant. This indicates that a good relation with the US is positively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. In addition, the coefficient for West IO 
Relations is also positive and statistically significant, which indicates that electoral 
authoritarianism is positively associated with a state’s relations to Western countries or 
international organizations. When it comes to the indicator variable for the post-Cold 
War era, the coefficient for Post-Cold War is positive and statistically significant. This  
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Table 6.1 Violent Origins Logistic Regression 
DV: Electoral 
Authoritarian 
Model 1  
(MLE) 
Model 2  
(MLE) 
Model 3  
(MLE) 
    
Violent Origins 0.80 (0.15)***   
    
Revolution/Civil War  0.18 (0.19)  
    
Military Coups   0.69 (0.15)*** 
    
Violence Level 0.01 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07) 0.15 (0.06)* 
    
Mil. Officer -0.00 (0.13) 0.21 (0.13) -0.11 (0.15) 
    
Mil. Personnel 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
    
US Relations 0.60 (0.16)*** 0.60 (0.15)*** 0.53 (0.15)*** 
    
West IO Relations 0.82 (0.19)*** 0.75 (0.18)*** 0.83 (0.19)*** 
    
West Exports -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
    
West Imports 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
    
Post-Cold War 0.98 (0.14)*** 0.95 (0.14)*** 1.05 (0.14)*** 
    
Global Index 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01 
    
Foreign Aid 0.13 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)*** 
    
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01)+ 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)+ 
    
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.12 (0.08) -0.18 (0.08)* -0.16 (0.08)+ 
    
Fuel Exports 0.00 (0.00)+ 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)+ 
    
Reg. Duration -0.01 (0.01)+ -0.01 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01)** 
    
Observations 2013 2022 2022 
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. DV = Dependent Variable. MLE = Maximum 
Likelihood Estimate. + p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 6.2 Violent Origins Complementary Log-Log 
DV: Electoral 
Authoritarian 
Model 4  
(CLL) 
Model 5  
(CLL) 
Model 6  
(CLL) 
    
Violent Origins 0.58 (0.11)***   
    
Revolution/Civil War  0.03 (0.15)  
    
Military Coups   0.55 (0.12)*** 
    
Violence Level -0.01 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05)* 
    
Mil. Officer 0.02 (0.11) 0.15 (0.10) -0.08 (0.12) 
    
Mil. Personnel 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
    
US Relations 0.52 (0.13)*** 0.53 (0.13)*** 0.48 (0.13)*** 
    
West IO Relations 0.63 (0.16)*** 0.58 (0.16)*** 0.65 (0.16)*** 
    
West Exports -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
    
West Imports 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
    
Post-Cold War 0.83 (0.12)*** 0.83 (0.12)*** 0.90 (0.12)*** 
    
Global Index 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
    
Foreign Aid 0.10 (0.03)** 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.11 (0.03)** 
    
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01)+ 0.01 (0.01)+ 0.01 (0.01)+ 
    
GDP/Capita (ln) -0.11 (0.07)+ -0.18 (0.07)** -0.15 (0.07)* 
    
Fuel Exports 0.00 (0.00)+ 0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00)+ 
    
Reg. Duration -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)* 
    
Observations 2013 2022 2022 
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. DV = Dependent Variable. CLL = 
Complementary Log Log.  + p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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suggests that the post-Cold War era is positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism.    
The results of Model 4, or the corresponding complementary log-log model are 
similar. Once again the coefficient for Violent Origins is both positive and statistically 
significant, which indicates that violent origins are positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism. Additionally, the coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. 
Personnel are not statistically significant in Model 4. With regard to international factors 
such as the US Relations, West IO Relations, and Post-Cold War coefficients, the results 
for Model 4 are similar to the results of Model 1.  
In Model 2, the main independent variable of interest is Revolutions/Civil War. 
The coefficient for Revolution/Civil War while positive is not statistically significant. 
This indicates that revolutions or civil wars do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with electoral authoritarianism. In addition, the coefficients for Violence 
Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are not statistically significant in Model 2. Once 
again, however, we see that international factors play a crucial role in the likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism. The coefficients for US Relations, West IO Relations, and 
Post-Cold War were all positive and statistically significant. Model 5 is the 
corresponding complementary log-log model to Model 2 and includes the same 
covariates. The results of Model 5 are similar to the results of Model 2. The coefficient 
for Revolutions/Civil War is once again positive but not statistically significant. Likewise, 
the coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are not statistically 
significant in Model 5. On the other hand, the coefficients for US Relations, West IO 
Relations, and Post-Cold War were all positive and statistically significant in Model 5. 
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In Model 3, the main independent variable of interest is Military Coups. The 
results reveal that the coefficient for Military Coup is both positive and statistically 
significant. This means that military coups are positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism, or that military coups increase the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. In contrast, the coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. 
Personnel are not statistically significant for Model 3. International factors are once again 
positively associated with electoral authoritarianism since the coefficients for US 
Relations, West IO Relations, and Post-Cold War were all positive and statistically 
significant. Model 6 is the corresponding complementary log-log model to Model 3 and 
includes the same covariates. The results of Model 6 are similar to the results of Model 3. 
Most notably, the coefficient for Military Coups is both positive and statistically 
significant in Model 6. The coefficient for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. 
Personnel are not statistically significant in Model 6. The coefficients for US Relations, 
West IO Relations, and Post-Cold War were all positive and statistically significant 
Model 6.    
In order to interpret the results of these models substantively, odds ratios were 
estimated. I specifically focus on the odds ratios of Violent Origins and Military Coups.6 
The odds ratios for Model 1 are presented on Table 6.3. The odds ratio for Violent 
Origins (2.22) indicates that when other predictor variables are held constant, a one-unit 
increase in violent origins increases the odds of electoral authoritarianism by 122%. In 
other words, a violent origin increases the odds of electoral authoritarianism  
																																																						
 
6 Odds ratios for Model 2 were not estimated because the main independent 
variable of interest, Revolutions/Civil War was not statistically significant. 




  Table 6.3 Violent Origins Odds Ratios 
 Odds Ratios CI: 95% 
   
Violent Origins 2.22 1.66 - 2.96 
   
Violence Level 1.01 0.89 - 1.15 
   
Mil. Officer 1.00 0.77 - 1.30 
   
Mil. Personnel 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
   
US Relations 1.81 1.35 - 2.47 
   
West IO Relations 2.28 1.60 - 3.30 
   
West Exports 0.99 0.99 - 1.00 
   
West Imports 1.00 0.99 - 1.01 
   
Post-Cold War 2.68 2.05 -  3.51 
   
Global Index 1.00 0.99 - 1.01 
   
Foreign Aid 1.14 1.06 - 1.24 
   
GDP Growth 1.01 1.00 - 1.02 
   
GDP/Capita (ln) 0.89 0.75 - 1.05 
   
Fuel Exports 1.00 1.00 - 1.01 
   
Reg. Duration 0.99 0.98 - 1.00 
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substantially. The odds ratios for Model 3 are presented on Table 6.4. The odds ratio for 
Military Coups (2.00) signifies that when other predictor variables are held constant, a 
one-unit increase in military coups increases the odds of electoral authoritarianism by 
100%. This means that military coups substantially increase the odds of electoral 
authoritarianism.  
Table 6.5 summarizes the results of robustness checks for Model 1. The results 
for Model 1 are highly robust. When the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic types are 
accounted for, maximum likelihood estimates and complementary log-log estimates 
remain powerful and statistically significant for Violent Origins. When region indicators 
are implemented, the results remain similar; the estimates for Violent Origins are 
statistically significant and positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. When 
probit regression analysis is applied, the coefficient for Violent Origins is slightly weaker 
but remains statistically significant. This is true even when the Geddes et al. (2014) 
autocratic types are accounted for in probit regression analysis. These robustness checks 
are further evidence that violent origins and electoral authoritarianism have a strong 
relation. 
With regard to robustness checks for Model 3, Table 6.6 summarizes the results. 
Recall that the main independent variable of interest for Model 3 is Military Coups, and 
the robustness checks reveal that the results of Model 3 are highly robust. Maximum 
likelihood estimates and complementary log-log estimates for Military Coups remain 
powerful and statistically significant when the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic types are 
accounted for. Moreover, when region indicators are included in the model, the estimates 
for Military Coups remain positive and statistically significant. With regard to the probit  
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Table 6.4 Military Coups Odds Ratios 
 Odds Ratios CI: 95% 
   
Military Coups 2.00 1.49 - 2.71 
   
Violence Level 1.16 1.03 - 1.31 
   
Mil. Officer 0.89 0.67 - 1.19 
   
Mil. Personnel 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
   
US Relations 1.69 1.25 - 2.30 
   
West IO Relations 2.29 1.61 - 3.33 
   
West Exports 0.99 0.99 - 1.00 
   
West Imports 1.00 0.99 - 1.01 
   
Post-Cold War 2.84 2.17 - 3.74 
   
Global Index 1.00 0.99 - 1.01 
   
Foreign Aid 1.15 1.07 - 1.25 
   
GDP Growth 1.01 1.00 - 1.02 
   
GDP/Capita (ln) 0.85 0.73 - 1.00 
   
Fuel Exports 1.00 1.00 - 1.01 
   
Reg. Duration 0.99 0.98 - 1.00 
 
Note. —CI = Confidence Interval. 
 
 




Table 6.5 Robustness Checks of Violent Origins 
 Violent Origins CLL  
    
Baseline 0.80 (0.15)*** 0.58 (0.11)***  
    
Geddes Types 0.64 (0.15)*** 0.46 (0.12)***  
    
Regions 0.78 (0.15)*** 0.57 (0.11)***  
    
Probit 0.49 (0.09)***   
    
Probit Geddes Types 0.37 (0.09)***     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. CLL = Complementary Log Log. *** p < .001. 
 
 
Table 6.6 Robustness Checks of Military Coups 
 Military Coups CLL  
    
Baseline 0.69 (0.15)*** 0.55 (0.12)***  
    
Geddes Types 0.57 (0.16)*** 0.43 (0.12)***  
    
Regions 0.85 (0.15)*** 0.63 (0.12)***  
    
Probit 0.42 (0.09)***   
    
Probit Geddes Types 0.34 (0.09)***     
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analysis, the coefficient for Military Coups is relatively weaker but remains statistically 
significant, even when the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic types are accounted for in the 
probit analysis. These results provide further support for the notion that military coups 
and electoral authoritarianism have a strong association. Overall, this analysis reveals 
some important conclusions about violent origins and electoral authoritarianism. 
From these results we can draw several conclusions worthy of discussion. One 
conclusion that we can draw from these results is that violent origins are for the most part 
tied to electoral authoritarianism. This statement comes with some caveats, which I will 
expound upon below. However, let us first begin with the finding that violent origins 
increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. In this analysis the covariate Violent 
Origins is positively associated with electoral authoritarianism in all of the models this 
covariate was included in. Even with checks of robustness, the Violent Origins covariate 
is still positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Therefore, these results 
provide evidence that violent origins increase the likelihood and odds of electoral 
authoritarianism. Even still, some caveats emerged throughout this analysis.   
Recall that Violent Origins represents an aggregate measure of revolutions, civil 
wars, and military coups. When these measures of violent means are disaggregated, the 
results of this analysis are mixed. On the one hand, the covariate Revolutions/Civil Wars 
was positive, but it was not statistically significant in any of the models that it was 
included in. This can be interpreted to mean that revolutions and civil wars do not 
increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. On the other hand, the covariate 
Military Coups was both significant and positively associated with electoral 
authoritarianism in all of the models this covariate was included in. Robustness checks 
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still supported the positive relationship between military coups and electoral 
authoritarianism. From this, we can conclude that military coups increase the likelihood 
and odds of electoral authoritarianism. Thus, in this logistic regression analysis we find 
evidence that violent origins are connected to electoral authoritarianism, but this 
statement has to be made with some reservations since revolutions and civil wars were 
not significantly associated with electoral authoritarianism. In this analysis, I also find 
more evidence that international factors play a crucial role.  
Another conclusion that we can draw from these results is that international 
factors are positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Consider for instance 
that the coefficients for US Relations, West IO Relations, and Post-Cold War were 
positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Overall, the results 
indicate that positive relations with the US and/or Western countries or international 
organizations increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Additionally, the post-
Cold War era increased the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. The results of this 
analysis further support the findings in Chapter 5 and provide further evidence that 
electoral authoritarianism is indeed tied to international factors. Although these results 
support the notion that electoral authoritarianism is associated with violent origins, more 
research is needed.   
 
Violent Origins: Multinomial Regression 
Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 
Multinomial regression analysis allows the analysis of dependent variables with 
multiple categories. In this multinomial regression analysis, the dependent variable has 
three outcomes or three categories: fully authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and 
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democracy. In this analysis the fully authoritarian category is the reference or the base 
category. This means that there will be two sets of coefficients, one for the electoral 
authoritarian category and another for the democracy category. The base category, or full 
authoritarianism, is important because the two sets of coefficients are interpreted in 
comparison to the base category. Therefore, we will be able to compare and contrast how 
each independent variable affects electoral authoritarianism on the one hand, and full 
democratization on the other hand. Essentially, multinomial analysis provides an 
illustration into how each covariate affects different levels of liberalization.   
When it comes to the independent variables, I utilize the same independent 
variables included in the logistic regression conducted above. The main independent 
variable of interest is the violent origins indicator (labeled Violent Origins), which 
accounts for regime change due to military coup, revolution, or insurgents/combatants 
fighting a civil war. This variable is coded dichotomously, or coded as 1 if the violent 
origin description applies and coded as 0 in other instances. This analysis also includes 
independent variables that disaggregate the violent origins indicator variable. One of 
these variables (labeled Military Coups) only accounts for whether a military coup was 
the origin of the regime. This variable is again coded dichotomously; coded as 1 if the 
regime origin was due to a military coup and coded as 0 otherwise. The other variable 
only accounts for revolutions and civil wars (labeled Revolutions/Civil War). 
Observations are coded dichotomously; coded 1 if regime origin was due to revolution or 
civil war and code 0 in other instances. 
Another independent variable accounts for the death toll in a regime change (data 
from Geddes et al. 2014). This variable (labeled as Violence Level) is measured on an 
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ordinal scale.7 Another independent variable (labeled Mil. Personnel) accounts for a 
state’s active military personnel (data from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972 version 4.0 
and data from World Bank 2012). This analysis also includes the independent variable 
that accounts for whether the regime’s chief executive is an unretired military officer 
(data from World Bank 2012). This variable (labeled Mil. Officer) is coded 
dichotomously, or coded as 1 if chief executive is an unretired military officer and coded 
0 if otherwise.  
Like other analyses in this study, international factors are once again accounted 
for. Some of these variables account for a state’s linkage to the West and other 
international governmental organizations. These independent variables account for US 
relations (labeled US Relations), which accounts for whether a state’s relations with the 
US are good or poor; the nature of relations with Western countries (labeled West 
Relations), which accounts for whether a state’s relations with Western countries or 
international organizations are good or poor; exports to Western countries (labeled West 
Exports), which accounts for the percentage of a state’s total exports that went to the 
West; imports from Western countries (labeled West Imports) which accounts for the 
percentage of a state’s total imports that came from the West; international aid (labeled 
Foreign Aid), which incorporates the sum of financial aid (logged) that a state received 
from intergovernmental organizations, and the interpretation of how economically, 
socially and politically globalized a state is (labeled Global Index). Lastly, an indicator 
variable for the post-Cold War era was included (labeled Post-Cold War). This indicator 
																																																						
	
7 This is an ordinal scale from 1-4 (e.g., 1 = no deaths, 2 = 1-25 deaths, 3 = 26-
1000 deaths, 4 = more than 1000 deaths).  
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variable is coded as 1 for observations years post-1990 and coded as 0 for observations 
pre-1990.   
 
Models and Procedures of Analysis 
In this multinomial regression analysis a total of three models are estimated. 
While the covariates included vary from model to model, two sets of coefficients are 
estimated for each model. In all three models estimated, one set of coefficients 
corresponds to the effects that the covariates have on electoral authoritarianism and the 
other set of coefficients correspond to the effects that the covariates have on full 
democratization. Equally important is the fact that the coefficients are always interpreted 
in comparison to the base category, which is full authoritarianism. The three models are 
presented on separate tables, and in each table the electoral authoritarian or democracy 
coefficients are clearly labeled.   
For the first model (Model 1), the main independent variable of interest is Violent 
Origins. This model also includes the covariates Violence Level, Mil. Officer, Mil. 
Personnel, US Relations, West Relations, West Exports, West Imports, Global Index, 
Foreign Aid, and Post-Cold War. For the second model (Model 2), the main independent 
variable is Revolution/Civil War. The other covariates in Model 2 are the same as the 
covariates from Model 1. Finally, for the third model (Model 3), the main independent 
variable of interest is Military Coups. For this model, the other covariates remain the 
same as the previous models. For all three models, I control for annual GDP growth 
percentage (labeled GDP Growth), GDP per capita (logged) (labeled GDP/Capita), fuel 
exports as percentage of GDP (labeled Fuel Exports), and the duration of the regime in 
years (labeled Reg. Duration). Additionally, all of the covariates (in all models) are 
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lagged by one year to help control for issues of reverse causation.8 To interpret the results 
substantively, odds ratios for the models are also estimated.  
 
Results and Discussion 
In this section the results of the multinomial regression analysis are examined. 
First, we begin with a description of the results. Afterward, the major conclusions and 
implications of these results are discussed. Overall, the results reveal that the effects of 
violent origins differ when it comes to electoral authoritarianism on the one hand and full 
democratization on the other hand. While violent origins increase the likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism, violent origins decrease the likelihood of democracy. This may 
have several crucial implications, but first, we begin with a discussion of the results from 
Model 1.  
The results of Model 1 are presented on Table 6.7. Let us begin with a discussion 
of the electoral authoritarian coefficients. The electoral authoritarian coefficient for 
Violent Origins is both positive and statistically significant. This means that in 
comparison to full authoritarianism, a violent origin is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Put slightly differently, violent regime origins 
increase the odds of electoral authoritarianism in a state. When it comes to other 
covariates such as Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel the coefficients for 
electoral authoritarianism are not significant. On the other hand, many of the international 
factors are significant in this analysis.  
Consider for instance that the electoral authoritarian coefficient for US Relations  
																																																						
	
8 The exception is Reg. Duration, for which I see no issues of reverse causation.  
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Table 6.7 Violent Origins Multinomial Analysis Model 1 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian Democracy 
   
Violent Origins 0.55 (0.17)*** -0.78 (0.26)** 
   
Violence Level -0.11 (0.07) -0.91 (0.16)*** 
   
Mil. Officer -0.13 (0.15) -0.78 (0.24)** 
   
Mil. Personnel 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
   
US Relations 0.90 (0.17)*** 1.69 (0.27)*** 
   
West Relations 0.55 (0.22)* 0.11 (0.28) 
   
West Exports 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)*** 
   
West Imports -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)* 
   
Post-Cold War 1.25 (0.14)*** 1.86 (0.25)*** 
   
Global Index 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
   
Foreign Aid 0.18 (0.05)*** 0.15 (0.07)* 
   
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) 0.03 (0.10) 0.01 (0.14) 
   
Fuel Export -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.10 (0.01)*** 
   
N= 2013     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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is both positive and statistically significant. This can be interpreted to mean that in 
comparison to full authoritarianism, a good relationship with the US is associated with an 
increased likelihood in electoral authoritarianism. Likewise, the electoral authoritarian 
coefficient for West Relations is positive and statistically significant. This signals that in 
comparison to full authoritarianism, a good relation with Western countries or 
international organizations increases the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. The 
electoral authoritarian coefficient for Post-Cold War is also positive and statistically 
significant. In comparison to full authoritarianism, an increased likelihood in electoral 
authoritarianism is associated with the post-Cold War era. Lastly, the electoral 
authoritarian coefficients for Global Index and Foreign Aid were also positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that in comparison to full authoritarianism, these 
variables are positively associated with the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism.  
Coefficients for democracy were also estimated in Model 1. The democracy 
coefficient for Violent Origins is negative and statistically significant. This crucial 
finding means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, a violent origin is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of full democratization. Put differently, violent origins 
decrease the odds of full democratization. In addition, the democracy coefficient for 
Violence Level is negative and statistically significant. This signifies that in comparison 
to full authoritarianism, an increasing death toll during regime change is negatively 
associated with full democratization. In other words, an increasing level of violence 
during the origins of a regime decreases the likelihood of full democratization. Similarly, 
the democracy coefficient for Mil. Officer is both negative and statistically significant. 
This indicates that in comparison to full authoritarianism, the likelihood of full 
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democratization decreases when the chief executive is an unretired military officer. The 
democracy coefficient for Mil. Personnel is not statistically significant in this analysis. 
International factors once again seem to play a crucial role. The democracy 
coefficient for US Relations is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in 
comparison to full authoritarianism, a good relationship with the US is associated with an 
increased likelihood of full democratization. Similarly, the democracy coefficient for 
West Relations is positive and statistically significant. This signifies that in comparison to 
full authoritarianism, a good relation with Western countries or international 
organizations increases the likelihood of full democratization. When it comes to the 
democracy coefficient for Post-Cold War, it is positive and statistically significant. This 
means that the post-Cold War era is associated with an increased likelihood of 
democracy. Other international covariates such as Global Index, Foreign Aid, and West 
Exports were also positive and statistically significant when it comes to democracy. In 
contrast, the democracy coefficient for West Imports is negative and statistically 
significant, which indicates that in comparison to full authoritarianism, imports from the 
West decrease the likelihood of full democratization.  
The results of Model 2 are presented on Table 6.8. In Model 2 the main 
independent variable of interest is Revolution/Civil War. First, we begin with a discussion 
of the electoral authoritarian coefficients. In this analysis, the electoral authoritarian 
coefficient for Revolution/Civil War is positive, but it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are not statistically 
significant. Many of the international factors proved to be relevant in this model. For 
example, the electoral authoritarian coefficients for both US Relations and West Relations  
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Table 6.8 Revolutions/Civil Wars Multinomial Analysis Model 2 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian Democracy 
   
Revolution/Civil War 0.05 (0.22) -0.79 (0.34)* 
   
Violence Level -0.03 (0.08) -0.93 (0.16)*** 
   
Mil. Officer 0.01 (0.15) -1.06 (0.23)*** 
   
Mil. Personnel -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
   
US Relations 0.87 (0.17)*** 1.65 (0.27)*** 
   
West Relations 0.49 (0.22)* 0.13 (0.28) 
   
West Exports 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)*** 
   
West Imports -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01)* 
   
Post-Cold War 1.23 (0.14)*** 1.88 (0.25)*** 
   
Global Index 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
   
Foreign Aid 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.16 (0.07)* 
   
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) -0.02 (0.10) 0.01 (0.14) 
   
Fuel Export -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.10 (0.01)*** 
   
N= 2022     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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were positive and statistically significant. This indicates that in comparison to full 
authoritarianism, good relations with the US and good relations with Western countries 
or international organizations increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. 
Likewise, the electoral authoritarian coefficients for Post-Cold War, Global Index, and 
Foreign Aid are positive and statistically significant as well. 
The democracy coefficients in Model 2 also reveal some important findings. The 
democracy coefficient for Revolution/Civil War is negative and statistically significant. 
This finding means that in comparison to full authoritarianism, a revolutionary or civil 
war regime origins are negatively associated with the likelihood of full democratization. 
This is to say that having a revolutionary/civil war regime origin decreases the odds of 
democracy. The coefficient for Violence Level is also negative and statistically 
significant. This reveals that in comparison to full authoritarianism, the death toll during 
a regime change is negatively associated with the likelihood of full democratization. In 
other words, the higher the level of violence, the lower the odds of democracy in the 
future. The democracy coefficient for Mil. Officer is also negative and statistically 
significant. This signifies that in comparison to full authoritarianism, the likelihood of 
full democratization decreases when the chief executive is an unretired military officer. 
The democracy coefficient for Mil. Personnel is not statistically significant for Model 2. 
With regard to international factors, the results of Model 2 support the notion that 
international variables play a crucial role in democratization. The democracy coefficient 
for US Relations is once again positive and statistically significant, which means that in 
comparison to full authoritarianism, good relations with the US increase the likelihood of 
democracy. While positive, the West Relations coefficient is not statistically significant in 
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Model 2. The Post-Cold War coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which 
indicates that in comparison to full authoritarianism, the post-Cold War era increased the 
likelihood of democracy. The democracy coefficients for Global Index, Foreign Aid, and 
West Exports are both positive and statistically significant for Model 2. In contrast, the 
coefficient for West Imports is negative and statistically significant.  
Model 3 is the final model for this multinomial regression analysis. The results of 
Model 3 are presented on Table 6.9. In Model 3 the main independent variable of interest 
is Military Coups. The electoral authoritarian coefficient for Military Coups is both 
positive and statistically significant. This means that in comparison to full 
authoritarianism, military coups increase the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. The 
electoral authoritarian coefficients for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel 
are not statistically significant in this analysis. In this model the international factors are 
positively associated with the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. The electoral 
authoritarian coefficients for US Relations, West Relations, and Post-Cold War are all 
positive and statistically significant. In addition, the electoral authoritarian coefficients 
for Global Index and Foreign Aid are positive and statistically significant.  
The democracy coefficients in Model 3 reveal several important insights. 
Consider for example that the Military Coups coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant. This coefficient indicates that in comparison to full authoritarianism, military 
coups are negatively associated with the likelihood of democracy. This is to say that 
military coup origins decrease the odds of full democratization. Similarly, the democracy 
coefficient for Violence Level is negative and statistically significant. This reveals that in  
comparison to full authoritarianism, the death toll during regime change is negatively 
   
 
181 
Table 6.9 Military Coups Multinomial Analysis Model 3 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian Democracy 
   
Military Coups 0.52 (0.17)** -1.23 (0.38)** 
   
Violence Level -0.01 (0.07) -0.90 (0.15)*** 
   
Mil. Officer -0.22 (0.16) -0.63 (0.26)* 
   
Mil. Personnel 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
   
US Relations 0.82 (0.17)*** 1.62 (0.27)*** 
   
West Relations 0.55 (0.22)* 0.05 (0.28) 
   
West Exports 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)*** 
   
West Imports -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01)* 
   
Post-Cold War 1.28 (0.15)*** 1.87 (0.25)*** 
   
Global Index 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
   
Foreign Aid 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.15 (0.07)* 
   
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) 0.00 (0.10) 0.03 (0.14) 
   
Fuel Export 0.01 (0.00)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
   
Reg. Duration -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.10 (0.01)*** 
   
N= 2022     
 
Note. —Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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associated with the likelihood of democracy. As the level of violence goes up during a 
regime origin, the odds of full democratization decrease. The coefficient for Mil. Officer 
is also negative and statistically significant, which signifies that in comparison to full 
authoritarianism, the likelihood of full democratization decreases when the chief 
executive is an unretired military officer. The democracy coefficient for Mil. Personnel is 
not statistically significant in Model 3.  
Many of the international variables in Model 3 are positively associated with 
democracy. The coefficients for US Relations and Post-Cold War were positive and 
statistically significant. Additionally, the democracy coefficients for West Exports, 
Global Index, and Foreign Aid are all positive and statistically significant in Model 3. 
However, the West Imports coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
the in comparison to full authoritarianism, an increase in imports from the West reduces 
the likelihood of democracy. The democracy coefficient for West Relations is not 
statistically significant in this model. 
The results of all three models revealed some important insights, but to interpret 
the results substantively, odds ratios for all three models were estimated. The odds ratios 
for each model are presented on separate tables. First, let us begin with the odds ratios for 
Model 1. The odds ratios of Model 1 are presented on Table 6.10. This table shows odds 
ratios for electoral authoritarianism and democracy, and odds ratios correspond with the 
independent and control variables of interest. We begin with a discussion of the odds 
ratios for electoral authoritarianism relative to full authoritarianism. The odds ratio for 
Violent Origins (1.74) indicates that violent origins increase the odds of electoral  
authoritarianism. Substantively, a one-unit increase in Violent Origins indicates that the 
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Table 6.10 Odds Ratios Violent Origins Model 1 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian            Democracy 
   
Violent Origins 1.74 0.46 
   
Violence Level 0.90 0.40 
   
Mil. Officer 0.88 0.46 
   
Mil. Personnel 1.00 1.00 
   
US Relations 2.46 5.41 
   
West Relations 1.73 1.13 
   
West Exports 1.00 1.02 
   
West Imports 1.00 0.99 
   
Post-Cold War 3.47 6.42 
   
Global Index 1.06 1.12 
   
Foreign Aid 1.20 1.16 
   
GDP Growth 1.01 1.01 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) 1.03 1.01 
   
Fuel Export 0.99 0.95 
   
Reg. Duration 0.96 0.90 
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odds of a state being electoral authoritarian, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, 
increase by 74% when holding other variables in the model constant. The electoral 
authoritarian odds ratios for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are not 
statistically significant.  
The odds ratios for democracy reveal several important insights. The democracy 
odds ratio for Violent Origins (0.46) reveals that having a violent regime origin decreases 
the odds of a state being fully democratic. Having a violent origin means that the odds of 
a state being fully democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, decrease by 54% 
while holding other variables constant. Moreover, the odds ratio for Violence Level (0.40) 
signifies that a higher death toll during regime change decreases the odds of a state being 
fully democratic. For every one-unit increase in Violence Level, the odds of a state being 
fully democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, decrease by 60% when other 
variables in the model are held constant. Similarly, the odds ratio for Mil. Officer (0.46) 
means that having an unretired military officer as the chief executive reduces the odds of 
full democratization. When holding other variables constant, having a military officer as 
chief executive reduces the odds of a state being fully democratic, as opposed to being 
fully authoritarian, by 54%. The odds ratio for Mil. Personnel is not statistically 
significant in this instance.  
The estimated odds ratios for Model 2 also reveal some insightful results. The 
odds ratios of Model 2 are presented on Table 6.11. In Model 2 the main independent 
variable of interest is Revolution/Civil War. The electoral authoritarian odds ratio for 
Revolution/Civil War is not statistically significant in this model. In fact, the electoral  
authoritarian odds ratios for Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are also not 
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Table 6.11 Odds Ratios Revolutions/Civil Wars Model 2 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian          Democracy 
   
Revolution/Civil War 1.05 0.45 
   
Violence Level 0.97 0.39 
   
Mil. Officer 1.01 0.35 
   
Mil. Personnel 1.00 1.00 
   
US Relations 2.39 5.18 
   
West Relations 1.62 1.14 
   
West Exports 1.00 1.02 
   
West Imports 1.00 0.99 
   
Post-Cold War 3.41 6.55 
   
Global Index 1.06 1.12 
   
Foreign Aid 1.21 1.18 
   
GDP Growth 1.02 1.01 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) 0.98 1.01 
   
Fuel Export 0.99 0.95 
   
Reg. Duration 0.96 0.90 
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statistically significant. However, when it comes to the odds ratios for democracy, the 
results tell a different story. 
The democracy odds ratio for Revolution/Civil (0.45) indicates that having a 
revolution or civil war as the regime origin decreases the odds of state being democratic. 
A revolutionary or civil war origin means that the odds of a state being fully democratic, 
as opposed to being fully authoritarian, decrease by 55% when other variables are held 
constant. The democracy odds ratio for Violence Level (0.39) signifies that a higher death 
toll during regime change decreases the odds of democracy. Every one-unit increase in 
Violence Level decreases the odds of a state being democratic, as opposed to being fully 
authoritarian, by 61% when holding other variables constant. With regard to the odds 
ratio for Mil. Officer (0.35), the results indicate that having an unretired military officer 
as the chief executive reduce the odds of democracy. In particular, having a military 
officer as the chief executive decreases the odds of a state being fully democratic, as 
opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 65% while holding other variables in the model 
constant. The democracy odds ratio for Mil. Personnel is not statistically significant. The 
results of Model 3 also show some interesting findings.  
The estimated odds ratios for Model 3 are presented on Table 6.12. The main 
independent variable of interest is Military Coups. The electoral authoritarian odds ratio 
for Military Coups (1.68) indicates that a military coup origin increases the likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism. Specifically, having a military coup origin increases the odds 
of state being electoral authoritarian, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 68% 
when other variables are held constant. The electoral authoritarian odds ratios for  
Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel are not statistically significant. The 
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Table 6.12 Odds Ratios Military Coups Model 3 
Base: Autocracy Electoral Authoritarian           Democracy 
   
Military Coups 1.68 0.29 
   
Violence Level 1.00 0.41 
   
Mil. Officer 0.80 0.54 
   
Mil. Personnel 1.00 1.00 
   
US Relations 1.00 5.03 
   
West Relations 2.28 1.05 
   
West Exports 1.74 1.02 
   
West Imports 1.00 0.99 
   
Post-Cold War 1.00 6.46 
   
Global Index 3.61 1.12 
   
Foreign Aid 1.06 1.16 
   
GDP Growth 1.21 1.01 
   
GDP/Cap (ln) 1.02 1.03 
   
Fuel Export 1.00 0.95 
   
Reg. Duration 0.99 0.91 
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democracy odds ratios in Model 3 also provide some important findings. 
The democracy odds ratio for Military Coups (0.29) indicates that military coup 
origins decrease the likelihood of democratization. Having a military coup decreases the 
odds of a state being fully democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 71% 
while holding other variables constant. The democracy odds ratio for Violence Level 
(0.41) reveals that a higher death toll during regime change decreases the odds of full 
democracy. In particular, every one-unit increase in Violence Level decreases the odds of 
a state being fully democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 59% when 
holding other variables constant. The odds ratio for Mil. Officer (0.54) means that having 
an unretired military officer as the chief executive decreases the odds of full 
democratization. More specifically, having a military officer as chief executive decreases 
the odds of being fully democratic, as opposed to being fully authoritarian, by 46% when 
other variables are held constant. In this model the odds ratio for Mil. Personnel is not 
statistically significant. Taken together the results of this analysis have some interesting 
conclusions.  
One major insight of this multinomial analysis is that the relationship between 
violent origins and electoral authoritarianism is different from the relationship between 
violent origins and democracy. Violent origins increase the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism, but decrease the likelihood of democracy. This was the case for Model 
1, in which Violent Origins was the main independent variable of interest. For the most 
part, the results were similar for the disaggregated violent origin variables: 
Revolutions/Civil War (Model 2) and Military Coups (Model 3). In Model 2, the 
relationship between Revolutions/Civil War and electoral authoritarianism was 
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insignificant. However, the relationship between Revolutions/Civil War and democracy is 
significant, with Revolutions/Civil Wars decreasing the likelihood of democracy. In 
Model 3, Military Coups increased the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, but 
decreased the likelihood of democracy. When it comes to the level of violence or the 
death toll that occurs during regime change, the results are mixed but promising. 
Additionally, the presence of a military officer as the chief executive seems crucial. In all 
three models Violence Level, Mil. Officer, and Mil. Personnel did not have a significant 
relationship with electoral authoritarianism. Still, the results show that these covariates do 
not have liberalizing effects. In fact, Violence Level, and Mil. Officer had a significant 
and negative association with democracy in all three model specifications. Violence Level 
and Mil. Officer decrease the likelihood and the odds of democracy in this analysis. 
Although these variables did not significantly affect the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism, their relationship with full democratization is evidence that these 
variables do not have a liberalizing effect.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, two major analyses were conducted, logistic regression analysis 
and multinomial regression analysis. Both analyses yielded very interesting results. The 
results of the logistic regression analysis showed that violent origins are associated with 
electoral authoritarianism. The exception to this pertains to the Revolutions/Civil War 
covariate which had a positive relationship with electoral authoritarianism, but was not 
statistically significant. However, the Violent Origins variable (aggregate measure of all 
violent origin types) and the Military Coups variable were positively and significantly 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. Even when robustness checks were instituted, 
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both Violent Origins and Military Coups remained statistically significant and positively 
associated with electoral authoritarianism. Logistic regression analysis is useful for 
determining the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, but multinomial regression 
analysis provides information about how covariates affect the likelihood of both electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy. 
There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from the multinomial 
regression analysis. First, there is the fact that violent regime origins affect the likelihood 
electoral authoritarianism and democracy in different ways. On the one hand, violent 
regime origins increase the likelihood and the odds of electoral authoritarianism, but on 
the other hand, violent regime origins decrease the likelihood and the odds of full 
democratization. The results were similar when the violent origins indicator variable was 
disaggregated into separate independent variables. For instance, the Military Coups 
variable increased the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, but decreased the 
likelihood of democracy. Although the Revolutions/Civil Wars variable did not a have a 
statistically significant relation with electoral authoritarianism, the results reveal that 
revolutionary and civil war regime origins reduce the likelihood and the odds of 
democracy.  
One momentous implication that can be drawn from this analysis is that violent 
regime origins do not have liberalizing effects. In fact, I argue that violent regime origins 
are more likely to lead to some forms of authoritarian durability. For the most part, 
violent regime origins are positively associated with electoral authoritarianism, but this is 
not because violent origins have a liberalizing influence. Quite the contrary, violent 
origins are positively associated with electoral authoritarianism because they keep fully 
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authoritarian regimes from liberalizing all the way to the point of democracy. The effects 
of violent origins result in lingering authoritarian practices that inhibit full 
democratization. The multinomial regression analysis best illustrates these claims. From 
the multinomial analysis, we see that violent regime origins, whether the aggregated or 
disaggregated variables, have a negative association with democracy. In essence, violent 
origins decreased the likelihood of full democratization, across all multinomial model 
specifications. 
The notion that violent origins lead to more authoritarian durability may be the 
reason why revolutions and/or civil wars are not significantly associated with electoral 
authoritarianism but are negatively associated with full democracy. Revolution and civil 
wars, which are some of the bloodiest types of regime origins in terms of death tolls, 
increase authoritarian durability so much that even the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism is not likely. Clearly, the results show that revolutions and civil wars do 
not have a liberalizing effect because these types of violent origins strongly decrease the 
odds of full democratization. 
Also consider that military coups are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
full democratization. Nevertheless, the analyses show that military coups are positively 
associated with the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. One possible explanation is 
that military coups, which are relatively less bloody (in terms of death tolls) than 
revolutions or civil wars, do not lead to the same level of authoritarian durability 
associated with revolutions and/or civil wars. Therefore, less authoritarian durability 
makes some form of liberalization possible, and the result is the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism. Howbeit, military coups provide enough authoritarian durability that the 
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odds of full democratization decrease in states with military coup origins. States with 
violent origins still liberalize, but the pressures for liberalization are not the result of 
violent origins. Instead, the pressure or the influence to liberalize comes from different 
sources. The models presented in this analysis suggest the international environment may 
be the source of liberalizing influences or pressures. 
Another important insight from both analyses is that international factors are 
associated with electoral authoritarianism and seem to have a strong liberalizing affect. In 
the logistic regression analysis international factors were significantly associated with the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. In the multinomial regression analysis, good 
relations with the US and with Western countries or international organizations increased 
the likelihood of both electoral authoritarianism and full democratization. The results of 
the post-Cold War indicator variable suggest that the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy increases during the post-Cold War era. These findings 
seemed to be consistent across all model specifications.  These findings also support the 
notion that the international environment and international factors are a crucial aspect of 
liberalization and the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. 
The results of these analyses show that violent regime origins increase the 
likelihood of electoral authoritarianism, yet decrease the likelihood of full 
democratization. This means that violent origins are associated with some form of regime 
liberalization, but they are not associated with full liberalization. These results would be 
perplexing if one believed that violent origins had liberalizing effects on regimes. The 
results are less perplexing, however, if violent origins do not have liberalizing effects but 
are instead a factor that contribute authoritarian durability or the continuation of 
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authoritarian practices. In essence, violent origins are associated with electoral 
authoritarianism not because they cause liberalization, but because the residual effects 
that come with violent origins prevent full liberalization from occurring. Other factors 
may contribute to whether a fully authoritarian regime liberalizes. In fact, these results 
suggest that some of the liberalizing effects or influences come from the international 
environment or linkages with the West. This is to say that international factors or the 
international environment contribute to liberalization or openings in regimes, but the 
effects of violent origins ultimately reduce the chances of full liberalization or 
democracy. Obviously, these are not the only factors at work and more research certainly 




















ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN NICARAGUA 
	
Introduction 
In 1979 the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) rose to power in 
Nicaragua after a violent revolution. The FSLN, also known as the Sandinistas, deposed 
Anastasio Somoza. Initially, the Sandinistas enjoyed some legitimacy. Somoza was a 
brutal and corrupt dictator, and the Sandinistas had some popular support and 
sympathizers in the masses. The power struggle between Somoza and the Sandinistas 
ravaged much of Nicaragua and many innocent bystanders suffered. Most Nicaraguans 
were glad that the revolutionary struggle was over. After a violent revolutionary origin, 
the FSLN developed a strong political party and an effective repressive state apparatus. 
Strong partisan identities played a key role in regime cohesion. Regime cohesion was 
enhanced by strong Sandinista principles and ideology, and many key political posts were 
filled with individuals involved in the revolutionary struggle.   
Nicaragua developed into an electoral authoritarian regime in the 1980s. While 
the Sandinistas still employed authoritarian practices, liberalization spread. International 
factors played a momentous role in the liberalization process. After receiving tremendous 
financial support from the Soviet Union, the regime found itself internationally isolated 
when the Soviets could no longer fund the revolution. US pressure and influence also 
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played a major role in the liberalization process. A civil war with the Contras, a force 
comprised of right-wing guerrilla groups funded and supported by the US, also played a 
role in the liberalization process. Multiparty elections were first in held in 1984. 
Nicaragua’s liberalization culminated with the 1990 elections.  
The 1990 elections pitted the FSLN incumbent Daniel Ortega against the 
opposition’s candidate Violeta Chamorro. The opposition won the election, and the most 
dangerous risk associated with implementing elections materialized: the FSLN lost 
power. Interestingly, the FSLN did not collapse completely after this election loss. As 
noted in Chapter 3, one of the benefits of implementing liberalization is that losing is a 
matter of politics instead of a matter of life and death. One can always regroup, 
reorganize and attempt to regain power. In the case of Nicaragua, this is exactly what 
happened. In 2006, the FSLN party won the presidency and Daniel Ortega, former 
revolutionary and Sandinista guerilla fighter, became president. There were even 
widespread expectations that voters would re-embrace Ortega and the FSLN in the 
previous elections of 1996 and 2001 (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 5).  
The rest of this chapter will delve into how Nicaragua developed into an electoral 
authoritarian regime. I will examine how the effects of a violent origin led to 
authoritarian durability and cohesion in the Sandinista regime. Moreover, I will explain 
how the international environment and international factors contributed to the rise of 
electoral authoritarianism in Nicaragua. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. 
The first section describes electoral authoritarianism in Nicaragua during the 1980s. The 
second section focuses on the international dimension of Nicaragua’s liberalization 
process. The next section discusses the causal mechanisms of violent origins. Initially, 
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The Sandinistas gained some initial legitimacy from the masses, though this legitimacy 
wavered eventually. Even still, authoritarian practices lingered in Nicaragua because of 
capable and organized repressive state apparatus, regime cohesion, and partisan 
identities. The final section of this chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes the case 
of Nicaragua. 
 
Electoral Authoritarianism in Nicaragua 
Electoral authoritarianism emerged in Nicaragua in the 1980s. Specifically, 
Nicaragua classified as electoral authoritarian from 1981-1990. In this time period, the 
Freedom House political rights score is in the 5-6 range, indicating that the regime was 
not completely closed but not fully democratize. In addition, Nicaragua held multiparty 
elections in 1984 and the opposition was allowed to run. The 1984 elections were 
internationally monitored, and several observers even concluded that the elections were 
“free and fair” (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 2). Despite the multiparty elections, electoral 
competition was certainly affected by the country’s civil war. It is important to note that a 
leading opposition group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN), boycotted the 
elections (Weaver and Barnes 1991, 128-129). Instead, many members joined the 
Contras (Weaver and Barnes 1991, 128-129). The FSLN easily came out as victors in the 
1984 elections.  
Nicaragua’s liberalization continued in the late 1980s and culminated with the 
1990 elections. For some scholars it was quite surprising that the Sandinistas would even 
hold these elections. For example, Anderson and Dodd (2005) explain that unlike other 
socialist regimes, the Sandinistas had already won an election in 1984. The regime held 
some legitimacy through its revolutionary efforts and had already expanded legitimacy 
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with elections earlier in the decade (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 2). In 1988, the regime 
also agreed to release political prisoners, and the regime allowed some openings in the 
media as independent newspapers began to circulate through the country (Leogrande 
1992, 194; Linfield 1991, 280-282). More importantly, the press was actually allowed to 
criticize and protest the regime (Kinzer 1991). As part of a peace agreement with the 
Contras, the Sandinista regime agreed to hold elections in 1990. Heading into the 1990 
elections, Nicaragua was very much an electoral authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the 
type of electoral authoritarian regime fits the description of a competitive one rather than 
a hegemonic type, in which the incumbent party is expected to dominate. Many analysts 
did not give the opposition a good chance to win the 1990 presidential elections (Pastor 
1992, 182; Close 1999, 82). Even still, at least the opposition could compete. Another 
result of the massive liberalization was the return of many opposition groups and leaders 
who had been in exile.  
Even with these political openings, the Sandinista regime still engaged in 
authoritarian practices and competed on an uneven electoral playing field with ample 
political advantages. When it comes to organization and power, the Sandinistas were 
heavily favored in elections. The regime even had some advantages within the masses. 
Scholars argue that the Sandinistas had the largest civic and social organizations going 
into the 1990 elections (Serra 1991; Williams 1994). While some argue that mass popular 
sentiments for the Sandinistas carried the regime (Anderson and Dodd 2005), others 
argue that any election was going to be illegitimate. For example, Booth (1985) argues 
that the Sandinista regime had hegemonic control of the state. President Reagan’s 
administration agreed with these sentiments, challenging the results of past elections and 
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even supporting the overthrow of the Sandinista regime (Walker 1985, 521-532).  
Despite being compelled towards some liberalization, the incumbent regime had 
enough cohesion and organization to continue several authoritarian practices. The regime 
enjoyed the advantages of authoritarian incumbency. The Sandinistas utilized the state’s 
repressive apparatus for electoral purposes. The state’s bureaucratic system and security 
forces were employed in the elections (Cajina 1997, 16). Several scholars note that 
opposition leaders were still subject to arrest, harassment, and property confiscation; 
opposition rallies and public meetings were also disturbed by goons and thugs employed 
by the Sandinista regime (Kagan 1996, 550-551; Miranda and Ratliff 1993, 190-195; 
Walker 2003, 147-149).  
The Sandinista regime seemed to enjoy massive financial benefits, and some 
argue that the regime enjoyed “seemingly unlimited funds” (Kinzer 1991, 390). The 
Sandinistas could easily outspend the opposition. Even with support from the US, the 
opposition could not keep up (Leogrande 1992, 197). Specifically, the FSLN outspent the 
opposition at a 10-1 margin (Buckman 2013, 304). The Sandinistas also enjoyed access 
to other state resources. The regime utilized public buildings, employees and vehicles; the 
regime was also able to campaign throughout most of the country (Cajina 1997, 16). In 
contrast, the opposition was only capable of opening campaign offices in about half of 
the country, usually around major cities (Kagan 1996, 667). In essence, the opposition 
did not compete on the same electoral playing field as the ruling regime.  
Some advantages were not gained by explicit repression per se, but instead, 
several of the advantages were the result of the regime’s domination in prior years. Take 
for instance the organizational state of opposition parties heading into the 1990 elections. 
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Opposition parties were considered relatively weak. One observer even contends that 
many of the opposition parties existed only on paper (Gilbert 1988, 122). One reason for 
this relates to the fact that many of Nicaragua’s parties divided into smaller parties during 
the 1980s (Cajina 1997, 42-45; Leogrande 1992, 190; Walker 2003, 165). In an attempt 
to combat their disadvantaged political form, the opposition united into the National 
Opposition Union (UNO). Even with this unification the UNO was still perceived as 
weak because it lacked an organizational presence among the masses and an inability to 
mobilize (Close 1999, 31). Even with all of these advantages the Sandinistas lost the 
1990 election, and Nicaragua eventually transitioned from an electoral authoritarian state 
to a fully democratized state in the 1990s. In many ways this result was quite shocking. 
Some scholars argue that Nicaragua did not have any of the prerequisites of democracy 
when the Sandinistas came to power, and the arrival of democracy looked like it would 
take decades (Anderson and Dodd, 2005). The liberalization experienced in Nicaragua 
was certainly connected to international factors and the international environment.  
 
The International Dimension 
Several factors contributed to liberalization in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas 
implemented democratic reforms in the early 1980s, but more liberalization came later in 
the decade. A combination of US pressure, withdrawal of Soviet aid, a failing economy, 
and ongoing civil war led to massive political liberalization especially in the late 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War era certainly had a powerful effect on regime policies. The 
inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union had massive repercussions in Nicaragua. The 
Sandinistas’ rise to power attracted support from the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The 
Sandinista regime depended heavily on Soviet aid. In fact, some estimates note that 
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Nicaragua received about $4.5 billion in aid between 1981-1989 (Orozco 2002, 54). 
When it comes to military aid, some estimates show that Nicaragua received $500 million 
from the Soviet Union in the 1980s (Vanden 1991, 312). In 1986, the Soviet Union 
withdrew most financial support (Vanden and Prevost 1993, 106). These events left the 
Sandinista regime quite vulnerable to US pressures and influences.  
Pressure and influence from the United States are among the major reasons why 
the Sandinistas implemented major liberalization. Prior to the Sandinistas’ rise to power, 
Nicaragua and the US were closely linked. Consider for example that in order to survive 
financially the Somoza regime depended on US support (Morley 1994). The US 
withdrew support for Nicaragua when the Sandinistas rose to power. The 1979 revolution 
was in many ways disconcerting to the US. The revolt was against both Somoza and US 
hegemony in the hemisphere. Since the revolution was unacceptable, the US became 
devoted to sabotaging the success of the Sandinistas (Walker 1987; Prevost and Vanden 
1997; Robinson 1992). When Nicaragua transitioned into a full democratic state in the 
1990s, US pressure and the threat of international isolation played a momentous role. 
Liberalization in Nicaragua was closely related to US influence for several 
reasons. First, the Sandinista takeover prompted the US to implement a trade embargo 
with Nicaragua. In addition to economic statecraft, the US also began to pressure 
Nicaragua diplomatically. Moreover, other international actors established a presence in 
Nicaragua. The presence of international governmental organizations rose in Nicaragua 
during the 1980s (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 303; Orozco 2002, 61-62). When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, this left the Sandinista regime somewhat internationally isolated. 
Second, the US openly sponsored the Contras and other opposition groups in Nicaragua. 
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The US provided assistance to opposition politicians, churches, businesses, civil groups, 
and the media (Cohn and Hynds 1987, 114-115; Cruz 1989, 230; Robinson 1992, 68-76). 
This support even got into the realm of corruption and illegality with the Iran-Contra 
scandal. This support for the Contras essentially prolonged a civil war in Nicaragua and 
chipped away at the Sandinistas’ hold.  
 These actions by the US resulted in serious damage to the Sandinista regime. For 
instance, some scholars estimate that the civil war resulted in almost thirty thousand 
deaths and cost more than $9 billion in damage (Conroy 1990, 48-49; Orozco 2002, 68). 
Even without full democratization, the US still had some influence in Nicaraguan 
electoral politics. The opposition was especially influenced by US clout. Exiled 
Nicaraguan groups maintained close ties with the US government and worked very 
closely with the political opposition inside of Nicaragua (Robinson 1992, 119-131). 
Consider also that when it comes to the 1984 presidential election, the opposition’s 
nomination of Arturo Cruz was in large part to appease US public and Congress (Reding 
1991, 27).  
 Interestingly, US pressure and influence in Nicaragua likely reached an apex 
when the US invaded Panama in December of 1989. The invasion got the attention of 
many in Nicaragua. Robinson confirms that many in Nicaragua were “genuinely 
repulsed” by the invasion (1992, 140). If the US was willing to invade Panama, it was 
possible that Nicaragua could suffer the same fate (Robinson 1992, 140). For most of the 
1980s the US had been at odds with the Sandinistas and threats were likely exchanged. 
The invasion made these threats more real in people’s minds (Robinson 1992, 140).  
 In the late 1980s when Nicaragua experienced even more liberal openings, the US 
   
 
202 
played a tremendous role. The first step for the Sandinista regime was to agree to a peace 
process with the Contras. As part of the peace process, the Sandinistas agreed to political 
liberalization. However, as some scholars note, the regime agreed to liberalization in 
exchange for protection against US hegemony or “protection from US coercion” (Roberts 
1990, 96-97). The main component of this increased liberalization was freer and fairer 
presidential elections. Allowing these elections was perceived by the Sandinistas as the 
key to more international aid, the end of a US embargo, and peace with the Contras 
(Pastor 1990). The reflections of FSLN leader Humberto Ortega vividly illustrate this 
point, “the elections were a tactical tool. They were a bitter pill that had to be swallowed” 
(quoted in Kagan 1996, 304). The regime went as far as to gain international and US 
approval for the electoral process (Kagan 1996, 668). 
 In fact, the 1990 Nicaraguan elections are the perfect example of how 
international influence and pressure truly have an effect on liberalization, particularly the 
electoral process. Carothers argues that the 1990 election was subject to tremendous 
external scrutiny (1991, 95). There was massive coverage of the elections in the 
international media (Booth 1998). Additionally, international observers and electoral 
monitors closely observed the electoral process (Pastor 1990, 18). Specifically, polling 
stations, opposition rallies, radio and television programs were monitored and observed 
(López Pintor 1998, 44). This international influence limited the Sandinista regime in 
several ways.  
To be clear, the regime still harassed and repressed political opponents leading up 
to the election. There were still reports of killings, disappearances, arrests, and beatings 
(Leiken 1990, 31). However, the regime’s capacity to repress the opposition was 
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extremely limited. With international monitors present, employing repression came with 
consequences (Walker 2003, 164). Reports of abuse would be swiftly reported and would 
reaffirm US sanctions and international isolation. For example, in several instances the 
Sandinista regime was pressured to release arrested politicians (Kinzer 1991, 386). The 
extent of international monitoring was so tremendous that when the opposition won the 
election, the transition process was negotiated by former US President Jimmy Carter and 
other international supervisors (Lacayo Oyanguren 2005, 105-109; Pastor 2001, 266). 
Despite liberalization in the 1980s, Nicaragua maintained authoritarian practices for the 
whole decade. The effects of the Sandinistas’ revolutionary origins contributed to this 
authoritarian durability.  
 
Violent Origin and Authoritarian Durability 
The Sandinistas came to power after the culmination of a violent revolution in 
1979. This violent origin contributed to the durability of authoritarian practices in many 
ways. The Sandinistas gained some legitimacy in their revolutionary quest. When the 
Sandinistas defeated the Somoza regime they gained even more support. Though fighting 
with the Contras renewed conflict years after victory, victory in 1979 allowed the 
Sandinistas to build a strong and capable repressive apparatus that reinforced the 
regime’s hold on power. The Sandinistas also maintained a cohesive regime. Regime 
cohesion was amplified by partisan identities and a legitimate commitment to the 
revolutionary efforts.  
Although the FSLN regime was certainly repressive and autocratic, the regime 
had some initial support and legitimacy in Nicaragua. The Sandinista front was formed in 
the 1960s and steadily gained followers as the Somoza regime became more and more 
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ruthless. The Sandinista regime had some initial legitimacy, but given their conflict with 
the Contras, the regime was certainly not tolerated by all. While many in the masses 
certainly experienced fatigue from the country’s internal conflicts, the Contras did not 
experience conflict fatigue until the late 1980s when peace talks were put on the table. 
Still, the Sandinistas’ revolutionary victory gave the regime an opportunity to reinforce 
their hold on power. While the opposition was still recovering from defeat, the 
Sandinistas had the opportunity to supplement their military and security forces, and the 
regime built a repressive state apparatus. 
Overall, the Sandinistas gained legitimacy for two major reasons. First, some 
initial legitimacy stemmed from the fact that Nicaragua was fatigued from conflict when 
the Sandinistas took over in 1979. This form of legitimacy was short-lived because a 
conflict with Contra guerilla fighters brought civil war to Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the 
Sandinistas had enough initial legitimacy at the beginning of their rule. This gave the 
regime an opportunity to strengthen regime organization fairly unopposed, and it gave the 
regime the flexibility to form an organized state apparatus. In essence, the Sandinistas 
garnered enough support to build a strong regime. Some observers contend that the 
Contras did not have a chance of defeating the Sandinistas since the regime was highly 
capable and strong enough to withstand challenges (Anderson and Dodd 2005). Though 
not entirely tied to effects of violent origins, the regime also gained some legitimacy 
because it brought an end to a brutal dictatorship and transformed Nicaragua. 
 A second major reason the Sandinistas gained legitimacy is that they defeated a 
violent Somoza dictatorship and instituted socialist reforms. Mass support for the 
Sandinistas began developing when Somoza pocketed international relief funds meant for 
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a devastating earthquake that hit Managua in 1972 (Buckman 2013, 301). The 
Sandinistas began to garner support in rural areas of the country. When the Sandinistas 
inched closer to overthrowing Somoza, he responded with actions that were ultimately 
self-defeating. Somoza began killing indiscriminately, which cost the regime support 
from some vital business leaders (Buckman 2013, 301). In the spring of 1979, the 
Somoza regime was close to defeat. Somoza committed one egregious tactical error that 
netted the Sandinistas some valuable legitimacy. In a last ditch effort to avoid defeat, 
Somoza ordered heavy bombings in civilian areas. The strategy was supposed to deny the 
enemy food and shelter, but instead, the bombed out buildings gave the guerrilla fighters 
excellent concealment (Buckman 2013, 301). Even more outrageous is the fact that the 
bombings killed very few Sandinistas (Buckman 2013, 301). If anything, the bombing of 
populated areas turned public opinion against Somoza. If they had not already done so, 
the masses had a reason to turn against Somoza. More importantly, the Sandinistas likely 
gained new sympathizers and solidified the support they already had. 
After Somoza was deposed, the Sandinistas implemented policies that increased 
their popularity. The Sandinistas began with land redistribution and made improvements 
in health, education, welfare and employment (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 2). These social 
reforms went a long way in one of the poorest nations in the world. Along with temporal 
improvements in the lives of most citizens, the masses began to be more involved 
politically. Under the Sandinistas, many began to engage in political participation to a 
degree that Nicaragua had never experienced (Vanden and Prevost 1993). These reforms 
that brought some legitimacy to the Sandinistas are not the results of a violent origin per 
se. Instead, these reforms were the result of a socialist ideology. Nevertheless, the 
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Sandinistas had some legitimacy to work with when they commenced their rule.  
 
Repressive State Apparatus 
The Sandinistas came to power through military force. These same principles 
were used to enforce their dominance. After their revolutionary takeover the Sandinista 
regime built a larger and more capable repressive state apparatus. Along with being one 
of the best-equipped militaries in Latin America, the Sandinista Popular Army was 
comprised of over 100,000 active soldiers (Walker 1991, 81-87). Additionally, the 
Sandinista regime had access to an extensive militia that was spread throughout the 
country. If we take into account militias and military reserves, the Sandinista Popular 
Army could have mobilized as many 200,000 individuals in the 1980s (Close 1988, 176; 
Miranda and Ratlift 1993, 199-204; Walker 1991, 81-86). Overall, the Sandinistas had an 
effective military. Some observers even affirm that the regime faced no serious prospect 
of a military coup and little chance of being toppled by the Contras in Nicaragua’s civil 
war (Anderson and Dodd 2005, 11). 
In addition to the military, the Sandinista regime constructed and impressively 
large secret police force. Known as the General Directorate of State Security, the 
Sandinista’s secret police was estimated to be ten times larger than that of Somoza’s 
secret police (Kinzer 1991, 179-185). The secret police force allowed the Sandinista 
regime to keep a close eye on the opposition and enhanced the regime’s hold on power. 
Consider for example that the secret police had a system of informants and undercover 
agents that infiltrated almost all aspects of society and even implemented a surveillance 
system that tapped telephone calls, opened mail, and kept a close eye on the opposition 
(Miranda and Ratliff 1993, 189-195). The secret police was also used to kill political 
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opponents. The most prominent opponent was the exiled Somoza. Though the Sandinista 
guerilla fighters ousted Somoza from the country, the Sandinistas did not consider 
themselves politically safe as long Somoza was alive. Somoza took refuge in Paraguay. 
However, in 1980 the secret police hired a hit squad of Argentine guerillas to go into 
Paraguay and kill the former dictator (Lewis 2006, 173). 
Despite the fall of Somoza, human rights violations remained a prominent issue in 
Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s media was especially repressed. Few newspapers remained in the 
country. This is because the press was either seized by the government or regularly 
harassed. For example, La Prensa was one of the few newspapers that was non-
governmental, but it was inspected daily by the government (Buckman 2013, 303). The 
Sandinistas were especially intolerant of the opposition. After all, they essentially tracked 
down the country’s former dictator and assassinated Somoza while he was in exile. Many 
others experienced similar fates. An estimated 10,000 people were jailed or exiled during 
the Sandinistas’ reign (Buckman 2013, 303). Many of these individuals were former 
Somoza supporters or former members of the Guardia, Somoza’s military force 
(Buckman 2013, 303). This loathing of the opposition is certainly an effect of the 
regime’s violent origin. Furthermore, strong regime cohesion reinforced by enduring 
partisan identities was also an effect of the Sandinista’s violent origins. 
 
Regime Cohesion and Partisan Identities 
After the revolutionary rise to power the Sandinistas created a highly cohesive 
regime. The state’s repressive apparatus was cohesive for several reasons. The regime’s 
rise from a violent origin resulted in sentiments that led to a cohesive regime. The FSLN 
was founded in the 1960s, and grew rather rapidly during Anastasio Somoza’s tenure 
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(Buckman 2013, 301). The individuals who risked their lives and even lost friends and 
family to institute the revolution, stood with the Sandinistas to protect the revolution. The 
effects of the revolution led to a state in in which only compatriots or comrades from the 
revolution could be trusted with important military and political posts. Despite a turbulent 
decade, the regime maintained loyalty and stability within the regime. Partisan identities 
contributed to the regime’s cohesion. Regime supporters believed in the Sandinista cause. 
These strong beliefs were one effect of the regime’s violent origin. Partisan identities 
were most likely developed prior to the Sandinistas revolutionary takeover, but the 
violent conflict reaffirmed and sustained these partisan identities. 
In order to maintain control of the state, the means of repression or the state’s 
repressive apparatus was organized around loyal Sandinistas. Take for instance the fact 
that the top positions in the security forces were purposefully reserved for Sandinistas 
(Walker 1991, 81). Promotions were based on loyalty to the Sandinistas, especially 
military promotions. In fact, party membership was required in order to rise above the 
rank of captain (Miranda and Ratliff 1993, 206-207). Many of the ex-guerrilla fighters 
and revolutionaries became active in politics and in the military well after the revolution 
was over. The most prestigious and highest ranking military posts were only reserved for 
ex-guerilla fighters and revolutionaries (Cajina 1997, 107; Gilbert 1988, 63). 
 Deep rooted partisan identities led to this particular organization of the state’s 
repressive apparatus. Cajina (1997) argues that the Sandinistas had total ideological 
influence in the ranks of the army. The majority of military officers were motivated by 
their partisan and political identities. Cajina contends that these officers had a genuine 
mission that transcended their military duty (1997, 125). The Sandinista military officers 
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saw themselves as the defenders and guarantors of a revolutionary political project they 
had started (Cajina 1997, 125). One effect of these partisan identities was high cohesion 
and high internal discipline within the Sandinista regime. Since cohesion was high, 
revolts within the repressive apparatus or security forces were extremely rare. 
 Potential revolts were quashed in their early stages since the majority of security 
forces would not go along with them. In 1982, during the regime’s early years, Eden 
Pastora’s efforts to lead an army revolt failed miserably (Christian 1985, 277-279). The 
effects of partisan identities are even more impressive when one considers the dreary 
circumstances in Nicaragua during the Sandinistas’ reign. The likelihood of a revolt from 
within the regime was low despite a costly war against the Contras, economic collapse, 
and an unpopular military draft (Cajina 1997, 11-28; Miranda and Ratliff 1993). In 
essence, military officers had several legitimate reasons and justifications to organize a 
major revolt, but many withheld either due to tremendous loyalty to the regime or the 
realization that they would not gain enough support from others.  
 The Sandinista regime intensified regime cohesion through the organization of a 
strong and capable political party. At the time, the FSLN was the largest and most 
organized political party in Nicaraguan history (Robinson 1996, 240). In the early 1980s, 
the FSLN initially maintained a strict criterion for party membership and membership did 
not exceed 30,000 (Vanden and Prevost 1993, 114). However, when membership criteria 
were eased, membership steadily rose through the decade. The party’s strength derived 
from its massive outreach to every corner of the country (Booth 1985, 201). Some 
scholars estimate that at one point the party’s combined membership was close to 
300,000 (Prevost 1991, 112). Another figure estimates FSLN membership at over 
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350,000 in 1990 (Prevost 1997, 36). The party had some support from the masses and 
touched most facets of Nicaragua. The FSLN operated in hundreds of bases in 
neighborhoods, workplaces, youth, labor, peasant, and women’s associations throughout 
the country (Prevost 1991, 112). The Sandinistas political party had impressive cohesion.   
The internal cohesion within the ruling regime’s party was incredibly high and 
contributed to the regime’s overall cohesion (Spalding 1994, 209). During the 1980s the 
party experienced little to no dissension and few defected from the party (Gilbert 1988, 
49-55). The party’s cohesion could be traced to regime’s violent origins. The party was 
essentially organized in a similar manner to the regime’s guerilla roots. Part of the 
internal cohesion came from the militarized organization of the party. Often without 
question, lower ranking members followed and carried out the orders of higher ranking 
officials (Gilbert 1988, 55). Cohesion was also high within the FSLN because party 
leadership was composed of revolutionary compatriots with strong Sandinista identities. 
At one point all nine members of the FSLN National Directorate were revolutionary 
fighters, and the other top posts in the party’s leadership were filled with individuals who 
had participated in the revolution (Cajina 1997, 183; Gilbert 1988, 53). This notion of 
partisan identities was crucial to the party’s internal discipline and cohesion.  
 
Conclusion 
The Sandinistas rose to power in 1979 through a violent revolutionary origin. In 
the 1980s Nicaragua transitioned into an electoral authoritarian state. Nicaragua remained 
electoral authoritarian until 1990 and then transitioned toward democracy. Liberalization 
occurred in Nicaragua for several reasons. The Sandinistas certainly faced tremendous 
pressures to liberalize. In the early years of the regime, pressures to liberalize were 
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augmented by international actors, most notably the US. Multiparty elections were held 
in 1984, and the Sandinistas employed repressive tactics to ensure victory. The 
Sandinistas relied on a strong repressive state apparatus and strong regime cohesion to 
prevent full democratization. These elements of authoritarian durability carried over from 
the regime’s violent rise to power. The aftereffects of the regime’s violent origin allowed 
the regime to hold unto power even in the face of liberalizing pressures. The case of 
Nicaragua illustrates how the effects of violent origins can lead to the authoritarian 
durability needed for electoral authoritarianism to emerge.    
The liberalizing pressures eventually led to the ultimate electoral loss in 1990. 
The fact that the ruling regime lost the elections does not mean that Nicaragua was less 
electoral authoritarian in the years leading up to the 1990 elections. In hindsight, and in 
comparison to the 1984 elections, the 1990 elections were labeled as “freer and fairer.”  
Even so, the Sandinista regime exemplified the characteristics of electoral authoritarian 
regimes. Leading up to the 1990 elections, the Sandinistas employed repressive tactics 
and strived to create an uneven electoral playing field for the opposition. As explained, 
the Sandinistas were favored to win the elections because of an abundance of advantages. 
The fact that the Sandinistas lost substantiates the effects of international factors and the 
international environment. 
Nicaragua’s transition from electoral authoritarianism to democracy provides 
evidence and support for the international dimension of regime change. The early stages 
of the post-Cold War international environment certainly had a strong effect on 
Nicaragua’s democratization. International pressures and influences were much stronger 
and sustained in the lead up to the 1990 elections. Under a focused international 
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microscope, the regime could not employ the full repertoire of authoritarian practices and 
therefore lost the elections. International actors even supervised and guided the 
succession process. Overall, the Nicaraguan case illustrates how violent origins 
contribute to the continuity of authoritarian practices, but how international factors 
































ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN PARAGUAY 
       
Introduction 
In 1954 Alfredo Stroessner came to power in Paraguay via a violent military 
coup. The Stroessner regime held power in Paraguay until 1989. Although the regime 
was initially closed and fully authoritarian, Paraguay eventually transitioned into 
electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarian features developed in the late 1960s to 
early 1970s. Electoral authoritarianism in Paraguay was of the hegemonic variety. The 
opposition was allowed to compete in the electoral process and even won legislative 
seats. Nonetheless, the incumbent regime dominated the electoral process to the point 
where the opposition’s odds of winning the presidency were extremely low.  
Several factors contributed to Paraguay’s transition into electoral 
authoritarianism. International factors played an important role in the liberalization 
process. The US initially supported the Stroessner regime. However, US pressure and 
influence in Paraguay was a major reason the Stroessner regime implemented forms of 
liberalization. Despite the implementation of multiparty elections, Paraguay did not fully 
democratize. The effects of a violent origin contributed to the regime’s authoritarian 
durability.  
When the Stroessner regime came to power, Paraguay had endured years of 
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violent conflict and instability. Years of conflict also weakened the opposition, and the 
Stroessner regime took advantage of these circumstances by building an effective 
repressive state apparatus. Regime cohesion was maintained through some patronage and 
cooptation, but it was amplified by partisan identities. In Paraguay, the effects of partisan 
identities have centered around political party identification. Throughout Paraguay’s 
history there have been several political parties, but among the most dominant is the 
Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR), better known as the Colorado party. The 
Liberal party has been popular in Paraguay, though it has split into microparties in the 
past. Lastly, the Februarist Revolutionary Party (PRF), natively known as the 
Febreristas, has also been popular. The effects of party identification were amplified 
because of violent conflict between the parties in Paraguay.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section of this chapter 
discusses electoral authoritarianism in Paraguay. The second section focuses on the 
international dimension of Paraguay’s transition toward electoral authoritarianism. The 
third section of this chapter discusses the violent origins of the Stroessner regime. In this 
section the causal mechanisms of violent origins are analyzed. The final section of this 
chapter is a conclusion that summarizes the entire chapter and provides some concluding 
thoughts on the case of Paraguay.    
 
Electoral Authoritarianism in Paraguay 
The Stroessner regime began as fully authoritarian, but the regime eventually 
implemented some democratic reforms. Electoral authoritarianism developed in the late 
1960s to early 1970s. Though there are no scores available beforehand, the Freedom 
House political rights scores from 1975-1989 are in the 4-6 range. Additionally, 
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multiparty elections were held in that time span. In Paraguay, when the regime felt 
secure, massive repression tended to loosen up. One example is the treatment of the 
opposition. In the early years of the Stroessner regime, the opposition was given no 
openings and had to operate cautiously. The Colorado party was the only legal party in 
Paraguay from 1947 to 1962. During this time frame, the leaders of the opposition parties 
were either jailed or exiled (Bryce 1986, 30).  In the 1960s, however, several liberal 
openings gave the opposition some leeway. The opposition was permitted to organize 
legally, hold meetings, publish newspapers, contest elections, and participate in 
Congress.  
In 1959, the Stroessner regime allowed some members of the Liberal party and 
the Febreristas party to return to Paraguay after years of exile (Lewis 1982). Years later, 
the regime legalized some of the exiled parties, permitted political meetings to be held in 
public, and freed many political prisoners (Lewis 1980, 91). The Stroessner regime 
announced that elections would be held in 1963 and that the opposition would be allowed 
to participate. In 1962, the Liberal Renovation Movement, a small faction in Paraguay’s 
Liberal Party, was legalized and allowed to participate in the 1963 elections (Bryce 1986, 
30). At the time, it had only been the second time in Paraguay’s history that more than 
one candidate ran for president (Lewis 1980, 96). In addition, the Febreristas party was 
also officially legalized in 1965 (Bryce 1986, 30). Soon after, another faction of the 
Liberal Party, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) was created and legalized in 
1977 (Bryce 1986, 30). In 1984, the Stroessner regime even allowed exiled leaders of the 
Popular Colorado Movement (Mopoco) to return from exile. The Mopoco was an internal 
faction of the Colorado party that split from the mainstream party and was subsequently 
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exiled in 1958 (Bryce 1986, 30). 
Although opposition parties were allowed to participate, there always seemed to 
be a very low likelihood that Stroessner was going to lose a presidential election. The 
electoral playing field was not free nor fair. During elections the opposition candidates 
were often denied access to radio and television (Nickson 1988, 241). In addition, the 
opposition was often denied the right of assembly for both private and public political 
rallies (Nickson 1988, 241). In some areas of the country, ballot-rigging occurred 
frequently. In rural areas, for example, opposition candidates were often left off the ballot 
and replaced by Colorado party candidates (Nickson 1988, 241). Additionally, opposition 
representatives were often denied access to vote-counting procedures, and in some 
instances, the Colorado party ended up with more votes than the number of registered 
voters in rural areas (Nickson 1988, 241). 
Even still, the opposition was allowed to compete in elections and in the 
legislature. The opposition’s participation was not exactly in vain. In fact, opposition 
parties were assured representation in the legislature as a proportion to their share of 
votes. In fact, the opposition was guaranteed up to one third of the seats in Congress, and 
in the 1963 elections, the defeated presidential candidate was given an ambassadorship in 
London (Lewis 1980, 97). Still, the Colorado party dominated politics and always 
maintained a legislative majority. Although the opposition had a medium to critique the 
regime and express public opinion, the opposition did not have serious power. During 
Stroessner’s tenure it was difficult for the opposition to pass political reform in Paraguay. 
In most instances, the Colorado majority would block such efforts. 
When it comes to censorship of the press, the Stroessner regime applied pressure 
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unevenly. While certainly less than ideal, some of the Paraguayan media had room to 
criticize the regime. In some instances, severe criticism of the regime was allowed to be 
published, though mostly small opposition newspapers had the best luck (Lewis 1980, 
177). In other instances, the regime turned to strong-arm methods. It was only during the 
twilight years of the regime when popular media establishments such as Radio Nanduti 
and the daily newspaper ABC Color were shut down (Roett 1989, 135). The shutdown of 
these media outlets was due to the fact that the regime was in danger of falling apart 
during the mid to late 1980s.  
To be clear, the Stroessner regime maintained repressive tendencies, but massive 
or savage repression was not aimed at everyone. Though the Stroessner regime brutally 
repressed communists and radicals such as guerilla fighters, the regime was less brutal 
with other political rivals, especially those within factions of the Colorado party. In 
Stroessner’s tenure, many political rivals from the Colorado party were purged from the 
government, but most were not imprisoned or executed. In many instances, peaceful 
gestures were given to members of a defeated party faction. Defeated political rivals were 
given secondary or honorary government positions that would get them out of the country 
(e.g., ambassadorships) (Lewis 1980, 121). Overall, the Stroessner regime allowed 
liberalization for two specific reasons. First, Stroessner recognized that a pacified country 
would be easier to rule (Lewis 1980, 96). Secondly, the Stroessner regime wanted to give 
the government a more democratic image in order to attract more foreign aid (Lewis 
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The International Dimension 
The relationship between the US and Paraguay during Stroessner’s regime was a 
complicated one. In the early years of the regime, the US unequivocally supported the 
Stroessner regime. Some speculate that the US actually helped Stroessner achieve power 
in 1954 (Seiferheld 1987, 139). By some estimates, Paraguay received over $31 million 
in military aid and more than $254 million in US economic assistance during all of 
Stroessner’s tenure (Roett 1989, 132). The US supported the Stroessner regime at the 
height of the Cold War. The US supported Stroessner because he was considered a 
friendly ally in the fight against communism and played well into the America’s 
containment policy. Some have even labeled Stroessner’s anticommunism as maniacal 
(Sondrol 1997, 113). Paraguay’s support of America’s containment policy netted 
Paraguay substantial rewards.  
The Stroessner regime received help from the US when it was most important, the 
regime’s consolidation years (1954-1961). During this time Paraguay received about $53 
million in aid from the US (Mora and Villanasa 1995, 236). Paraguay also had close 
economic ties with the US. In fact, the US was the second largest receiver of Paraguayan 
exports (behind Argentina) when Stroessner came to power (Baer and Birch 1987, 602). 
The Stroesnner regime even helped the US in foreign interventions. When US marines 
invaded the Dominican Republic, Stroessner sent soldiers to assist in the matter (Hoyer 
1975, 294). Moreover, in 1968 the regime even offered soldiers for the Vietnam war 
effort (Mora and Villasana 1995, 236). As long as a contentious policy was adopted 
against communism, the Stroessner regime could count on US economic aid and 
diplomatic support from the US (Hoyer 1975). Nevertheless, the US eventually made 
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some demands for political openness or liberalization in Paraguay.  
The US pressured the Stroessner regime to install liberalizing reforms and allow 
opposition parties. It was pressure from the US and President Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress program that facilitated limited opposition participation in Paraguay’s 1963 
elections. President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress pressured Stroessner to legalize the 
Liberal Renovation Movement as early as 1962 (Bryce 1986, 30). In addition, it was also 
US pressure from the newly elected President Jimmy Carter that facilitated the release of 
many political prisoners in the late 1970s. In 1978 and 1979, the Carter administration 
suspended several foreign aid loans and reduced military aid to Paraguay (Schoutz 1981, 
295-297). The Carter administration took issue with Paraguay’s human rights practices 
and pushed for more democratization in Paraguay. Never mind that Paraguay was a huge 
ally in the containment of communism. In fact, President Carter believed that improved 
human rights and democracy were better methods of defense against communism (Moran 
and Villasana 1995, 243).  
Obviously, the regime’s past human rights violations were not forgotten. 
Eventually, the opposition began looking outward for help. In fact, the opposition was 
vocal and gathered international support, so much support that the once cooperating US 
embassy in Asunción began to pressure the regime into fully liberalizing (Roett 1989, 
131). In the 1980s, the Stroessner regime bickered with the Reagan administration. 
Relations were normal during Reagan’s first term, but the Reagan administration created 
some pressures during its second term. In Reagan’s second term, human rights in 
Paraguay became an issue (Roett 1989, 132). The Reagan administration began to 
pressure and publicly criticize the Stroessner regime (Carothers 1991, 163).  
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US influence and pressure were major causes of liberalization in Paraguay. Part of 
Paraguay’s struggle was that international actors, most notably the US, had substantial 
leverage over Paraguay. Paraguay’s economy had been historically agrarian, and 
modernization and development came very slowly. Given this position, foreign aid was 
always welcomed. Nevertheless, it is difficult to receive foreign aid when the country is 
branded as a pariah in the international environment. In many instances, US influence 
and pressure resulted in the implementation of liberalizing reforms.  
Relations between the two countries eventually grew colder towards the end of 
Stroessner’s tenure. The Stroessner regime became more and more distrustful of the US. 
For example, in the midst of liberalizing pressures, Stroessner saw the US with some 
wariness and vowed not to forget US involvement in the Dominican Republic in 1965 
(Fernandez 1991). Some US actions even confounded the regime. While the US relied on 
Stroessner to combat communism in Latin America for decades, the US government 
actively promoted dialogue with communist groups towards the tail end of Stroessner’s 
tenure (Nickson 1988, 257). When Stroessner was finally toppled via military coup in 
1989, the United States was actually pleased with the coup. In fact, after the coup the US 
ambassador to Paraguay announced that Paraguay was on a pathway toward democracy 
(Fernandez 1991, 51), a pathway in which the military would stay out of politics and only 
assist in the defense of the country (Fernandez 1991, 51). Despite the regime’s fall from 
power in 1989, the Stroessner regime ruled Paraguay for 35 years. Part of this 
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Violent Origins and Authoritarian Durability 
The Stroessner regime came to power through a military coup in 1954. It is 
important to note that before Stroessner solidified his power, Paraguay experienced 
decades of bloody conflict. Besides fighting the Chaco War against Bolivia (1932-1935), 
Paraguay was marred by a series of coups and countercoups. Many of these conflicts 
pinned party against party, but rival factions were common even within parties (Nickson 
1988, 238). By the time Stroessner took power, conflict fatigue and the need for stability 
was high in Paraguay. To maintain power, the Stroessner regime built a repressive state 
apparatus. The regime also garnered high regime cohesion through some patronage and 
cooptation, but regime cohesion was also maintained because of strong partisan identities 
that resulted in a loyal following.  
 
Conflict Fatigue, Tolerance and Legitimacy 
Historically, Paraguay has experienced long sequences of authoritarianism. Many 
of Paraguay’s presidents rose to power through illegal means and were often deposed 
from power violently. When Stroessner achieved power, holding onto power was a 
relatively difficult endeavor in Paraguay. Consider for example that between 1870 to 
1954, Paraguay had forty-four presidents. This equals about one president every twenty-
three months (Lewis 1980, 4). Equally important is the fact that of those forty-four 
presidents, more than half were forced from office through violence or threat of violence 
(Lewis 1980, 4). In the period from 1936 and Stroessner’s emergence to power in 1954, 
eight presidents came to power and seven of them were forcibly removed from power 
(Snyder 1992, 398). Prior to Stroessner, Paraguay endured a bloody civil war in 1947 and 
several military coups. In the aftermath of the civil war, the Colorado party began to 
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oppress their defeated opponents throughout the country and this campaign of oppression 
caused a mass wave of emigration to Argentina (Nickson 1988, 239). Even after the civil 
war was over, competing factions within the Colorado party engaged in conflict for 
political power. The result was a series of coups. The succession of coups culminated in 
1954, when Alfredo Stroessner deposed Colorado party President Federico Chávez 
through a military coup. When Stroessner came to power, Paraguay was starving for 
stability.  
 The Stroessner regime brought relative stability to the country, and this gave 
Stroessner some legitimacy and even tolerance from the opposition. Throughout much of 
its history, Paraguay has been considered one of the poorest countries per capita in Latin 
America (Sondrol 1997, 110). Continued conflict made matters worse. The civil war 
ravaged much of Paraguay. Economic growth was disrupted and Asunción, the capital 
city, had extensive damage. Additionally, many Paraguayan citizens left the country 
during and after the conflict (Lewis 1980, 53). Violent conflict and government 
instability scared off many potential investors, which greatly affected economic capital 
and foreign investments (Lewis 1980, 53). Paraguay eventually experienced some 
economic growth.  
This growth was highlighted by the Itaipú hydroelectric dam, which was a joint 
venture with Brazil and at the time, the largest project of its kind in the world (Roett 
1989, 129). It is important to note that economic growth in Paraguay slowed down in the 
late 1970s to the mid-1980s. A world recession and the Latin American debt crisis 
reduced the level of investment and business activity in Paraguay (Roett 1989, 130). 
During this decade, inflation, unemployment and debt intensified in Paraguay (Sondrol 
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1997, 114). Regardless of this, Paraguay’s development and modernization during the 
early years of the regime gave Stroessner some legitimacy. The stability achieved in the 
early years gave the regime time to build a capable and organized state apparatus, which 
made it difficult to take the regime down.  
 Along with economic stability, many in the country wanted a conflict free 
Paraguay. Besides small skirmishes with guerilla fighters, the Stroessner regime brought 
relative peace to Paraguay. Even the opposition gradually began to tolerate the regime’s 
rule. The regime was so effective at dismantling the opposition that many members of the 
opposition abandoned violent means. Since the Stroessner regime was so effective at 
keeping guerilla fighters in check, the exiled opposition contemplated a moderate 
approach. Many of the opposition’s leaders started leaning toward pragmatism and trying 
to come to an agreement with the Stroessner regime (Lewis 1980, 96). Obviously, the 
Stroessner regime was in advantageous position vis-à-vis the opposition. Even though the 
civil war had occurred prior to Stroessner’s takeover via military coup, the opposition 
was still demoralized and may have had little option but to tolerate the Stroessner regime.  
Guiding the country toward relative stability and growth was tremendous for 
public opinion. Stroessner seemed to be highly aware of this and was often in attendance 
at ribbon cutting ceremonies. In fact, Stroessner took credit for “every school, road, 
clinic, sewer, or electric power line” that was built (Lewis 1980, 106). In many ways, the 
Stroessner regime succeeded in becoming indispensable to the nation. Some observers 
note that Stroessner repeatedly reinforced his image as the national hero who ended a 
civil war and restored social harmony in Paraguay (Roett 1989, 129). In essence, 
Stroessner milked this image often to the point where he was projected as irreplaceable. 
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Stroessner himself even had some legitimacy among the masses. Stroessner was known 
to set aside time to meet with businesses, farm groups, and various other functions 
sponsored by the Colorado party (Lewis 1980, 109). The Stroessner regime used the 
Colorado party as a means of building popular support and effectively extended its 
influence down to the smallest villages (Bryce 1986, 30).  
 
Repressive State Apparatus 
Prior to Stroessner taking power, change in Paraguay was tied to violent conflict 
and coercion. The military was involved in the means of regime change quite often. In 
order to maintain power, the Stroessner regime needed to organize a capable repressive 
force. The force needed to be strong enough to fend off exiled opposition forces and to 
maintain internal control of Paraguay. Many in the Stroessner regime certainly had the 
stomach for repression. General Stroessner and many in his military cohort experienced a 
variety of conflicts before coming to power. He fought in the Chaco War against Bolivia, 
fought in Paraguay’s civil war, and even participated in a number of coups before he 
finally came to power. Some scholars describe Stroessner as ambitious and ruthless 
because after the civil war, he plotted against almost every president he served under 
(Lewis 1982). In fact, Stroessner helped overthrow five presidents in total (Lewis 1980, 
72). For such reasons, the Stroessner regime knew it needed to organize a capable and 
repressive state apparatus to keep such opposition quelled.  
Stroessner stayed extremely close to the state’s means of repression. When 
Stroessner came to power he did not have real support in the Colorado party and only 
trusted a few loyal military friends around him (Lewis 1980, 72). To stay in power, the 
Stroessner regime slowly created a government tailored to maintaining power for the long 
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run. Stroessner took it upon himself to personally supervise all high profile military 
promotions and even took special care to cultivate junior officers (Snyder 1992, 390). 
Given Paraguay’s violent history and precedence of military coups, the Stroessner regime 
created a capable and repressive state apparatus.  
During Stroessner’s rule the ratio of military and police personnel to the 
population was one of the highest in the world. In fact, in Latin America only Cuba and 
Chile (under Pinochet) had a higher ratio (Lewis 1980, 128). With the support of the 
Colorado party, Stroessner had access to the py nandí, a strong rural militia tied to the 
party. By some estimates the py nandí had a force of 15,000 men (Snyder 1992, 391). 
Besides a strong military force, the Stroessner regime organized a conventional police 
force in Asunción. This police force was essentially responsible for harassing and 
restraining the opposition within the country. The fact that Stroessner was involved in 
several military coups molded him into a constant state of alertness. More importantly, 
this proximity to violent conflict prompted Stroessner to build security apparatus 
designed to discourage future coups. Stroessner built both a heavily armed presidential 
escort battalion and a police security battalion of 400 men personally loyal to him (Lewis 
1980, 139).  
Another key element of the repressive state apparatus was the establishment of a 
secret police. The Stroessner regime created a secret police which was allegedly 
controlled by the ministry of the interior. In fact, the Department of Investigation was 
believed to be a front for the secret police (Lewis 1980, 128). This secret police force was 
believed to be headquartered in Asunción, and regularly intimidated or eliminated 
opponents of the regime (Bryce 1986, 30). This secret police was given the task of 
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countering opposition guerrilla groups within the country and even outside of the country 
(Lewis 1980, 89). The regime was most brutal against guerilla groups comprised of 
members from exiled opposition parties or communists, which were the most despised by 
the regime. In some instances, guerilla leaders were assassinated, often while they were 
in other countries; captured guerilla fighters were executed on the spot or tortured for 
information and then executed (Lewis 1980, 89). Many members of the opposition or 
political prisoners were also commonly tortured and it is suspected that many died while 
in the custody of the secret police (Nickson 1988, 241).  
 The Stroessner regime used repressive tactics to constrain the opposition. Some 
argue that the Stroessner strategy to retain power was fairly simple. Roett argues that the 
Stroessner regime either co-opted potential opposition or repressed it, sometimes in a 
brutal manner (1989, 128). Saguier (1979) referred to the Stroessner years as a “culture of 
fear.” The regime’s reliance on repression frequently violated political rights and civil 
liberties. Social protest movements (usually among peasants and students) were 
efficiently stifled (Nickson 1988, 240). Those that criticized the regime experienced 
harassment and sometimes outright repression. University students were among the most 
outspoken critics of the regime. However, constant police harassment and outlawing 
demonstrations at universities often prevented the opposition from coalescing around 
them (Roett 1989, 135). While the regime had excellent strategies to maintain control 
internally, it was also successful at fighting off guerilla encounters.  
The Stroessner regime was also adept in military style conflict. The regime’s 
armed forces were especially capable of crushing guerrilla warfare. By the time 
Stroessner took over, many on the losing side of the civil war had somewhat recovered 
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from the shock of losing. In fact, the Liberal party and the Febreristas were making plans 
to invade the country (Lewis 1980, 72). Brutal repression was often used on communists 
and exiled political leaders conspiring to wage conflict against the regime. In fact, the 
regime crushed communists or the Partido Communista Paraguayo (PCP) in the early 
years of the regime (1959-1963) (Treherne 1982, 68). To maintain control the Stroessner 
regime also relied heavily on regime cohesion.  
 
Regime Cohesion Partisan Identities 
When Stroessner took over, cohesion in the government was not abundant, even 
among the dominant Colorado party. With the exception of 1904-1936, in which the 
Liberal Party dominated, the Colorado party has maintained a dominant position in 
Paraguay’s politics. Historically, the Colorado party and the Paraguayan military 
operated separately. The president of Paraguay was usually the president of the dominant 
party at the time, but the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces was usually 
reserved for a separate individual. In contrast to past modes of operation, Stroessner 
linked the Colorado party and the key elements of the military. Through crafty political 
maneuvering Stroessner eventually became the Colorado party president and maintained 
the position of Paraguay’s Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Under Stroessner, 
the Colorado party was converted into a highly cohesive political machine, which in turn 
made the ruling regime highly cohesive and organized. 
Though it was not the only factor in regime cohesion, the Stroessner regime relied 
on patronage. The Stroessner regime limited the growth of the opposition by constructing 
extensive patronage networks. These networks coopted moderate elites and even 
extended the state’s reach into civil society. The Colorado party truly worked 
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tremendously as a patronage system since it had many ancillary organizations including 
professional associations, student clubs, women’s organizations, and peasant groups 
(Snyder 1992, 390). The extensive network of the Colorado party branches or seccionales 
was highly organized throughout the country, including in rural areas and among the 
masses. This network served as the regime’s major system of patronage and the regime’s 
mechanism for keeping an eye on the political opposition (Nickson 1998, 240).  
For most of Stroessner’s tenure many of the military leaders in Paraguay 
maintained a very low profile and showed unwavering support for Stroessner (Nickson 
1988, 257). Those who supported Stroessner were rewarded for their loyalty. Such 
supporters could easily find ways to enrich themselves. Military officers were given 
many opportunities to supplement their incomes through smuggling (Hicks 1971, 99-
100). Stroessner, for example, allowed many of his generals to enrich themselves through 
contraband that was carried across the borders of both Brazil and Argentina (Bryce 1986, 
30). Many in the opposition were co-opted or rewarded handsomely. Beginning in 1963, 
some opposition parties became legalized. More importantly, many opposition members 
slowly became intrigued by benefits of becoming members of the legislature. For 
example, members of the legislature were granted lucrative salaries (Nickson 1988, 241). 
Nevertheless, the Stroessner regime did not rely on patronage alone to maintain regime 
cohesion. 
Strong partisan identities played a key role in regime cohesion. The Colorado 
party was a political party with traditions, heroes, symbols, and mass loyalty. Party 
identification in Paraguay is a relatively serious matter. Party identification even borders 
on the primordial. Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, a Colorado party leader, explains it clearly 
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and beautifully:  
When I came into the world, you were born in Paraguay a Liberal or a Colorado. 
Just as in the United States, with its blacks and whites, partisan prejudice was 
absolute and it was impossible to imagine someone of Liberal origins turning into 
a Colorado or vice-versa. (quoted in Lewis 1980, 146) 
 
The propensity to align one’s loyalties to a political party or leader is a strong force in 
Paraguay. In Paraguay, party identification is universal and commonplace. During the 
Stroessner era, membership was often perceived as a lifetime commitment. Surveys 
performed during the Stroessner era reveal that when asked about changing parties, three-
quarters of respondents had not even contemplated the idea (Nichols 1968). Some 
individuals selected friends and marriage partners based on parties (Nichols 1968). 
Membership is passed down from generation to generation, and family feuds tied to party 
identification are passed down for years (Hicks 1971). This notion of partisan identities is 
only amplified when rival political parties and factions within those parties engage in 
violent conflict.  
 Paraguay’s history is brimming with contentious party politics. Prior to Stroessner 
taking power via military coup, Paraguay’s main political parties engaged in a civil war. 
Not surprisingly, rigid animosity existed between the ruling Colorado party and 
opposition parties. Many members of the Colorado party hated the idea of a non-
Colorado at the head of the government and would not accept this outcome. Paul Sondrol 
notes that one of the key elements of the regime’s success included loyalty to the persona 
of Stroessner, but part of the regime’s success centered on virulent nationalism, that 
bordered xenophobia and contentious party politics (1997, 113).  
The Stroessner regime also created a political environment that served the 
Colorado party. Consider for example that admission to Paraguay’s military officer corps 
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was restricted to children of Colorado families (Arditi 1987). Moreover, officials serving 
in the armed forces were strongly encouraged to become official members of the 
Colorado party (Arditi 1987). In many cases, access to employment in the public sector 
or public enterprises such as teaching, university, state hospital, or the judiciary was 
reserved for Colorado party members (Arditi 1987). Despite party members’ loathing for 
other parties, the Colorado party had endless bouts of bickering and factionalism within 
the party. In fact, the notion of partisan identities went beyond the quarrels between 
parties and even existed within parties.  
 Several factions existed within the Colorado party when Stroessner took power. In 
the years prior to Stroessner’s takeover, the Colorado party factions engaged in serious 
quarrels that even led to factions orchestrating coups on Colorado party presidents. 
Stroessner evolved into a masterful technician in party politics. In some instances, 
Stroessner used this factionalism to his advantage to slowly get rid of factions that did not 
initially support him. The Stroessner regime pitted these factions against each other, 
eliminating them from the government one by one. Stroessner succeeded in this endeavor 
and did something that no other Paraguayan president had ever done: gain complete 
control of both the military and the Colorado party. Eventually, the Paraguayan 
government and the Colorado party was filled with Stroessner’s people.  
 Overall, Stroessner eliminated three major factions within the Colorado party. 
Nicknamed after their leader Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, the epifanistas faction was the 
first to be eliminated (Lewis 1980). Stroessner played off the epifanistas against another 
Colorado party faction, the democráticos. As the name of the faction suggests, the 
democráticos were in favor of more liberalization in Paraguay (Lewis 1982). Neither 
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faction truly supported Stroessner as president and viewed the regime as temporary 
(Lewis 1980, 73). The epifanistas’ strategy was to use Stroessner to get rid of the 
democráticos and then work to undermine him (Lewis 1980, 74). Nevertheless, a botched 
coup attempt in 1955 by the epifanistas led to the arrest or exile of many in the faction 
(Lewis 1980, 84). Not long after, the democráticos were purged from the party and 
government in 1959. Once again, Stroessner played faction against faction.  
Led by Edgar Ynsfran, another faction in the Colorado party had a serious feud 
with the democráticos. Though Ynsfran’s faction was small, members of the faction 
controlled crucial cabinet posts. In particular, Ynsfran was the minister of the interior, 
and one of the faction’s followers, Ramón Duarte Vera, was the chief of the government 
police (Lewis 1980, 92). The purging of the democráticos was sparked by an incident in 
which several congressmen from the democráticos faction were imprisoned and beaten 
by the police. In the subsequent session of Congress, the democráticos demanded the 
dismissal of Ynsfran and Duarte, and the democráticos even disobeyed a direct order 
from Stroessner to adjourn Congress (Lewis 1980, 1993). The Stroessner regime turned 
the incident into an opportunity to purge the faction. Given their feud, the Ynsfran faction 
was willing to execute this purge of the democráticos. Overall, hundreds of democráticos 
were taken into custody rather swiftly, and this purge caught many of the democráticos 
off-guard (Lewis 1980, 94). The leadership in the democrático faction was exiled and 
some politicians were sent to prison. By 1960, there was only one faction that the 
Stroessner regime saw as potentially threatening. 
The Stroessner regime relied on Ynsfran tremendously, but an international 
scandal and Ynsfran’s alleged interest in the presidency eventually led to the purging of 
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his faction. Duarte Vera, the government police chief and Ynsfran’s right hand man, was 
involved in an embezzlement scandal involving German embezzlers, Interpol, and the 
West German embassy (Lewis 1980, 98). The scandal was also connected to others 
within the police force and the ministry of the interior (Lewis 1980, 98). Essentially, 
many in Ynsfran’s power base were connected to the scandal and placed under arrest. 
Given the predicament and lost support, Ynsfran resigned from his post as minister of the 
interior. After Ynsfran’s faction dwindled in 1966, those left in the Paraguayan 
government followed the Stroessner regime with conviction. The Colorado party was no 
longer divided by factions. In fact, everyone in the government was a stroessnerista and 
readily devoted to the Stroessner regime. A major reason why Stroessner was successful 
at eliminating rival factions was that the means of repression within the state were under 
direct control of the Stroessner regime.  
When Stroessner rose to power, rival factions had some influence within the 
military. Howbeit, the Stroessner regime eventually replaced top military posts with 
officers that were expected to support the regime in times of crisis. When it comes to 
regime cohesion, the effects of violent origins were present in Stroessner’s regime. Years 
of conflict distinctly shaped the Paraguayan military forces. Consider for example that 
over three quarters of military officers participated on the losing side of the civil war 
(Lewis 1980). This only left a few military officers in power. One side-effect of this was 
that many of these men knew each other quite well (Lewis 1980, 70). They knew each 
other’s strong points and weaknesses, but more importantly, most officers knew who they 
could or could not trust. In addition, many of the government positions were given to 
Stroessner’s supporters, protégés, and military friends.  
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For example, the Stroessner cabinet was filled with old army comrades. 
Stroessner’s most loyal, trusted, and longest tenured ministers were military men (Lewis 
1980, 119). Many of these individuals fought with Stroessner during several of 
Paraguay’s violent conflicts (i.e., Chaco War, civil war, military coups). Stroessner 
personally chose military officers that had supported him in the various coups that 
Stroessner orchestrated on behalf of the Colorado party (Lewis 1980, 75). In addition, 
The Colorado party’s leadership committee, referred to as the junta de gobierno, was 
filled with Stroessner’s old army buddies as well. The Stroessner regime also cultivated 
younger generations of leaders. Stroessner personally vetted many of the officers up for 
promotion in the military, and only those personally chosen by Stroessner rose to 
prominent positions in the military (Lewis 1980). Overall, the regime’s repressive 
apparatus was strengthened by strong partisan identities.  
 
Conclusion 
The Stroessner regime initially started out as closed or fully authoritarian. 
Paraguay began to transition towards electoral authoritarianism from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s. Electoral authoritarianism remained until 1989 when Stroessner lost power. 
In this time span, multiparty elections were held every five years and the opposition was 
legally allowed to compete. In presidential elections Stroessner’s victory usually felt 
certain, but the opposition could win some seats in the legislature. Nonetheless, 
Stroessner’s Colorado party dominated the legislature. International factors contributed to 
liberalization in Paraguay. Among the most notable, US pressure and influence 
contributed to liberalizing reforms in Paraguay. Despite pressures to liberalize, Paraguay 
did not fully democratize. The durability of authoritarianism in Paraguay is tied to the 
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effects of violent origins.  
The Stroessner regime came to power via a violent military coup, but Paraguay 
had experienced years of bloody conflict beforehand. A civil war and series of coups and 
counter coups took their toll. Years of conflict left opposition parties weak and left the 
country with a thirst for stability. The Stroessner regime had the opportunity to strengthen 
a repressive state apparatus in such circumstances, which contributed tremendously to the 
regime’s hold on power. The effects of violent origins also contributed to strong regime 
cohesion. Conflict among parties and even party factions amplified the effects of partisan 
identities. Several supported the Stroessner regime because years of conflict intensified 
resentment for the opposition. Such supporters followed the Stroessner regime with 
extreme loyalty. The Stroessner regime filled the most important government positions 
with these followers. Overall, conflict fatigue and instability gave the regime the 
opportunity build a capable and repressive state apparatus. The combination of a 
repressive state apparatus and high regime cohesion allowed the regime to maintain 
power even in the face of liberalizing and democratic pressures.  
 
 





















     
Summary of Main Arguments 
Electoral authoritarian regimes are not exactly fully democratic, nor are they fully 
authoritarian. Democratic institutions exist, but incumbent regimes utilize authoritarian 
practices to limit the success of the opposition. The literature on electoral 
authoritarianism or even hybrid regimes has mostly focused on the characteristics of such 
regimes, but less attention has been devoted to how and why these regimes emerge. In 
this study, I examined the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Specifically, I 
examined a variety of factors and explanations that relate to the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism.  
The emergence of electoral authoritarianism is due to several factors. However, I 
find that regime origins matter. The main argument of this study is that electoral 
authoritarianism is associated with violent origins. Violent origins refer to revolutions, 
civil wars, insurgencies, or military coups. Violent origins are not the only explanation 
for the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism can emerge 
from different conditions and contexts. Even so, violent origins are an important factor. 
Violent origins do not have liberalizing effects. The effects of violent origins 
increase the durability of authoritarianism. Violent regime origins are likely to create 
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environments that foster authoritarian durability. Regimes that arise from violent origins 
are likely to have strong repressive capabilities. The regime can utilize a repressive 
apparatus to employ authoritarian practices. Additionally, strong regime cohesion is 
another effect of violent origins. Partisan identities are reinforced during violent conflicts. 
These partisan identities become difficult to shake and contribute to regime cohesion. 
Finally, regimes that arise from violent conflicts have an advantage due to the fact that 
the country is likely fatigued from conflict and the fact that opposition forces are likely at 
their weakest. This fatigue brings forth tolerance and may even bring forth legitimacy if 
the regime can stabilize the country. Even if tolerance and legitimacy are short-lived, it 
still gives the regime an opportunity to build regime cohesion and a capable state 
apparatus. These effects increase authoritarian durability.   
Though the pressure to liberalize can certainly stem from domestic sources, I find 
that the pressure to liberalize can come from the international environment. In some 
instances, states have enough leverage to avoid the pressures to liberalize altogether, and 
in such instances, regimes are likely to remain closed or fully authoritarian. In other 
circumstances, states may not have enough leverage to avoid the pressure to liberalize 
and democratic reforms are implemented. When the characteristics of authoritarianism 
are not durable, states are likely to fully democratize. In contrast, when authoritarian 
durability is high, authoritarian practices will linger despite democratic reforms. In such 
instances, the result is electoral authoritarianism. Overall, I find evidence that violent 








In Chapter 6, the relationship between electoral authoritarianism and violent 
origins is examined through large-N analysis. Two types of analyses were conducted, 
logistic regression analysis and multinomial regression analysis. The results of the 
logistic regression analysis showed that violent origins are associated with electoral 
authoritarianism. Some caveats arise when the measure for violent origins was 
disaggregated into violent origin types. For example, although the revolutions/civil wars 
covariate had a positive relationship with electoral authoritarianism, it was not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, military coups were positively and 
significantly associated with electoral authoritarianism. Robustness checks revealed 
similar results.  
 Multinomial regression analysis was also utilized in Chapter 6 and several 
conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, there is the interesting fact that violent 
origins affect the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism and democracy differently. 
When it comes to electoral authoritarianism, violent origins increase the likelihood and 
the odds of its emergence. In contrast, violent origins decrease the likelihood and the 
odds of full democratization. When the violent origin variable was disaggregated into 
violent origin types, the results were similar. Military coups increased the likelihood of 
electoral authoritarianism, but decreased the likelihood of democracy. Even though 
revolutions/civil wars did not a have a statistically significant relation with electoral 
authoritarianism, revolutions/civil wars reduced the likelihood and the odds of 
democracy. These results support the notion that violent origins do not have liberalizing 
effects. Violent origins are positively associated with electoral authoritarianism because 
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their effects prevent closed or fully authoritarian regimes from fully democratizing. These 
results support the claim that violent origins are associated with authoritarian durability.  
The effects of violent origins are further illustrated in the case of Nicaragua. 
Additionally, the case of Nicaragua illustrated how the international environment can be 
a major factor in bringing liberalization. The FSLN or the Sandinistas rose to power 
through a violent revolution in 1979. Electoral authoritarianism emerged in Nicaragua in 
the 1980s. Democratic reforms were implemented, but the regime still utilized 
authoritarian practices. Multiparty elections took place in 1984 and in 1990. Before both 
elections the Sandinistas employed repressive tactics and strived to create an uneven 
electoral playing field for the opposition. Though not the only factor, international 
pressure played a role in the liberalization that took place during the 1980s. Despite 
liberalization, full democratization did not materialize because the Sandinista regime had 
strong authoritarian durability. The effects of a violent revolutionary origin helped bolster 
the regime’s authoritarian characteristics.  
The effects of violent origins are present in the case of Nicaragua. After deposing 
the brutal dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza, the Sandinistas enjoyed some initial 
legitimacy. Though the Sandinistas did not gain tolerance from the opposition, the 
opposition was initially weak and demoralized after defeat. Eventually the Contras 
carried on the conflict, but the revolutionary victory gave the Sandinistas the opportunity 
to build a strong regime. The Sandinistas developed a strong political party and a strong 
repressive apparatus. Regime cohesion was bolstered by Sandinista partisan identities. 
Important government posts were given to individuals that were tied to the revolutionary 
struggle and possessed strong Sandinista principles and ideologies. Despite the dreary 
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circumstances of a civil war and slow economy, the FSLN experienced little to no 
dissension. The effects of violent origins allowed the Sandinista regime to implement 
authoritarian practices. The regime did not have enough leverage to avoid international 
pressures to liberalize, and by holding elections the regime risked losing power. Quite 
surprisingly, the ultimate risk materialized in 1990 when the Sandinistas lost the elections 
to the opposition.  
The case of Paraguay also illustrates the effects of violent origins. Moreover, in 
the case of Paraguay the international dimension played a momentous role in the 
liberalization process. In 1954, Alfredo Stroessner came to power in Paraguay via a 
violent military coup. The regime was initially closed and fully authoritarian, but 
Paraguay eventually transitioned into electoral authoritarianism. Electoral 
authoritarianism developed in the late 1960s to early 1970s. Electoral authoritarian status 
continued until the end of Stroessner’s tenure in 1989. The opposition was allowed to 
compete in the electoral process, but the ruling regime dominated the electoral process. 
The odds of winning the presidency were extremely low. When it comes to the 
liberalization process, the US played a momentous role. The Stroessner regime relied 
heavily on US support. Beginning with the Kennedy administration, the US pressured the 
Stroessner regime into implementing some democratic reforms. Despite experiencing 
some pressure, Paraguay did not fully democratize because the Stroessner regime could 
still utilize authoritarian practices.    
In Paraguay, the effects of violent origins were clearly present. The effects of a 
violent regime origin contributed to the durability of authoritarianism. After years of 
violent conflict, Paraguay was longing for some stability when Stroessner came to power. 
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The Stroessner regime earned some legitimacy when it brought some stability to the 
country. The regime even gained some tolerance from the weakened and demoralized 
opposition. Rising to power after a violent conflict gave the Stroessner regime an 
opportunity to solidify its power, and the regime maintained a capable repressive 
apparatus. Since Paraguay’s regime transitions were often tied to violent conflict, the 
Stroessner regime knew it needed to organize a capable repressive force. The regime’s 
repressive apparatus was highly capable and effective at curtailing the opposition. Strong 
partisan identities played an important role in regime cohesion. In Paraguay, party 
identification was the main source of partisan identities. In particular, party identification 
was bolstered by contentious politics and violent conflicts. Despite the implementation of 
democratic reforms, the regime carried out authoritarian practices. This authoritarian 
durability was augmented by the effects of a violent regime origin.  
In both case studies international factors played a crucial role in the liberalization 
process. In fact, an important finding of this study is that the international factors or the 
international environment do indeed affect the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. 
In Chapter 5 the relationship between electoral authoritarianism and the international 
environment was examined. The logistic regression results indicate that the post-Cold 
War era is positively associated with electoral authoritarianism. Other international 
factors were also important. For example, strong linkages with the West also increased 
the likelihood of electoral authoritarianism. Good relations with the US increased the 
likelihood and the odds of electoral authoritarianism. Furthermore, good relations with 
Western countries or international organizations increased the likelihood of electoral 
authoritarianism. These findings were supported by the results of the multinomial 
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analysis. Electoral authoritarianism and democracy were positively associated with the 
post-Cold War era. Additionally, positive relations with the US increased the likelihood 
and odds of both electoral authoritarianism and democracy. These results indicate that 
international factors contribute to the liberalization of full authoritarian regimes.  
Some secondary findings are also found in this study. In Chapter 5, I analyzed the 
relationship between economic development and electoral authoritarianism. The results 
were somewhat ambiguous. In the analyses conducted, only minimal support was found 
for the notion that economic development affects electoral authoritarianism. Logistic 
regression analysis did not reveal strong support for the notion that economic 
development affects electoral authoritarianism. Multinomial regression analysis also 
revealed ambiguous results. Many of the development covariates were not consistently 
significant across all of the model specifications. Given such results, it is difficult to 
make any clear conclusions at this point. Therefore, more research should be conducted 
on the economic development and electoral authoritarian relationship. 
 
Implications and Future Research  
Several implications can be drawn from this study. This study provides evidence 
that international factors or the international environment contribute to liberalization or 
openings in regimes, but the effects of violent origins ultimately reduce the chances of 
full liberalization or democracy. The effects of the post-Cold War environment seem to 
matter. International constraints and incentives are strongly associated with liberalization. 
The promotion of democracy can be accomplished through an international route. The 
international dimension of regime change is a momentous factor. Another implication of 
this study is that regime origins matter. An examination of regime origins gives us 
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insights into the mechanisms of regime change. The notion of violent origins merits 
crucial attention in future research endeavors. 
The findings in this dissertation prompt further questions that can be addressed in 
future research projects. Since the results are ambiguous in this study, the relationship 
between economic development and electoral authoritarianism may require more 
attention. More large-N analyses with different indicators of economic development may 
garner more promising results. In addition, in depth-case studies that examine this 
relationship could also be promising.  
This study reveals some promising insights on the concept of violent origins, but 
more research is necessary. One possible route for future research involves more analysis 
of case studies. There are several other cases of electoral authoritarian regimes that arose 
through violent origins. States such as Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Zimbabwe 
represent only a few cases in the African region. In the Asian region, states such as 
Taiwan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia could be interesting cases. Another interesting case-
study route involves examining cases that experienced a violent origin but eventually 
transitioned directly into democracy. To my knowledge, the case of Chile under the 
regime of Augusto Pinochet best fits this description.    
An examination of such cases would provide interesting findings and further 
clarify the relationship between violent origins and electoral authoritarianism. In depth 
cases studies that utilize first-person resources and accounts would be extremely useful. 
Such accounts could increase our understanding of how the causal mechanisms or the 
effects of violent origins function. Future research on violent origins can also examine the 
causal mechanisms or the effects of violent origins more closely. If possible, the specific 
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mechanisms of violent origins could be examined through large-N research. For example, 
large-N research studying the effects of regime cohesion and partisan identities would 
reveal interesting results. Theoretically, more causal mechanisms of violent origins could 
also be uncovered. Perhaps violent origins have more effects than the ones analyzed in 
this study.  
 Another path for future research requires us to review the underlying goal of this 
study: explaining the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. The explanations provided 
in this dissertation are likely only a part of the puzzle. Electoral authoritarianism emerges 
from a variety of contexts, and violent origins are not a prerequisite to the emergence of 
electoral authoritarianism. This study has focused on the emergence of electoral 
authoritarianism from fully or closed authoritarian states. However, electoral 
authoritarianism can also emerge from democracies that backslide into authoritarianism. 
There are more explanations that can be explored. When it comes to the question of 
electoral authoritarianism, violent origins are only part of the answer. More research is 
certainly necessary. However, I can conclude that violent origins are an important part of 




























































Operational definition of democracy is based of Freedom House’s annual reports 
on Freedom in the World. Regimes that obtain political rights (PR) scores of 3 or lower 
are classified as democracies. Rule of exception applies with gaps of 2 points or more (≥ 
2) between Freedom House political rights scores (PR) and Freedom House civil liberties 
(CL) scores (with CL > PR). Generally, Freedom House evaluations of political rights 
and civil liberties closely match and do not usually diverge by more than one point. 
Regimes that received political rights scores of 3, but civil liberties ratings of 5 (or 
higher), were deemed illiberal enough to be included in the data set (rather than to be 
excluded as democracies). Examples: Sierra Leone in 1998-1999, Burundi in 2005, and 
Mozambique in 1994. For an illustrative explanation of the measuring process please 
refer to Figure A.1. 
 
Fully or Closed Authoritarian Regimes 
 Operational definition of closed authoritarianism is based on Freedom House’s 
annual reports on Freedom in the World. Regimes that obtain political rights (PR) scores 
of 7 are classified as fully authoritarian and are coded as autocracies in the dataset. 
 Rule of exception applies with gaps of 2 points or more (≥ 2) between Freedom 
House political rights scores (PR) and Freedom House civil liberties (CL) scores (with 
PR > CL). Regimes that received a PR score of 7, but a CL score of 5 (or lower), were 
deemed liberal enough to be coded as electoral authoritarian (instead of fully 
authoritarian). Examples: Cameroon 1997, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) 1997-
1998, Central African Republic 2003, Guinea 2008, Niger 1996-1998, Nigeria 1993, 
Swaziland 2003-2013, and Togo 1993. 
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 In order to classify a regime as electoral authoritarian three requirements must be 
met. The first, requirement is based on Freedom House’s annual reports on Freedom in 
the World. In order to be considered electoral authoritarian, regimes must obtain political 
rights (PR) scores in the range of 4-6 (unless one of the rule exceptions apply). In 
addition to the first requirement, regimes must fit a specific timeframe (outlined below) 
in order to be classified as electoral authoritarian. Finally, in addition to the first two 
requirements, regimes must also have multiparty competition during election years.  
 
Regime Timeframe 
 The notion of a political regime implies some type of continuity. Cases were 
coded as electoral authoritarian only if the state remained within the specified range of 
PR scores (4-6 unless rules of exception apply) for at least four consecutive years, 
including an election year. Elections could be at the beginning, middle, or the end of this 
four-year time frame. Additionally, since some countries hold elections every 5 or even 6 
years apart, a regime timeframe can extend beyond four years as long as the following 
requirements are met. 
1. The years for the regime timeframe have Freedom House PR scores in the 4-6 
range, or the specified range for electoral authoritarianism. 
2. The first year of the regime timeframe is at least within four years of an election 
(e.g., if timeframe begins in 1991, the election year is no later than 1994 or four 
years since the beginning of 1991). 
3. The regime timeframe can be extended until a country no longer fits the specified 
range of PR scores and/or the last election did not meet the multiparty 
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competition requirements. (e.g., timeframe begins in 1991 and ends in 1999 
because the country was not under the specified PR range score in the year 2000 
and/or the country’s election year 2000 did not fit the multiparty competition 
requirements). 
4. Examples: Algeria 1999-2006 with elections in 1999, 2002, and 2004; Lesotho 
1995-2001 with election in 1998. 
 
Multiparty Competition 
 For a regime to be classified as electoral authoritarian an election must occur 
during the regime timeframe. The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy 
(NELDA) is utilized to determine whether a country allowed multiparty competition 
during such elections. The variables in the NELDA dataset are labeled numerically as 
“NELDA1,” “NELDA2,” “NELDA3,” and so on. Specifically, three variables are 
utilized for this study. 
 NELDA3: Was opposition allowed? This variable indicates if at least one 
opposition political party existed to contest the election. An opposition party refers to a 
political party that is not affiliated with the government. This variable is coded as “Yes” 
if opposition is allowed, while it is coded as “No” if opposition is not allowed. 
 NELDA4: Was more than one party legal? This variable indicates if multiple 
political parties are legal. A well-organized opposition party may exist, but it may not be 
legal. Therefore, the party is prevented from competing in elections. This variable is 
coded as “Yes” if more than one political party was legal, and the variable was coded as 
“No” if more than one political party was not legal. 
NELDA13: Were opposition leaders prevented from running? This variable is 
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similar to the NELDA3 variable, but it is different in that it measures whether any 
specific opposition candidates were explicitly prevented from running. This variable is 
coded as “Yes” when at least some opposition candidates are prevented from running. 
This variable is coded “No” when such restrictions did not occur.  
In order to classify as electoral authoritarian, multiparty competition had to occur. 
To determine whether multiparty competition took place I examined all three NELDA 
variables for each case. Cases were classified as electoral authoritarian only if the 
NELDA variables were coded as followed: 
1. NELDA3 (Was opposition allowed): Yes 
2. NELDA4 (Was more than one party legal): Yes 
3. NELDA13 (Were opposition leaders prevented from running): No 
A case had to fit all three NELDA requirements for it to be classified as electoral 
authoritarian. Even when only one of the NELDA requirements was not met, the case 
was classified as authoritarian. The exception to this rule is Uganda from 1993-2005 
because the Ugandan constitution called for a no party system. This made the answer for 
NELDA4 not applicable since all types of parties (not just the opposition) were illegal. In 
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